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Profile: John Perry (University of California, Riverside, Stanford University)
  1. Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  2.  14
    John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the first edition -- Introduction -- Contents and propositions -- Utterance and context -- Context and cognitive paths -- Meanings and contents -- Names and the co-reference problem -- Names, networks, and notions -- The no-reference problem -- Pragmatics -- Unarticulated constituents -- Contents and attitudes -- Conclusion.
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  3. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
  4.  61
    John Perry (2001). Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press.
    A defense of antecedent physicalism, which argues against the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings ..
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  5. John Perry (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.
    This collection deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." He includes such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," and "The Prince and the Phone Booth.".
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  6. John Perry (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press.
    A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." Postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," "From Worlds to Situations," and "The Prince and (...)
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  7. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press.
  8. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  9. John Perry (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
  10.  12
    Robin Cooper, Kuniaki Mukai & John Perry (eds.) (1990). Situation Theory and its Applications Vol. Csli.
    Preface This volume represents the proceedings of the First Conference on Situation Theory and Its Applications held by CSLI at Asilomar, California, ...
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  11. John Perry (1979). ``The Problem of the Essential Idexical&Quot. Noûs 13:3-21.
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  12. John Perry (2002). Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  13. John Perry (1986). Thought Without Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 137:137-152.
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  14.  55
    Wesley H. Holliday & John Perry (2014). Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic. In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Trends in Logic, Outstanding Contributions: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer 591-629.
    Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic : Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate logic, implemented formally in Melvin (...)
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  15. John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
    Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...
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  16. John Perry (1997). Indexicals and Demonstratives. In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell 486--612.
    When you use the word “I” it designates you; when I use the same word, it designates me. If you use “you” talking to me, it designates me; when I use it talking to you, it designates you. “I” and “you” are indexicals. The designation of an indexical shifts from speaker to speaker, time to time, place to place. Different utterances of the same indexical designate different things, because what is designated depends not only on the meaning associated with the (...)
     
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  17. John Perry (1970). The Same F. Philosophical Review 79 (2):181-200.
  18. John Perry (1980). A Problem About Continued Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):317.
     
