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  1.  54
    John Skorupski (2010). The Domain of Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    This book is about normativity and reasons.
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  2.  19
    John Skorupski (1999). Ethical Explorations. Oxford University Press.
    In these essays, John Skorupski develops a distinctive and systematic moral philosophy. He examines the central ethical concepts of reasons, the good, and morality, and applies the results to issues of culture and politics. Ethical Explorations firmly connects liberal politics to its ethical ideal, and links that ideal to modern morality and modern ideas of the good.
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  3.  39
    John Skorupski (2007). Buck-Passing About Goodness. In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Defends the buck-passing account of value from the wrong kind of reason objection by arguing that in the cases proposed there are no reasons to value the intuitively worthless object, but there are practical reasons to bring it about that one values it. Also extends the account to other evaluative concepts.
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  4. John Skorupski (2007). What is Normativity? Disputatio 2 (23):1 - 23.
    The thesis that the concept of a reason is the fundamental normative concept is in the air. In this paper I examine what it amounts to, how to formulate it, and how ambitious it should be. I distinguish a semantic version, according to which any normative predicate is definitionally reducible to a reason predicate, and a conceptual version, according to which the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. Although I reject the semantic version (...)
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  5. John Skorupski (2009). The Unity and Diversity of Reasons. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press
    Can we give a uniform account of reasons in the three spheres of action, belief, and sentiment? Are reasons in these three spheres genuinely distinct, or are they in some way reducible to less than three? What kind of knowledge do we have of reasons – and what is it that we know? Some basic problems in philosophy depend on our answers to these questions.
     
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  6. John Skorupski (2002). Ethical Explorations. Oxford University Press Uk.
    John Skorupski develops in these essays a distinctive and systematic moral philosophy: he examines the central ethical concepts of reasons, the good, and morality, and applies the results to issues of culture and politics. He makes firm the connection between liberal politics and its ethical ideal, and links that ideal to modern morality and modern ideas of the good.
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  7.  1
    John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill, Alan Ryan & J. M. Robson (1982). An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):171.
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  8.  19
    John Skorupski (1989/1999). John Stuart Mill. Routledge.
    This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
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  9. John Skorupski (2012). The Domain of Reasons. Oxford University Press Uk.
    John Skorupski argues that all normative properties are reducible to reason relations, so that the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. This is a concept fundamental to all thought. It is pervasive, primitive, and constitutive of the idea of thought itself. He goes on to examine epistemic reasons; the concept of a person's good and moral concepts; and the epistemology and metaphysics of reasons. The book shows how reflection on the logic, epistemology, and (...)
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  10.  77
    John Skorupski (2002). The Ontology of Reasons. Topoi 21 (1-2):113-124.
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  11.  69
    John Skorupski (2013). Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. By Robert Stern. (Cambridge UP, 2011. Pp. 292. Price AUD$110.00 Hardback.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):603-607.
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  12.  51
    John Skorupski (1999). Irrealist Cognitivism. Ratio 12 (4):436–459.
    This paper argues that normative claims are truth‐apt contents of cognition – propositions about what there is reason to believe, to do or to feel – but that their truth is not a matter of correspondence or representation. We do not have to choose between realism about the normative and non‐cognitivism about it. The universality of reasons, combined with the spontaneity of normative responses, suffices to give normative claims the distinctive link to a ‘convergence commitment’ which characterises any genuine judgement; (...)
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  13.  60
    John Skorupski (2006). Propositions About Reasons. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):26–48.
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  14.  23
    John Skorupski (1993). The Definition of Morality. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35:121-144.
    We use such terms as good, bad, right, wrong, should, ought , in many ways other than moral: good evidence and bad argument, right answers and wrong notes, novels which should be read and policies which ought not to be adopted. The moral is a sphere of the practical and the practical itself only a sphere or the normative. Norms guide us in all we believe, feel and do. Do these normative words then have a specifically moral sense? If so (...)
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  15.  39
    John Skorupski (2005). Blame, Respect and Recognition: A Reply to Theo Van Willigenburg. Utilitas 17 (3):333-347.
    In an article in Utilitas Theo van Willigenburg has argued that moral valuation is distinguished from other forms of valuation by the Kantian concept of respect. He criticizes, from that standpoint, an account I put forward, which builds on the connections between moral wrongdoing, blame and withdrawal of recognition. I examine the difference between these two approaches and defend my own.
