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  1. Jeff Broome & John O. Nelson (2009). Hume's 'New Scene of Thought' and the Several Faces of David Hume in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Upa.
    This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.
     
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  2. John O. Nelson (1999). Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of the Tractatus Really Superior to Ogden's and Ramsey's? Philosophical Investigations 22 (2):165–175.
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  3. John O. Nelson (1996). In Defence of a Radical Millianism. Philosophy 71 (278):521 - 530.
  4. John O. Nelson (1996). In Defence of a Radical Millianism: John O.Nelson. Philosophy 71 (278):521-530.
    In order to by-pass immaterial historical bickering I shall stipulatively mean by ‘Radical Millianism’ just this much more than what Katz in his recent article in The Philosophical Review , ‘Names without Bearers’ , means by the unqualified term, ‘Millianism’; namely, whereas Katz means by ‘Millianism’ that theory of proper names which holds that proper names ‘have no linguistic meaning,’.
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  5. John O. Nelson (1995). That a Worker's Labour Cannot Be a Commodity. Philosophy 70 (272):157 - 165.
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  6. John O. Nelson (1995). Pragmatism According to Rorty. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:349-366.
    The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that denies to (...)
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  7. John O. Nelson (1995). That a Worker's Labour Cannot Be a Commodity: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 70 (272):157-165.
    There are, no doubt, a variety of reasons, good and bad, why anyone might want to treat a worker's labour, and most people, consciously or unconsciously do, as a commodity.
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  8. John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique. Philosophy 68 (266):473 - 482.
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  9. John O. Nelson (1993). A Defense of Masculinism Versus Feminism or, a Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General. Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (3):241-256.
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  10. John O. Nelson (1993). Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
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  11. John O. Nelson (1992). Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution. Philosophy 67 (261):307 - 327.
  12. John O. Nelson (1992). Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 67 (261):307-327.
    Pre-analytically at least some of our inductions seem to be possessed of rational justification. This comment would apply, for instance, to my present induction, ‘If that climber high on the Flatirons falls he will be killed,’ not to mention such more momentous inductions as, ‘If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out there will be greater destruction than in World War II.’ Notoriously, however, a few Humean reflections seem to strip even the most plausible of our inductions of all possible rational (...)
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  13. John O. Nelson (1991). The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited. Hume Studies 17 (1):83-86.
  14. John O. Nelson (1991). Why Democracy and Rights Do Not Mix. Public Affairs Quarterly 5 (3):269-277.
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  15. Tibor R. Machan & John O. Nelson (1990). A Dialogue Partly on Political Liberty. Upa.
    This work is a classic dialogue between two philosophers, with the unusual twist that it was actually conducted, not fabricated, by two different philosophers. It presents in a conversational tone the various crucial and not so crucial aspects of the topic of political liberty and what if any value it has for us.
     
