66 found
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  1.  45
    John O. Nelson (1986). The Burial and Resurrection of Hume's Essay. Hume Studies 12 (1):57-76.
    I TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY THE "ESSAY OF MIRACLES" DID NOT APPEAR IN THE "TREATISE" BUT DID IN THE "ENQUIRY". I ARGUE THAT THE ESSAY WAS ORIGINALLY DIRECTED AGAINST REVEALED KNOWLEDGE; SO DIRECTED, IT FITTED INTO THE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED PROGRAM OF THE "TREATISE", BUT HAD TO BE SUPPRESSED FOR PRUDENTIAL REASONS. RECONSTRUCTED AS AN ESSAY DIRECTED MERELY AGAINST NON-SCRIPTURAL MIRACLES ITS APPEARANCE IN THE "ENQUIRY" PRESENTED NO PHILOSOPHICAL OR PRUDENTIAL DIFFICULTIES.
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  2.  66
    John O. Nelson (1964). I Know That Here Is a Hand. Analysis 24 (6):185 - 190.
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  3.  54
    John O. Nelson (1975). Some Experiential Incoherencies of Riemannian Space. Philosophia Mathematica (1):66-75.
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  4.  49
    John O. Nelson (1966). Tastes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (4):537-545.
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  5.  45
    John O. Nelson (1962). Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable? Analysis 22 (3):59 - 65.
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  6.  13
    John O. Nelson (1962). Mr. Hochberg on Moore. Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):119-132.
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  7.  17
    John O. Nelson (1984). Wittgenstein. Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):380-382.
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  8.  24
    John O. Nelson (1989). Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-Viewed. Hume Studies 15 (2):353-363.
  9.  8
    John O. Nelson (1961). Y-Propositions. Philosophical Studies 12 (5):65 - 72.
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  10.  15
    John O. Nelson (1964). An Inconsistency in “Dreaming”. Philosophical Studies 15 (3):33 - 35.
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  11.  17
    John O. Nelson (1987). A Berkeleian Reading of Hume's Treatise, Book I. Philosophy Research Archives 13:245-269.
    In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...)
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  12.  52
    John O. Nelson (1954). In Defense of the Traditional Interpretation of the Square. Philosophical Review 63 (3):401-413.
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  13.  12
    John O. Nelson (1964). The Conclusion of Book One, Part Four, of Hume's Treatise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):512-521.
  14.  26
    John O. Nelson (1990). Was Aristotle a Functionalist? Review of Metaphysics 43 (4):791 - 802.
  15.  11
    John O. Nelson (1991). The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited. Hume Studies 17 (1):83-86.
  16.  10
    John O. Nelson (1964). A Question of Entailment. Review of Metaphysics 18 (2):364 - 377.
    A r anderson and n d belnap, Jr., Maintained in their 1962 article, "the pure calculus of entailment," that necessary propositions can be entailed only by necessary propositions, And not by contingent ones. Against this r w ashby offered an apparently conclusive counterexample in "entailment and modality" (1963). In support of anderson and belnap, The author of the present paper develops a definition of entailment and argues that contingent propositions never entail necessary ones. However, Psychological factors may intervene in our (...)
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  17.  4
    John O. Nelson (1964). I Know That Here is a Band. Analysis 24 (6):185.
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  18.  9
    John O. Nelson (1965). A Groat's Worth More on Moore's Assertion. Analysis 26 (1):32 -.
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  19.  5
    John O. Nelson (1988). The Role of Part XII in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume Studies 14 (2):347-371.
  20.  9
    John O. Nelson (1976). Has the Authorship of an Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature Really Been Decided? Philosophical Quarterly 26 (102):82-91.
  21.  19
    John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique. Philosophy 68 (266):473 - 482.
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  22.  17
    John O. Nelson (1963). Zeno's Paradoxes on Motion. Review of Metaphysics 16 (3):486 - 490.
    The author argues that, Although zeno's paradoxes on motion cannot be resolved in their own terms, They are nonetheless illegitimate. Examining the paradox of achilles and the tortoise, He finds that the mechanism of zeno's argument consists in an equivocal concept of motion characterized at once by a constant rate and by proportionate segments of movement. He then contends it is illegitimate to treat the concept of motion and its subconcepts like the postulates of a deductive system. However, That the (...)
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  23.  3
    John O. Nelson (1982). Does Physics Lead to Berkeley?: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 57 (219):91-103.
