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  1. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2006). Formal Operations and Simulated Thought. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234.
    A series of representations must be semantics-driven if the members of that series are to combine into a single thought. Where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. There is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. A related point is that a popular doctrine - the so-called 'computational (...)
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  2. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2006). Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.
    According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are ambiguous, as (...)
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  3. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Another Argument Against the Thesis That There is a Language of Thought. Communication and Cognition 37 (2):83-103.
    One cannot have the concept of a red object without having the concept of an extended object. But the word "red" doesn't contain the word "extended." In general, our concepts are interconnected in ways in which the corresponding words are not interconnected. This is not an accidental fact about the English language or about any other language: it is inherent in what a language is that the cognitive abilities corresponding to a person's abilities to use words cannot possibly be reflected (...)
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  4. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). A Quasi-Materialist, Quasi-Dualist Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. Kriterion 45 (109):81-135.
  5. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Some Arguments Against Intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
    According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents, in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past experiences, or other facts about his past or present (...)
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  6. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2002). Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of Perception. Dartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag.
     
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  7. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2001). Materialism, Causation, and the Mind-Body Problem. Prima Philosophia 14 (1):69-90.
     
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  8. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (1998). A Proof of the Partial Anomalousness of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504.
    Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive (...)
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