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  16.  44
    John Skorupski (1995). Agent-Neutrality, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism … A Terminological Note. Utilitas 7 (1):49.
    It seems common at the moment to make agent-neutrality a necessary condition of ‘consequentialism” and to hold that deontological ethics are agent-relative. This note argues that both these tendencies regrettably obscure useful terms and distinctions. It concludes by considering what it would be best, now, to mean by ‘utilitarianism” and making a proposal.
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  17.  41
    John Skorupski (2004). Externalism and Self-Governance. Utilitas 16 (1):12-21.
    What outcomes are good, and what there is reason for one to do, is not generally determined by what one thinks or even what one has reason to think. But is a similarly ‘externalist’ account of the distinctively moral concepts, the concepts of moral duty or obligation, of moral wrongness, blameworthiness and guilt, appropriate? I argue not; and on that basis I suggest that an externalist account is not appropriate for the concept of a virtue either.
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  18. John Skorupski (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125 - 136.
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded (...)
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  19.  7
    John Skorupski (2015). Being Realistic About Reasons, by T. M. Scanlon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Vii + 132 Pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-967848-8 Hb £18.99. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 23:e8-e12.
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  20.  54
    John Skorupski (2012). Précis of The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):174-184.
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  21.  77
    John Skorupski (2010). Moral Obligation, Blame, and Self-Governance. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):158-180.
    This paper shows how moral concepts are definable in terms of reasons for the blame sentiment. It then shows how, given that definition, the categoricity of moral obligation follows from some plausible principles about reasons for blame. The nature of moral agency is further considered in this light. In particular, in what sense is it self-governing agency? Self-governing actors must be at least self-determining: that is, they must be able to think about what reasons they have, in order in order (...)
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  22.  46
    John Skorupski (2012). The Triplism of Practical Reason. Ratio 25 (2):127-147.
    There can be reasons for belief, for action, and for feeling. In each case, knowledge of such reasons requires non-empirical knowledge of some truths about them: these will be truths about what there is reason to believe, to feel, or to do – either outright or on condition of certain facts obtaining. Call these a priori truths about reasons, ‘norms’. Norms are a priori true propositions about reasons.It's an epistemic norm that if something's a good explanation that's a reason to (...)
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  23.  4
    John Skorupski (1976). Symbol and Theory: A Philosophical Study of Theories of Religion in Social Anthropology. Cambridge University Press.
    Anthropologists have always been concerned with the difference between traditional and scientific modes of thought and with the relationships between magic, religion and science. John Skorupski distinguishes two broadly opposed approaches to these problems: the 'intellectualist' regards primitive systems of thought and actions as cosmologies, comparable to scientific theory, which emerge and persist as attempts to control the natural world; the 'symbolist' regards them as essentially representative or expressive of the pattern of social relations in the culture in which they (...)
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  24.  23
    John Skorupski (1998). Rescuing Moral Obligation. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):335–355.
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  25.  34
    John Skorupski (2004). Morality as Self-Governance: Has It a Future? Utilitas 16 (2):133-145.
    In The Invention of Autonomy, Schneewind argues that a main development in early modern ethical thought is the transition from a conception of morality as obedience to a conception of morality as self-governance. I consider the presuppositions implicit in the latter conception and ask whether they can be maintained. Correspondence:c1 jms2@st-andrews.ac.uk.
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  26.  2
    John Skorupski, Peter Dews & Dirk tD Held (1995). Critical Notices. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):143 – 178.
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  27.  65
    John Skorupski (2007). The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1):181 – 197.
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  28.  66
    John Skorupski (2002). Review: Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):704-706.
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  29.  4
    John Skorupski (1996). Value-Pluralism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:101-115.
    A view with some considerable influence in current moral and political philosophy holds that there is a plurality of values, all of them fundamental and authoritative and yet, in some genuinely disconcerting way, in conflict . I shall call it ‘value-pluralism’.
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  30.  50
    John Skorupski (2008). Review of Peter Railton, Facts, Values and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. [REVIEW] Utilitas 20 (2):217-229.
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  31.  13
    John Skorupski (2008). Review of Peter Railton, Facts, Values and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. [REVIEW] Utilitas 20 (2).
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  32.  14
    John Skorupski (1997). Logical Grammar, Transcendentalism, and Normativity. Philosophical Topics 25 (2):189-211.
