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John R. Lucas [17]John Randolph Lucas [1]
  1. John R. Lucas, Can the Theory of Games Save Mill's Utilitarianism?
    John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism engages our interest and sympathy because it is flawed. It reflects the crisis in Mill’s life, when he lost his faith. He had been brought up by his father in the straitest tenets of utilitarianism, but had had nervous breakdown in early adult life from emotional ill-nourishment. Utilitarianism might work as a guide for the well-governing of India by James Mill and his colleagues, but gave little sustenance to the aspiring spirit of the Romantic Movement. It (...)
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  2. John R. Lucas, The Implications of Godel's Theorem.
    In 1931 Kurt Gödel proved two theorems about the completeness and consistency of first-order arithmetic. Their implications for philosophy are profound. Many fashionable tenets are shown to be untenable: many traditional intuitions are vindicated by incontrovertible arguments.
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  3. John R. Lucas (2010). Umysły, maszyny i Gödel (przełożył Michał Zawidzki). Hybris 8.
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  4. John R. Lucas & Michael Redhead (2007). Truth and Provability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):331-2.
    The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.
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  5. John R. Lucas, The Godelian Argument: Turn Over the Page.
    I have no quarrel with the first two sentences: but the third, though charitable and courteous, is quite untrue. Although there are criticisms which can be levelled against the Gödelian argument, most of the critics have not read either of my, or either of Penrose's, expositions carefully, and seek to refute arguments we never put forward, or else propose as a fatal objection one that had already been considered and countered in our expositions of the argument. Hence my title. The (...)
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  6. M. R. Griffiths & John Randolph Lucas (1999). [Book Review] Ethical Economics. [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (2):442-444.
     
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  7. John R. Lucas (1999). A Century of Time. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), The Arguments of Time. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. 1--20.
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  8. John R. Lucas (1996). Mind, Machines and Godel: A Retrospect. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press. 103.
     
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  9. John R. Lucas (1994). A View of One's Own (Conscious Machines). Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A 349:147-52.
    Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed.
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  10. John R. Lucas (1989). The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
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  11. John R. Lucas (1984). Lucas Against Mechanism II: A Rejoinder. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (June):189-91.
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  12. John R. Lucas (1976). This Godel is Killing Me: A Rejoinder. Philosophia 6 (March):145-8.
  13. John R. Lucas (1971). Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind: A Rejoinder. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):310-13.
  14. John R. Lucas (1970). Mechanism: A Rejoinder. Philosophy 45 (April):149-51.
    PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the general aim of the whole manoeuvre.
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  15. John R. Lucas (1970). The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press.
    It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...
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  16. John R. Lucas (1968). Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf. The Monist 52 (1):145-58.
    The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...)
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  17. John R. Lucas (1967). Human and Machine Logic: A Rejoinder. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (August):155-6.
    We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for (...)
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  18. John R. Lucas (1961). Minds, Machines and Godel. Philosophy 36 (April-July):112-127.
    Goedel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then it (...)
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