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John R. Bowlin [8]John Rennell Bowlin [1]
  1.  22
    John R. Bowlin (1999). Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    In this study John Bowlin argues that Aquinas's moral theology receives much of its character and content from an assumption about our common lot: the good we desire is difficult to know and to will, in particular because of contingencies of various kinds - within ourselves, in the ends and objects we pursue, and in the circumstances of choice. Since contingencies are fortune's effects, Aquinas insists that it is fortune that makes good choice difficult. Bowlin then explicates Aquinas's treatment of (...)
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  2.  1
    John R. Bowlin (2016). Democracy, Tolerance, Aquinas. Journal of Religious Ethics 44 (2):278-299.
    Democracy is more than a collection of institutions, laws, and freely contested sources of authority. It is also an ideal. If we think of this ideal in republican terms, in terms of resistance to domination through the practices of mutual accountability, and if we recall that democratic life invariably comes with loss, then those of us who inhabit a democratic political society will need to locate, and then cultivate, responses to loss that do not undermine our commitment to this ideal. (...)
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  3.  3
    John R. Bowlin (2000). Sieges, Shipwrecks, and Sensible Knaves: Justice and Utility in Butler and Hume. Journal of Religious Ethics 28 (2):253-280.
    By examining the theories of justice developed by Joseph Butler and David Hume, the author discloses the conceptual limits of their moral naturalism. Butler was unable to accommodate the possibility that justice is at least to some extent, a social convention. Hume, who more presciently tried to spell out the conventional character of justice, was unable to carry through that project within the framework of his moral naturalism. These limits have gone unnoticed, largely because Butler and Hume have been misinterpreted, (...)
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  4.  16
    John R. Bowlin (2000). Sieges, Shipwrecks, and Sensible Knaves: Justice and Utility in Butler and Hume. Journal of Religious Ethics 28 (2):253 - 280.
    By examining the theories of justice developed by Joseph Butler and David Hume, the author discloses the conceptual limits of their moral naturalism. Butler was unable to accommodate the possibility that justice is, at least to some extent, a social convention. Hume, who more presciently tried to spell out the conventional character of justice, was unable to carry through that project within the framework of his moral naturalism. These limits have gone unnoticed, largely because Butler and Hume have been misinterpreted, (...)
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  5.  8
    John R. Bowlin (2000). Comment by John R. Bowlin. Journal of Religious Ethics 28 (3):473-477.
    Comments on:Charles T. Mathewes, Agency, Nature, Transcendence, and Moralism: A Review of Recent Work in Moral Psychology.
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  6.  3
    John R. Bowlin (1998). Psychology and Theodicy in Aquinas. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 7 (2):129-156.
    Throughout much of this century the most prominent exegetes maintained that Aquinass causal authority and the composition of the list of later works did little to unsettle their shared conviction that Aristotles insistence that the will can move itself, at least in some fashion, apart from the influence of the intellect. 1.
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  7. John R. Bowlin (2000). Comment [on Mathewes 2000]. Journal of Religious Ethics 28:473-77.
     
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