  33.  29
    John Skorupski (2009). Free Your Mind. The Philosophers' Magazine 46 (46):59-64.
    Dialogue, unconstrained truth-seeking discussion, is nothing but the social expression of free thought. Given the distortions and manipulations to which free thought is subject, only continued full exposure to free discussion can give us continued rational warrant for our beliefs. Socially possessed truth and disinterested, rational qualities of mind among citizens are public goods.
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  34.  15
    John Skorupski (2008). Utilitarianism and the Arrogance Objection. Rivista di Filosofia 99 (3):531-552.
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  35. Jens Timmerman, John Skorupski & Simon Robertson (2009). 1. General Constraints on a Cognitivist Account of Intentions. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. OUP Oxford 4--243.
     
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  36.  7
    John Skorupski (1985). Objectivity and Convergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:235 - 250.
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  37. John Skorupski (forthcoming). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. Viii+ 300. $105.00 (Cloth); $24.95 (Paper). Ethics.
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  38.  26
    John Skorupski (1996). Neutral Versus Relative: A Reply to Broome, and McNaughton and Rawling. Utilitas 8 (2):235.
  39.  20
    John Skorupski (2012). Aristotelianism and Modernity: Terence Irwin on the Development of Ethics. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):312-337.
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  40. John Skorupski (1993). English-Language Philosophy, 1750 to 1945. Oxford University Press.
    From the end of the Enlightenment to the middle of the twentieth century philosophy took fascinating and controversial paths whose relevance to contemporary post-modernist thought is becoming ever clearer. This volume traces the English-language side of the period, while also taking into account those continental thinkers who deeply influenced twentieth-century, English-language philosophy. The story begins with Reid, Coleridge, and Bentham--who set the agenda for much that followed--and continues with a portrait of the nineteenth century's greatest British philosopher, John Stuart Mill. (...)
     
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  41.  23
    John Skorupski (2000). Desire and Will in Sidgwick and Green. Utilitas 12 (3):307.
    This paper examines T. H. Green's and Henry Sidgwick's differing views of desireand the will, and connectedly, their differing views of an individual's good and freedom. It is argued that Sidgwick makes effective criticisms of Green, but that important elements in Green's idealist view of an individual's good and freedom survive the criticism and remain significant today. It is also suggested that Sidgwick's own account of an individual's good is unclear in an important way.
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  42.  6
    John Skorupski (1988). Review: Realism, Meaning and Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):500 - 525.
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  43.  6
    John Skorupski, Martin Hollis & Edward Nell (1977). Rational Economic Man. A Philosophical Critique of Neo-Classical Economics. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (108):282.
  44.  17
    John Skorupski (2009). Back to Kant? Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):97-110.
    Can we develop a Critical Philosophy without resorting either to transcendental idealism or to linguistic conventionalism; that is, without resorting to either of these accounts of the a priori? I argue that we can, by focusing on the notion of a reason: the basic normative concept, which provides the ‘interface’ between self and thought about an objective world.
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  45. John Skorupski (2000). Quality of Well-Being: Quality of Being. In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Clarendon Press 239--262.
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  46.  21
    John Skorupski (2002). Reply to Darwall. Utilitas 14 (1):124.
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  47.  28
    John Skorupski (2006). Welfare and Self-Governance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):289 - 309.
    Two ideas have dominated ethical thought since the time of Bentham and Kant. One is utilitarianism, the other is an idea of moral agency as self-governance. Utilitarianism says that morality must somehow subserve welfare, self-governance says that it must be graspable directly by individual moral insight. But these ideas seem to war with one another. Can we eliminate the apparent conflict by a careful review of what is plausible in the two ideas? In seeking an answer to this question I (...)
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  48.  1
    John Skorupski (1988). Realism, Meaning and Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):500.
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  49.  14
    John Skorupski (2012). Reply to Cassam, Olson, and Railton. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):210-221.
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  50.  26
    John Skorupski (2008). Equality and Bureaucracy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):161-178.
    Elizabeth Anderson argues for civic as against distributive egalitarianism. I agree with civic egalitarianism understood as a public ideal, and welcome her interest in the sociological conditions under which it may best flourish. But I argue that she is mistaken in opposing what she calls 'hierarchies of esteem' and proposing that where the egalitarian ideal has insufficient hold on civil society it should be implemented by an efficient bureaucracy. We should learn a different lesson from Max Weber. What the ideal (...)
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