More companies are understanding the benefits of designing work to enhance, rather than minimise, the contributions of their employees within human-centred systems. To do this, they require their supportive subsystems (such as training, job, and team design, performance measurement and information) to provide people with the ability, motivation and opportunity to become increasingly involved. Opportunity for involvement will require different communication interfaces, providing data and background information both personally and at the work site or process. In the past few years, (...) the media available for visualisation and communication have become much more numerous and have much greater capabilities. This paper examines the information requirements of certain features of modern manufacturing enterprisesâlocal control, skills, knowledge and training, function allocation and team communications. It then assesses the utility of three broad types of information displayâPersonal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Multimedia/Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) and Virtual Environments (VEs)âfor shopfloor systems. (shrink)
The concepts marked by "shame" and "guilt" are analysed briefly, and their merits and demerits as types of moral motivation reviewed. Both concepts appear as inexpellable from human life, although different cultures may weigh them differently and give them different contents. Each has certain advantages and disadvantages, but both may be paralysing rather than morally constructive. Various alternative motivations are considered, including fear and desire; and the conclusion is reached that the moral educator's prime task is to introduce children to (...) forms of life in which they may be pleasureably invested, and where their desire is disciplined by the demands of the form of life itself rather than by guilt or shame. (shrink)
Abstract Two aspects or aims of morality are distinguished: (1) the need to avoid trouble and ensure appropriate behaviour, and (2) forms of life which involve sharing, and hence require certain basic dispositions as well as behaviour?patterns. It is argued that (1) may, in principle, be achieved by various external agencies, not only by internalised guilt, shame and a sense of duty. ?Will?power?, and the whole notion of moral struggle, may in one sense be otiose or replaceable. Besides (1) efficient (...) conditioning, we need (2) the understanding of various worthwhile forms of life and the cultivation of the dispositions required by them. Philosophers and other moralists need to describe these forms of life clearly and without prejudice, and moral educators need to transmit the understanding and practice of them to children. (shrink)
Abstract The ability and willingness to bring one's attention and determination to bear on moral situations are of central importance in moral education. Various ways in which a person may succeed or fail in doing this are considered, in the light of Aristotle's ?practical syllogism?, and a rough classification is suggested. It is advocated (a) that a fuller classification be attempted, and (b) that teachers and parents share with young people their understanding of typical practical syllogisms.
Abstract Moral education has to be taken as ?education in morality?: that is, in a particular form of thought and life which has its own procedures of reason. We have to establish what these are, what equipment the morally educated person logically requires and, from that, how to assess such equipment and how to generate practical methods that enhance it. The main features of this are not difficult to understand: what stands in our way is certain kinds of psychological resistance (...) to the enterprise as a whole. (shrink)
What may be called 'the comprehensive ideal' is still powerful both in theory and practice. To put this ideal into a respectable shape requires attention to some basic logical/conceptual points, and awareness of the underlying feelings which inspire it. It is then possible to face questions about how to retain equality whilst catering for individual differences, how to establish a potent and fraternal community in schools and elsewhere, and how to give individuals a sense of worth whilst fully acknowledging criteria (...) of expertise - in virtue of which many people will never shine as performers or achievers. (shrink)
Everyone loves something or somebody, and most people are concerned with loving another person like themselves, all equal. This book is based on the belief that getting clear about the concept and meaning of love between equals is essential for success in our practical lives. For how can we love properly unless we have a fairly clear idea of what love is? The book is written in ordinary language and for the ordinary person, without jargon or philosophical technicalities. It aims (...) to show that love between equals involves a single basic disposition, though that disposition expresses itself in various ways. Thus, after an introduction explaining the need for analysis and clarification, the author then deals in order with love as desire or need; with intrinsic friendship and sharing the self; with basic difficulties concerning power, dependence, altruism and paranoia; with sex and erotic love; and finally with the value in human life of love between equals. The work as a whole gives clear, coherent and practical guidance for all who wish to grasp what such love is really like. (shrink)
Abstract The concept of authority is primary and inescapable, and anterior to the opposition of particular values (such as law and order? versus freedom'). No human interaction is possible without authority. Problems about the legitimacy and scope of authority are discussed: particularly the legitimacy of compelling school attendance. Attention is drawn to the particular importance of authority in moral and political education.