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  16. John O. Nelson (1990). Against Human Rights. Philosophy 65 (253):341 - 348.
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  17. John O. Nelson (1990). Against Human Rights: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 65 (253):341-348.
    Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, (...)
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  18. John O. Nelson (1990). Was Aristotle a Functionalist? Review of Metaphysics 43 (4):791 - 802.
  19. John O. Nelson (1989). Are There Inalienable Rights? Philosophy 64 (250):519 - 524.
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  20. John O. Nelson (1989). Are There Inalienable Rights?: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 64 (250):519-524.
    In the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights a quite large number of things are said to be ‘human rights’ and though in that Declaration the term ‘inalienable’ is not used to describe the rights in question it has been so used by commentators—at least with respect to some of the rights enumerated. I shall forgo asking the prior question as to whether any such thing as a human right exists and ask simply whether any such thing as an (...)
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  21. John O. Nelson (1989). Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-Viewed. Hume Studies 15 (2):353-363.
  22. John O. Nelson (1988). The Role of Part XII in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume Studies 14 (2):347-371.
  23. John O. Nelson (1987). Brute Animals and Legal Rights. Philosophy 62 (240):171 - 177.
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  24. John O. Nelson (1987). A Berkeleian Reading of Hume's Treatise, Book I. Philosophy Research Archives 13:245-269.
    In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...)
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  25. John O. Nelson (1987). Brute Animals and Legal Rights: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 62 (240):171-177.
    Various proponents of animal rights—for example, H. J. McCloskey— maintain that while brute animals cannot have; moral rights they can have legal rights. Indeed, McCloskey himself goes so far as to maintain that even inanimate objects are able to have legal rights. 1 And why should not inanimate objects be able to? After f all, for there to be a legal right is anything more required than that whatever agency is empowered to issue legal rights simply legislate or proclaim that (...)
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  26. John O. Nelson (1986). The Burial and Resurrection of Hume's Essay. Hume Studies 12 (1):57-76.
    I TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY THE "ESSAY OF MIRACLES" DID NOT APPEAR IN THE "TREATISE" BUT DID IN THE "ENQUIRY". I ARGUE THAT THE ESSAY WAS ORIGINALLY DIRECTED AGAINST REVEALED KNOWLEDGE; SO DIRECTED, IT FITTED INTO THE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED PROGRAM OF THE "TREATISE", BUT HAD TO BE SUPPRESSED FOR PRUDENTIAL REASONS. RECONSTRUCTED AS AN ESSAY DIRECTED MERELY AGAINST NON-SCRIPTURAL MIRACLES ITS APPEARANCE IN THE "ENQUIRY" PRESENTED NO PHILOSOPHICAL OR PRUDENTIAL DIFFICULTIES.
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  27. John O. Nelson (1985). Is Object-Seeing Really Propositional Seeing? Philosophical Topics 13 (2):231-238.
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  28. John O. Nelson (1984). How and Why Seeing is Not Believing. Philosophy Research Archives 10:117-137.
    In this paper I attempt to show, first, that doxastic theories of seeing must be rejected on at least two counts: paradoxically, they commit us on the one hand to pyrrhonic skepticism and on the other they fail to account for cases of defeasibility that a theory of perceiving ought to account for. So much for the “why”. As for the “how” I attempt to show that a non-doxastic conception of seeing can be formulated, with the aid of theoretic interpretations (...)
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  29. John O. Nelson (1984). Wittgenstein. Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):380-382.
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  30. John O. Nelson (1982). Does Physics Lead to Berkeley? Philosophy 57 (219):91 - 103.
  31. John O. Nelson (1982). Propositional Knowledge and Belief: Entailment or Mutual Exclusion? Philosophical Investigations 5 (2):135-141.
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  32. John O. Nelson (1982). Does Physics Lead to Berkeley?: John O. Nelson. Philosophy 57 (219):91-103.
    Russell said that physics drove him to a position not unlike that of Berkeley —by which he meant subjectivism or solipsism. ‘As regards metaphysics’, he tells us in his Autobiography , ‘when, under the influence of Moore, I first threw off the belief in German idealism, I experienced the delight of believing that the sensible world is real. Bit by bit, chiefly under the influence of physics, this delight has faded, and I have been driven to a position not unlike (...)
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  33. John O. Nelson (1980). How Inductive Conclusions Can Be Certain. Philosophical Investigations 3 (3):20-32.
  34. John O. Nelson (1979). "Everyman's Ontological Argument": A Dissident Version. Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):1-8.
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  35. John O. Nelson (1978). Is Freedom Only an Extrinsic Good? Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):292-295.
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  36. John O. Nelson (1976). Has the Authorship of an Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature Really Been Decided? Philosophical Quarterly 26 (102):82-91.
  37. John O. Nelson (1975). Some Experiential Incoherencies of Riemannian Space. Philosophia Mathematica (1):66-75.
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  38. John O. Nelson (1973). Can Systems of Imperceptible Particles Appear to Perceivers? Mind 82 (326):253-257.
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  39. John O. Nelson (1972). Philosophers‘ Nonsense. Metaphilosophy 3 (3):238–243.
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  40. John O. Nelson (1972). Two Main Questions Concerning Hume's Treatise and Enquiry. Philosophical Review 81 (3):333-350.
  41. John O. Nelson (1971). The Function of Government. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):161.
     
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  42. John O. Nelson (1970). Reason and Altruism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):324.
     
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  43. John O. Nelson (1969). How is Non-Metaphysics Possible? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (2):219-237.
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  44. John O. Nelson (1966). Can One Tell That He is Awake by Pinching Himself? Philosophical Studies 17 (6):81 - 84.
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  45. John O. Nelson (1966). Tastes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (4):537-545.
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  46. John O. Nelson (1965). An Examination of Sommers' Truth-Functional Counterfactuals. Theoria 31 (1):61.
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  47. John O. Nelson (1965). A Groat's Worth More on Moore's Assertion. Analysis 26 (1):32 -.
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  48. John O. Nelson (1965). Discussion. Theoria 31 (1):61-63.
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  49. John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
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  50. John O. Nelson (1964). An Inconsistency in “Dreaming”. Philosophical Studies 15 (3):33 - 35.
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