Search results for 'Joint Attention' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  96
    Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor (...)
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  2.  88
    Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many (...)
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  3.  68
    John Campbell (2005). Joint Attention and Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience (...)
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  4.  63
    Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. (...)
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  5.  74
    Naomi M. Eilan (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to (...)
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  6.  42
    Jane Heal (2005). Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Oxford University PressJoint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 34--44.
    It is plausible to think, as many developmental psychologists do, that joint attention is important in the development of getting a full grasp on psychological notions. This chapter argues that this role of joint attention is best understood in the context of the simulation theory about the nature of psychological understanding rather than in the context of the theory. Episodes of joint attention can then be seen not as good occasions for learning a theory (...)
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  7.  23
    Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (2005). Joint Reminiscing as Joint Attention to the Past. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Johannes Roessler & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 260.
    We identify a particular type of causal reasoning ability that we believe is required for the possession of episodic memories, as it is needed to give substance to the distinction between the past and the present. We also argue that the same causal reasoning ability is required for grasping the point that another person's appeal to particular past events can have in conversation. We connect this to claims in developmental psychology that participation in joint reminiscing plays a key role (...)
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  8.  86
    Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (2013). Delighting in Natural Beauty: Joint Attention and the Phenomenology of Nature Aesthetics. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4):167-186.
    Empirical research in the psychology of nature appreciation suggests that humans across cultures tend to evaluate nature in positive aesthetic terms, including a sense of beauty and awe. They also frequently engage in joint attention with other persons, whereby they are jointly aware of sharing attention to the same event or object. This paper examines how, from a natural theological perspective, delight in natural beauty can be conceptualized as a way of joining attention to creation. Drawing (...)
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  9.  22
    Matteo Bianchin (2015). From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science. Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):593-608.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
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  10.  33
    R. Peter Hobson (2005). What Puts the Jointness Into Joint Attention? In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press 185.
    This chapter argues that joint attention needs to be understood in terms of one person's engagement with another person's engagement with the world. It is pivotal from a developmental perspective that we have an appropriate view of what is involved when we share experiences, or when we perceive and align with another person's ‘attention’ as a bodily-expressed and affectively toned relation with the environment. The chapter explores these theoretical issues through studies involving children with autism, who have (...)
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  11.  52
    Juan-Carlos Gómez (2005). Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights From Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autism. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press
    This chapter proposes that the cognitive mechanisms of joint attention (defined as a combination of attention following skills with attention contact skills) are not metarepresentational in nature, but based upon the coordination of two different types of intentional understanding — third-person and second-person intentions — that are represented at the level of a sensorimotor notion of others as subjects. This proposal is developed and analyzed from a comparative perspective through a review of findings concerning apes, typically (...)
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  12.  11
    Axel Seemann (ed.) (2012). Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience. The MIT Press.
    Academic interest in the phenomenon of joint attention -- the capacity to attend to an object together with another creature -- has increased rapidly over the past two decades. Yet it isn't easy to spell out in detail what joint attention is, how it ought to be characterized, and what exactly its significance consists in. The writers for this volume address these and related questions by drawing on a variety of disciplines, including developmental and comparative psychology, (...)
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  13. Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Joint Attention in Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention (...)
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  14.  2
    David Leavens & Timothy Racine (2009). Joint Attention in Apes and Humans: Are Humans Unique? Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):240-267.
    Joint attention is the ability to intentionally co-orient towards a common focus. This ability develops in a protracted, mosaic fashion in humans. We review evidence of joint attention in humans and great apes, finding that great apes display every phenomenon described as joint attention in humans, although there is consid-erable variation among apes of different rearing histories. We conclude that there is little evidence for human species-unique cognitive adaptations in the non-verbal communication of humans (...)
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  15.  35
    Axel Seemann (2010). The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):161-182.
    John Campbell recommends a relational view on joint attention. In this paper, I ask what his position implies for the perceptual experience of jointly engaged persons, and suggest that this experience can be accounted for by taking seriously the notion of intersubjectivity. I provide an account of what I call the 'direct acquaintance' of jointly engaged persons with one another. To be so acquainted is to enjoy an experience of feelings that are shared in a particular way. I (...)
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  16.  32
    Tom Cochrane (2009). Joint Attention to Music. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (1):59-73.
    This paper contrasts individual and collective listening to music, with particular regard to the expressive qualities of music. In the first half of the paper a general model of joint attention is introduced. According to this model, perceiving together modifies the intrinsic structure of the perceptual task, and encourages a convergence of responses to a greater or lesser degree. The model is then applied to music, looking first at the silent listening situation typical to the classical concert hall, (...)
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  17.  46
    Axel Seemann (2007). Joint Attention, Collective Knowledge, and the "We" Perspective. Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230.
    In this paper, I am concerned with the practical aspect of joint attention. In particular, I ask what enables us to engage in joint activities, and go on to suggest that on a representational account of joint attention, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered. I explore John Campbell's "relational" approach and suggest that if one couples it with Peter Hobson's notion of "feeling perception", one may be in a position to account for the action-enabling aspect (...)
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  18.  9
    Timothy Martell (2010). Phenomenology of Joint Attention. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 10 (2).
    It is one thing for two or more persons to perceive the same object, and it is quite another for two or more persons to perceive the same object together. The latter phenomenon is called joint attention and has recently garnered considerable interest from psychologists. However, contemporary psychological research has not succeeded in clarifying how persons can share perception of an object. Joint attention thus stands in need of phenomenological clarification. Surprisingly, this has yet to be (...)
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  19.  93
    Joel Smith (2006). Review of Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1126-9.