    Russell said that physics drove him to a position not unlike that of Berkeley —by which he meant subjectivism or solipsism. ‘As regards metaphysics’, he tells us in his Autobiography , ‘when, under the influence of Moore, I first threw off the belief in German idealism, I experienced the delight of believing that the sensible world is real. Bit by bit, chiefly under the influence of physics, this delight has faded, and I have been driven to a position not unlike (...)
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  24.  22
    John O. Nelson (1969). How is Non-Metaphysics Possible? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (2):219-237.
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  25.  14
    John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
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  26.  10
    John O. Nelson (1989). Are There Inalienable Rights? Philosophy 64 (250):519 - 524.
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  27.  6
    John O. Nelson (1993). A Defense of Masculinism Versus Feminism or, a Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General. Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (3):241-256.
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  28.  6
    John O. Nelson (1995). Pragmatism According to Rorty. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:349-366.
    The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that denies to (...)
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  29.  20
    John O. Nelson (1958). The Confirmation of Hypotheses. Philosophical Review 67 (1):95-100.
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  30.  17
    John O. Nelson (1999). Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of the Tractatus Really Superior to Ogden's and Ramsey's? Philosophical Investigations 22 (2):165–175.
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  31.  12
    John O. Nelson (1963). Modal Logic and the Ontological Proof for God's Existence. Review of Metaphysics 17 (2):235 - 242.
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  32.  14
    John O. Nelson (1990). Against Human Rights. Philosophy 65 (253):341 - 348.
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  33.  14
    John O. Nelson (1978). Is Freedom Only an Extrinsic Good? Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):292-295.
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  34.  5
    John O. Nelson (1958). Knowledge of Remote Existence. Review of Metaphysics 11 (4):569 - 578.
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  35.  8
    John O. Nelson (1984). How and Why Seeing is Not Believing. Philosophy Research Archives 10:117-137.
    In this paper I attempt to show, first, that doxastic theories of seeing must be rejected on at least two counts: paradoxically, they commit us on the one hand to pyrrhonic skepticism and on the other they fail to account for cases of defeasibility that a theory of perceiving ought to account for. So much for the “why”. As for the “how” I attempt to show that a non-doxastic conception of seeing can be formulated, with the aid of theoretic interpretations (...)
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  36.  14
    John O. Nelson (1972). Two Main Questions Concerning Hume's Treatise and Enquiry. Philosophical Review 81 (3):333-350.
  37.  1
    John O. Nelson (1990). Against Human Rights: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 65 (253):341-348.
    Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, (...)
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  38.  8
    John O. Nelson (1972). Philosophers‘ Nonsense. Metaphilosophy 3 (3):238–243.
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  39.  10
    John O. Nelson (1996). In Defence of a Radical Millianism. Philosophy 71 (278):521 - 530.
    In order to by-pass immaterial historical bickering I shall stipulatively mean by ‘Radical Millianism’ just this much more than what Katz in his recent article in The Philosophical Review , ‘Names without Bearers’ , means by the unqualified term, ‘Millianism’; namely, whereas Katz means by ‘Millianism’ that theory of proper names which holds that proper names ‘have no linguistic meaning,’.
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  40.  10
    John O. Nelson (1965). Discussion. Theoria 31 (1):61-63.
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  41.  9
    John O. Nelson (1992). Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution. Philosophy 67 (261):307 - 327.
  42.  12
    John O. Nelson (1985). Is Object-Seeing Really Propositional Seeing? Philosophical Topics 13 (2):231-238.
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  43.  11
    John O. Nelson (1963). The Validation of Memory and Our Conception of a Past. Philosophical Review 72 (January):35-47.
  44.  2
    John O. Nelson (1964). On Sommers' Reinstatement of Russell's Ontological Program. Philosophical Review 73 (4):517-521.
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  45.  3
    John O. Nelson (1980). How Inductive Conclusions Can Be Certain. Philosophical Investigations 3 (3):20-32.
  46.  6
    John O. Nelson (1966). Can One Tell That He is Awake by Pinching Himself? Philosophical Studies 17 (6):81 - 84.
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  47.  1
    John O. Nelson (1962). Mr. Hochberg on Moore: Some Corrections. Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):119 - 132.
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  48.  1
    John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
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  49.  6
    John O. Nelson (1982). Does Physics Lead to Berkeley? Philosophy 57 (219):91 - 103.
  50.  2
    John O. Nelson (1979). "Everyman's Ontological Argument": A Dissident Version. Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):1-8.
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