Abstract Current demands for ?moral consensus? raise the question of whether liberalism can offer such consensus. It is argued that, though liberalism is often taken to be too weak and unappealing to do this, nevertheless a proper understanding of its logic and psychological requirements permits a more optimistic view. In particular, we have to understand and reinforce the various types of human interaction which form the psychic basis of liberalism and enable the individual to avoid both authoritarianism and paranoia.
Abstract This paper considers the notion of ?social skills? from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy. The authors note first prejudices for and against an approach to human problems in terms of identificable ?skills?. They then stipulate a definition of ?social skills? in terms of techniques ('knowing how'), and point to other essential aspects of change and treatment which fall outside this definition (in particular, the aspects of attitude or desire and judgement). Some generalisations are attempted relevant to the question of (...) what problems are likely to yield to a ?social skills? approach, and what problems are likely to go deeper than such an approach can cure. Attention is drawn to the necessity of defining what is to count as success in such training, and the logical limits of ?social skills? training are clarified. (shrink)
Abstract Arguments about whether stress should be laid on content or on method in moral education are shown to be misguided: both are inextricably interlocked since morality is a complete form of life, partly concerned with action and partly with feeling. Proper motivation for moral education must display this form in the daily lives of the pupils, who will come to be morally educated only in so far as they share the form with those who love them and whom they (...) love. Schools have to be structured into genuine communities in order to make this possible. In these respects morality is parallel to other forms of life and thought in the school curriculum. (shrink)
Abstract An extreme view of methods appropriate to moral education is criticized: roughly, the view that example is everything and instruction comparatively worthless. The assumptions behind this view are uncovered and demolished. As a better alternative, it is suggested that different pieces of equipment in the armoury of the morally?educated person require different methods.
Abstract Two basic worries about moral education are considered. The first ?? whether there are or are not fundamental principles of reason and procedure which govern moral decision?making ?? is argued to be unnecessary, since there plainly are some such procedures. The second ?? how and in what direction pupils should be motivated to attend to such principles ?? is a more complex and difficult matter, which has to be tackled whatever one's particular philosophical views on morality. It is argued (...) that the proper object of motivation is primarily allegiance to certain principles of rationality and justice, natural sympathy or personal benevolence being regarded as desirable but too fragile. (shrink)
Abstract Talk of ?stages of moral development? ?and ?moral reasoning? raises the question of what it is to understand and use a reason. This is chiefly a matter of knowing a rule and its application. The rules and concepts required for the basic form of moral reasoning can be taught without difficulty to quite young children, in so far indeed as they do not grasp them already. The kind of education required for getting children (or adults) to prefer to use (...) the rules and concepts is another matter. The ?stages? are not likely to be stages of cognitive reasoning, but backgrounds or regimes which encourage certain preferences for this or that type of reason. (shrink)
Abstract Progress in moral education depends chiefly on the rejection of fantasy. The philosophical basis must be understood: it involves (a) a non?partisan approach, and (b) grasp of moral methodology??we are to show pupils how to get the right answers. Research and development require a linear structure, beginning with (and controlled by) conceptual enquiry, then involving psychology and social science, and finally issuing in practical development. Moral education periods are needed in the school timetable. Education in morality must be distinguished (...) from the avoidance of social disorder. The fragmentation of those concerned with moral education into different partisan groups is disastrous: it is not a political issue, but one to be forwarded by scholarship and common sense. (shrink)
Introduction Philosophy and education 'Philosophy of education' is a name for nothing clear; but despite this there seem already to be two bodies of opinion ...
