Online research in philosophy

John R. Boatright, editor of this volume, draws together the contributions of distinguished scholars from a wide range of disciplines--including finance, ...

In the 1990s, the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) of major United States corporations underwent a profound transformation in which CEOs went from being bureaucrats or technocrats to shareholder partisans who acted more like proprietors or entrepreneurs. This transformation occurred in response to changes in the competitive environment of U.S. corporations and also to the agency theory argument that high levels of compensation by means of stock options helped to overcome the agency problem inherent in the separation of (...) ownership and control. Some critics charge that this new CEO role is objectionable for a variety of reasons, which may also be applicable to the current financial crisis in which CEO misconduct may have played a part. These objections are based largelyon a team production model of corporate governance, which is held by these critics to be superior to the standard agent-principal model. This article examines the objections offered by critics of the changed role of the CEO and argues that their negative assessment of this development and their use of the team production model to support their conclusions are not warranted. CEOs have changed from hired hands to co-owners, and this change may have contributed in some measure to the current financial crisis. However, in determining the morally preferable role of the CEO, care must be taken not to discard what is sound in the changed role. (shrink)

Rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful. In view of this wastefulness, it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice. This article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing Thomas Dunfee's idea of a marketplace with morality. This idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is (...) compatible with corporate social responsibility, it is necessary, first, to define rent seeking, which this article argues is a normative concept, and, second, to find some principled way of identifying rent-seeking behavior. It also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking. (shrink)

Ethics in the world of business -- Welfare, rights, and justice -- Equality, liberty, and virtue -- Whistle-blowing -- Trade secrets and conflict of interest -- Privacy -- Discrimination and affirmative action -- Employment rights -- Occupational health and safety -- Marketing, advertising, and product safety -- Ethics in finance -- Corporate social responsibility -- Corporate governance and accountability -- International business ethics.

This second edition of the ground-breaking Ethics in Finance, is an up-to-date, valuable addition to the emerging field of finance ethics. Citing examples of the scandals that have shaken public confidence in the ethics of Wall Street, this text explains the importance of ethics the operation of financial institutions and in the personal conduct of finance professionals. Focuses on practical issues that confront finance professionals and policy makers Now includes discussion of issues in mutual funds and financial engineering, the independence (...) of analysts at investment banks, and the bank’s responsibility for the conduct of its clients Features a new chapter on conflicts of interest in financial services, expanded treatment of ethical issues in IPOs, and a new discussion about the discarding of pension funds Cites examples of the scandals that have shaken public confidence in Wall Street. (shrink)

Intermediaries, such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, are gatekeepers, which are parties whose cooperation is necessary for corporations to function and who, by withholding cooperation, are able to prevent significant corporate misconduct. The recent scandals at Enron and other corporations were due, in part, to failures by gatekeeper institutions. However, intermediaries exist primarily to provide for-fee services and not specifically to detect and deter misconduct. Insofar asthese institutions are gatekeepers or guardians, they serve reluctantly. Hence the question: What is the (...) responsibility of intermediaries to act as gatekeepers? This article argues that the appropriate moral, as well as legal, principle for justifying responsibility in a gatekeeper role is cost effectiveness. This conclusion is reached by means of a hypothetical exercise called the investors’ bargain in which investors—who bear the costs and receive the benefits of intermediaries’ gatekeeper role—are asked to choose the best means of protecting their interests. (shrink)

Employee governance, which includes employee ownership and employee participation in decision making, is regarded by manyas morally preferable to control of corporations by shareholders. However, employee governance is rare in advanced market economies due to its relative inefficiency compared with shareholder governance. Given this inefficiency, should employee governance be given up as an impractical ideal? This article contends that the debate over this question is hampered by an inadequate conception of employee governance that fails to take into account the difference (...) between employees and shareholders. It offers a different, more adequate conception of employee governance that recognizes a sense in which employees currently have some ownership rights. The argument for this conception of employee governance is built on an expanded understanding of the ownership of a firm. The article also suggests new strategies for strengthening the role of employees in corporate governance. (shrink)

In addressing the theme of this special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly on business ethics in the new millennium, I want to focusnot on business ethics as an academic field of study but rather on ethics in business. By ethics in business I mean the standards for ethical conduct that are generally recognized in business and the ways in which these standards are established. Ethics in business in this sense is, at least in part, what the field of business ethics (...) studies. (shrink)

This presidential address to the Society for Business Ethics argues that business ethics rests upon the mistaken assumption thatteaching and research in the field ought to aim at the incorporation of ethics into managerial decision making. An alternative to this Moral Manager Model is a Moral Market Model, in which the aim is to develop markets that produce ethical outcomes. The differencesbetween the two models are discussed with reference to the themes of responsibility, participation, and relationships.

The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...) fiduciary duties of officers and directors of corporations. The basis is to be found, rather, in considerations of public policy, a point that was established in the Dodd-Berle exchange of the 1930s. This conclusion also shows the inadequacy of Goodpaster’s solution to the so-called stakeholder paradox, and an alternative solution to the paradox is presented. (shrink)

In order to understand the way in which the results of a study of business ethics could enter into the actual conduct of business, I formulate and examine five models of the role of the manager which can be found in the literature of management theory. These I call the engineering model, the economic model, the management of values model, the formal organization model, and the political model. While none of these models is wholly adequate, each provides important theoretical insights (...) into the relevance of ethics to management decision making which can be of use in the examination of specific cases. (shrink)