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John F. Post [48]John Post [9]John Frederic Post [2]
  1. John Post, Comments Welcome!
    The terminal philosopher thinks there must always be beliefs or other posits that are terminal: they can neither be justified nor criticized by inference from anything further. In any context whatever, reason giving must at some point leave off - not for practical reasons, such as lack of time, energy or resources, but in principle. No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality. The terminal matters must therefore be justified or criticized non-inferentially - that is to say, (...)
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  2. John Post, Minimal Epistemology: BeyondTerminal Philosophy to Truth (Latest Working Title).
    . In whatever form, terminal philosophy holds that some matters are so fundamental that they are presupposed in any practice of reason-giving; accordingly, if reason-giving were applied to such matters in order to justify them, or even to criticize, then the very attempt to do so would necessarily assume what is at issue, a fatal circularity . No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality ; rational reason-giving must terminate.
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  3. John Post, REVIEW of Beilby, James, Ed., Naturalism Defeated? For Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2002). [REVIEW]
    This collection of eleven critical essays, together with Plantinga's replies, examines his evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). All but one of the eleven are printed here for the first time, all are of high quality, and all receive Plantinga's trademark treatment -- rigorous, perceptive, thorough. In view of the numerous arguments, sub-arguments and observations advanced by the eleven against EAAN, his responses amount to a tour de force . It would take too long to sort through the point-counterpoint with a (...)
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  4. John Post, Using Language to Get Outside Language.
    They say it can't be done . You can't use language to get outside language . The very idea . Thus Putnam : "our language cannot be divided up into two parts, a part that describes the world `as it is anyway,' and a part that describes our conceptual contribution," in order..
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  5. John Post, Why Does Anything at All Exist?
    To ask the question "Why does anything at all exist?" is equivalent to asking "What is the explanation of why anything at all exists." Thus the question presupposes that there is an explanation, known or unknown or unknowable, of why anything at all exists.
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  6. John F. Post (2006). Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing From Below. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1–27.
    David Papineau’s model of scientific reduction, contrary to his intent, appears to enable a naturalist realist account of the primitive normativity involved in a biological adaptation’s being “for” this or that (say the eye’s being for seeing). By disabling the crucial anti-naturalist arguments against any such reduction, his model would support a cognitivist semantics for normative claims like “The heart is for pumping blood, and defective if it doesn’t.” No moral claim would follow, certainly. Nonetheless, by thus “pressing from below” (...)
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  7. John Post (2004). Reply to Gale and Pruss. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):114-121.
    I am indebted to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss for the excellent questions they raise in their separate responses to my comments on Gale's book, On the Nature and Existence of God ."(1) They focus on aspects of my discussion that need at least to be clarified, if not retracted, in ways I hope to explain in what follows. But first let me call attention to a couple of arguments they do not mention.
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  8. John F. Post (2004). Reply to Gale and Pruss. Philo 7 (1):114-121.
    Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss raise a number of excellent questions in their separate responses to my comments on Gale’s book, On the Nature and Existence of God. They focus on aspects of my discussion that need at least to be clarified, if not retracted, in ways I explain in this reply.
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  9. John Post (2003). Method, Madness, and Normativity. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):235-248.
    The method in question is conceptual analysis. The madness comes of its privileging received usage over theories that would revise our concepts so as to conform to the phenomena, not the other way around. The alternatives to capture-the-concept include revisionary theory-construction as practiced not only in the sciences but in some philosophies. I present a revisionary theory of an important kind of normativity -- the normativity involved in a biological adaptation's being for this or that -- which theory, (...)
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  10. John Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):33-48.
    Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim's Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of all propositions. By constructing variants and extensions of Grim's arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale's Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason. I conclude with some brief reflections on (...)
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  11. John F. Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo 6 (1):33-48.
    Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim’s Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of “all propositions.” By constructing variants and extensions of Grim’s arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale’s Weak PSR. I conclude with some brief reflections on method, suggesting that (...)
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  12. John F. Post (2002). Review of James Beilby (Ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8).
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  13. John F. Post (2002). Sense and Supervenience. Philo 4 (2):123-137.
    Abstract. Alleged counter-examples based on conceptual thought-experiments, including those involving sense or content, have no force against physicalist supervenience theses properly construed. This is largely because of their epistemological status and their modal status. Still, there are empirical examples that do contradict Kim-style theses, due to the latter's individualism. By contrast, non-individualist supervenience, such as "global" supervenience, remains unscathed, a possibility overlooked by Lynne Baker, as is clear from a physicalist account of sense in the case of non-human biological adaptations (...)
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  14. John F. Post (2001). Global-Anti-Realism. Review of Metaphysics 54 (4):910-911.
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  15. John F. Post (2001). Sense and Supervenience. Philo 4 (2):123-137.
    Alleged counter-examples based on conceptual thought experiments, including those involving sense or content, have no force against physicalist supervenience theses properly construed. This is largely because of their epistemological status and their modal status. Still, there are empirical examples that do contradict Kim-style theses, due to the latter’s individualism. By contrast, non-individualist supervenience, such as “global” supervenience, remains unscathed, a possibility overlooked by Lynne Baker, as is dear from a physicalist account of sense in the case of non-human biological adaptations (...)