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  19. John Perry (1972). Can the Self Divide? Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):463-88.
  20.  99
    Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):387-404.
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  21. John Perry (1998). Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht.
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  22. John Perry (1988). Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference. Noûs 22 (1):1-18.
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  23.  46
    John Perry (2010). Gentiles and Homosexuals: A Brief History of an Analogy. Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (2):321-347.
    This paper examines the argument that moral approval of homosexuality is analogous to the early church's inclusion of gentiles. The analogy has a long but often overlooked history, dating back to the start of the modern gay-rights movement. It has recently gained greater prominence because of its importance to the Episcopal Church's debate with the wider Anglican Communion. Beginning with the Episcopal Church argument, we see that there are five specific areas most in need of further clarification. In this essay (...)
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  24. John Perry (2003). Predelli's Threatening Note: Contexts, Utterances, and Tokens in the Philosophy of Language. Journal of Pragmatics 35:373--387.
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  25. Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen & John Perry, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to members of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/.
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  26. John Perry (2004). Compatibilist Options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book 231.
    Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of compatibilism by distinguishing (...)
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  27. David J. Israel & John Perry (1990). What is Information? In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press
  28.  42
    John Perry (2008). Can't We All Just Be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer's My Way. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157 - 166.
    My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the "semi" in "semicompatibilism". I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared stalemate rather than victory. In my (...)
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  29.  63
    John Perry (1997). Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names. In W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Csli 3--19.
    It has been persuasively argued by David Kaplan and others that the proposition expressed by statements like (1) is a singular proposition, true in just those worlds in which a certain person, David Israel, is a computer scientist. Call this proposition P . The truth of this proposition does not require that the utterance (1) occur, or even that Israel has ever said anything at all. Marcus, Donnellan, Kripke and others have persuasively argued for a view of proper names that, (...)
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  30.  14
    John Perry (2009). Directing Intentions. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 187--201.
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  31.  77
    Kepa Korta & John Perry (2008). The Pragmatic Circle. Synthese 165 (3):347 - 357.
    Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? Gricean (...)
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  32. John Perry (1998). Indexicals, Contexts and Unarticulated Constituents. In Atocha Aliseda-Llera, Rob J. Van Glabbeek & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Proceedings of the 1995 CSLI-Armsterdam Logic, Language and Computation Conference. CSLI Publications
    Philosophers and logicians use the term “indexical” for words such as “I”, “you” and “tomorrow”. Demonstratives such as “this” and “that” and demonstratives phrases such as “this man” and “that computer” are usually reckoned as a subcategory of indexicals. (Following [Kaplan, 1989a].) The “context-dependence” of indexicals is often taken as a defining feature: what an indexical designates shifts from context to context. But there are many kinds of shiftiness, with corresponding conceptions of context. Until we clarify what we mean by (...)
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  33. John Perry (1996). Evading the Slingshot. In J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Kluwer
    The topic of this essay is “the slingshot,” a short argument that purports to show that sentences1 designate (stand for, refer to) truth values. Versions of this argument have been used by Frege 2, Church 3, Quine4 and Davidson5; thus it is historically important, even if it immediately strikes one as fishy. The argument turns on two principles, which I call substitution and redistribution. In “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,”6 Jon Barwise and I rejected both principles, as part of our (...)
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  34.  71
    Kepa Korta & John Perry (2006). Three Demonstrations and a Funeral. Mind and Language 21 (2):166–186.
    Gricean pragmatics seems to pose a dilemma. If semantics is limited to the conventional meanings of types of expressions, then the semantics of an utterance does not determine what is said. If all that figures in the determination of what is said counts as semantics, then pragmatic reasoning about the specific intentions of a speaker intrudes on semantics. The dilemma is false. Key points: Semantics need not determine what is said, and the description, with which the hearer begins, need not (...)
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  35.  81
    Krista Lawlor & John Perry (2008). Moore's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
    G. E. Moore famously noted that saying 'I went to the movies, but I don't believe it' is absurd, while saying 'I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it' is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of 'believes' changes across first-person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the (...)
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  36.  24
    John Perry (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments, and an Abstract: Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference. Noûs 22 (1):1-18.
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  37.  77
    Jon Barwise & John Perry (1985). Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):105--161.
  38.  56
    Kepa Korta & John Perry (2007). Radical Minimalism, Moderate Contextualism. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press 94--111.
  39. John Perry (1963). Paradoxical Logic. Philosophy East and West 13 (2):155-157.
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  40. John Perry, Frege on Identity, Cognitive Value, and Subject Matter.
    Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work.2 He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework. In the Begriffsschrift Frege’s main semantic concept was content [Inhalt ]. Already in the Begriffsschrift, he is struggling with this concept. In §3 he..
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  41. John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.) (2012). Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Sixth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. The sixth edition includes five new readings--by renowned contemporary philosophers Anthony Brueckner, John Martin Fischer, Alan Goldman, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Thomas Nagel--and additional descriptive material on the authors throughout the book.
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  42. John Perry (ed.) (2008). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
    This volume brings together the vital contributions of distinguished past and contemporary philosophers to the important topic of personal identity. The essays range from John Locke's classic seventeenth-century attempt to analyze personal identity in terms of memory, to twentieth-century defenses and criticisms of the Lockean view by Anthony Quinton, H.P. Grice, Sydney Shoemaker, David Hume, Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid, and Bernard Williams. New to the second edition are Shoemaker's seminal essay "Persons and Their Pasts," selections from the important and previously (...)
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  43.  61
    John Perry (1980). Belief and Acceptance. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):533-542.
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  44.  79
    John Perry (1975). Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity. In Personal Identity. University of California Press
  45.  88
    John Perry (2010). Critical Study Velleman: Self to Self. Noûs 44 (4):740-758.
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  46. John Perry (2011). Textualism and the Discovery of Rights. In Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law. Oxford University Press, Usa 105--129.
     
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  47. John Perry (2006). Stalnaker and Indexical Belief. In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press 204--221.
     
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  48. John Perry (1994). Intentionality and its Puzzles. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
    Intentionality is a term for a feature exhibited by many mental states and activities: being directed at objects. Two related things are meant by this. First, when one desires or believes or hopes, one always believes or desires or hopes something. Let’s assume that belief report 1) is true.
     
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  49. John Perry (2004). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229.
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  50. John Perry (1998). Broadening the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231.
    The main topic of Jerry Fodor’s The Elm and the Expert,1, and the title of the first chapter, is “If Psychological processes are computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?” I focus on the first and second chapters; The first is devoted to setting up the question, the second to answering it.
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