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  16. John F. Post (2000). [Book Chapter] (in Press).
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  17. John F. Post, From is to Ought: Another Way.
    Argues for an objective protomoral normativity in terms of what an adaptation is for, without falling victim to Hume's Law, open-question arguments, queerness arguments, and internalism/externalism debates. Also provides a general strategy for naturalizing objective moral normativity which is likewise proof against the usual-suspect objections.
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  18. John F. Post (2000). Is Supervenience Asymmetric? In [Book Chapter] (in Press).
    After some preliminary clarifications, arguments for the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination, such as they are, are shown to be unsound. An argument against the supposed asymmetry is then constructed and defended against objections. This is followed by explanations of why the intuition of asymmetry is nonetheless so entrenched, and of how the asymmetric ontological priority of the physical over the non-physical can be understood without the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination.
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  19. John Post & Derek Turner (2000). Sic Transitivity. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:67-82.
    In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post’s objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post’s objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational ancestry. In reply, (...)
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  20. John F. Post, Breakwater: The New Wave, Supervenience and Individualism.
    New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological (...)
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  21. John F. Post, How to Refute Principles of Sufficient Reason.
    Outlines a conceptual argument against the Principle of Sufficient reason. The argument is presented in detail in earlier work, and is based on deductive inferences from PSR's own concept of explanation. The argument shows that not everything can have an explanation of the sort claimed by PSR. So far from being a presupposition of reason itself, as some think, PSR can be refuted by reason, arguing only from PSR's own concept of explanation. Hence PSR cannot be used to argue that (...)
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  22. John F. Post (1999). Is Supervenience Asymmetric? Manuscrito 22 (2):305-344.
    After some preliminary clarifications, arguments for the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination, such as they are, are shown to be unsound. An argument against the supposed asymmetry is then constructed and defended against objections. This is followed by explanations of why the intuition of asymmetry is nonetheless so entrenched, and of how the asymmetric ontological priority of the physical over the non-physical can be understood without the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination.
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  23. John F. Post (1998). Review of Ruth G. Millikan, White Queen Psychology, For. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:233-237.
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  24. John F. Post (1998). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):233-237.
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  25. John F. Post (1996). The Foundationalism in Irrealism, and the Immorality. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:1-14.
    The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect that when it comes (...)
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  26. John F. Post (1995). Book Review:Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays Jaegwon Kim. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 62 (2):338-.
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  27. John F. Post (1995). Perspectives on Buchler. Metaphilosophy 26 (3):279-299.
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  28. John F. Post (1995). "Global" Determination: Too Permissive? In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  29. John F. Post (1995). Naturalism. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 517--518.
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  30. John F. Post (1995). Review of Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind. [REVIEW] .
    "Adaptation properties," as individuated according to evolutionary biology, cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. This causes serious if not fatal trouble for several of Kim's crucial theses: the Causal Individuation of Kinds, Weak Supervenience, Alexander's Dictum, the synchronicity thesis (that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism), the Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing (...)
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  31. John F. Post (1993). On the Nature and Existence of God. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):950-954.
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  32. John F. Post (1991). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Paragon House.
     
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  33. John F. Post (1991). Philosophical Logic. Teaching Philosophy 14 (1):92-94.
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  34. John F. Post (1990). Objective Value, Realism, and the End of Metaphysics. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 4 (2):146 - 160.
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  35. John F. Post (1989). Stuart G. Shanker, Ed., Gödel's Theorem in Focus Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 9 (7):287-290.
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  36. John F. Post (1988). Intuition and Ideality. Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):415-417.
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  37. John F. Post (1987). The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics. Cornell University Press.
     
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  38. John F. Post (1984). Comment on Teller. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1):163-167.
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  39. John F. Post (1984). On the Determinacy of Valuation. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):315-33.
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  40. John F. Post (1984). On the Determinacy of Truth and Translation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1):117-135.
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  41. John F. Post (1983). Response: Comment on Teller. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):163-167.
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  42. E. D. Klemke, John F. Post & Aryeh Leo Motzkin (1982). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 12 (1-2):127-146.
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  43. John F. Post (1982). Chance, Cause, Reason. New Scholasticism 56 (1):111-121.
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  44. John F. Post, Harold Morick & Bruce Johnston (1981). Book Reviews and Critical Studies. [REVIEW] Philosophia 9 (3-4):405-435.
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  45. John F. Post (1980). Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):31 - 52.
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  46. John F. Post (1979). Presupposition, Bivalence, and the Possible Liar. Philosophia 8 (4):645-650.
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  47. John F. Post (1978). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):73-81.
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  48. John F. Post (1975). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):73-81.
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  49. John F. Post (1974). Propositions, Possible Languages and the Liar's Revenge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):223-234.
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  50. John F. Post (1974). Quine with God. Journal of Philosophy 71 (19):736-748.
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