    You and I are watching a spider crawl across the carpet. We are both aware of the spider, and aware that both are so aware. We are jointly attending to it. This collection of essays addresses a bewildering array of questions that arise regarding the notion of joint attention. How should joint attention be characterised in adults? In particular, how can we articulate the sense in which it is plausible to say that nothing is hidden from (...)
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  20.  44
    Ingar Brinck (2004). Joint Attention, Triangulation and Radical Interpretation: A Problem and its Solution. Dialectica 58 (2):179–206.
    By describing the aim of triangulation as locating the object of thoughts and utterances, Davidson has given it the double role of accounting for both the individuation of content and the sense in which content necessarily is public. The focus of this article is on how triangulation may contribute to the individuation of content. I maintain that triangulation may serve to break into the intentional circle of meaning and belief, yet without forcing us to renounce the claims concerning the interdependence (...)
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  21.  16
    Johan Modée (2000). Observation Sentences and Joint Attention. Synthese 124 (2):221-238.
    The aim of this paper is to examine W. V.Quine's theory of infants' early acquisition oflanguage, with a narrow focus on Quine's theory ofobservation sentences. Intersubjectivity and sensoryexperiences, the two features that characterise thenotion, receive the most attention. It is argued,following a suggestion from Donald Davidson, thatQuine favours a proximal theory of languageacquisition, i.e., a theory which is focused onprivate experiences as ultimate sources ofstimulation, contrary to a distal theory, where thestimulus source is located in externally observableobjects and events. (...)
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  22.  12
    Petr Urban (2014). Joint Attention and Anthropological Difference. Environmental Philosophy 11 (1):59-70.
    According to Michael Tomasello’s evolutionary anthropological approach, joint attention is one of the essential keys to understanding the difference between human and animal. The present paper discusses a recent phenomenological account of the anthropological difference inspired by Tomasello’s conception. A criticism of this account is put forward, while an alternative view is also introduced that stresses the impact of differential rearing experiences on the socio-cognitive development of human and non-human animals.
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  23.  29
    John Campbell (1998). Joint Attention and the First Person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 123-136..
    It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extremely (...)
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  24.  4
    Clemens Knobloch (1998). Reference: Grammaticalizing Joint Attention. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 6 (1-2):245-264.
    This paper investigates the gradual transformation of prelinguistic joint attention routines into resources of referential communication. It is argued that the child uses linguistic means of reference to recode and re-represent joint attention procedures in various ways. While semanticists stress the fact that pronouns, proper nouns, and definite descriptions may refer to the same entity, various modes of establishing, identifying and tracking discourse referents are considered here to be structural amplifications of joint attention routines, (...)
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  25.  10
    Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen (2008). Can the Shared Circuits Model (SCM) Explain Joint Attention or Perception of Discrete Emotions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):24-25.
    The shared circuits model (SCM) is a bold attempt to explain how humans make sense of action, at different levels. In this commentary we single out five concerns: (1) the lack of a developmental account, (2) the absence of double-dissociation evidence, (3) the neglect of joint attention and joint action, (4) the inability to explain discrete emotion perception, and (5) the lack of predictive power or testability of the model. We conclude that Hurley's model requires further work (...)
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  26. John Campbell (forthcoming). An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention. In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience. The MIT Press
  27. Juan Carlos Gomez (2005). Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights From Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autism. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press
     
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  28.  54
    J. Campbell (2002). Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins 241-253 (with a reply by Elisabe.
  29.  17
    P. Nuku & H. Bekkering (2008). Joint Attention: Inferring What Others Perceive (and Don't Perceive). Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):339-349.
    Research has shown that observers automatically align their attention with another’s gaze direction. The present study investigates whether inferring another’s attended location affects the observer’s attention in the same way as observing their gaze direction. In two experiments, we used a laterally oriented virtual human head to prime one of two laterally presented targets. Experiment 1 showed that, in contrast to the agent with closed eyes, observing the agent with open eyes facilitated the observer’s alignment of attention (...)
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  30.  3
    Maria Staudte & Matthew W. Crocker (2011). Investigating Joint Attention Mechanisms Through Spoken Human–Robot Interaction. Cognition 120 (2):268-291.
  31.  8
    Ben Robins, Paul Dickerson, Penny Stribling & Kerstin Dautenhahn (2004). Robot-Mediated Joint Attention in Children with Autism: A Case Study in Robot-Human Interaction. Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 5 (2):161-198.
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  32.  8
    Frédéric Kaplan & Verena V. Hafner (2006). The Challenges of Joint Attention. Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 7 (2):135-169.
  33. Henrike Moll & Andrew N. Meltzoff (2011). Perspective-Taking and its Foundation in Joint Attention. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
     
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  34.  32
    Lawrence Cahoone (2013). Mead, Joint Attention, and the Human Difference. The Pluralist 8 (2):1-25.
    The struggle between the parties bent on inflating humanity's self-conception and those bent on deflating it continues. Mind, consciousness, soul, reason, free will, language, culture, tool-use—all have been invoked as the unique character of the human, some deriving from Judeo-Christian religion, others from classical philosophy and modern anthropology. Opponents, sometimes motivated by ethical concerns about the treatment of animals, and buoyed by scientific advances in animal and especially primate studies, have either deconstructed these traits or ascribed them to nonhumans. Seeking (...)
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  35.  22
    Jasmina Ivšac (forthcoming). The Phenomenon of Joint Attention. Mind.
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  36.  10
    Andrew P. Bayliss, Emily Murphy, Claire K. Naughtin, Ada Kritikos, Leonhard Schilbach & Stefanie I. Becker (2013). “Gaze Leading”: Initiating Simulated Joint Attention Influences Eye Movements and Choice Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):76.
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  37. Charman (2004). Why is Joint Attention a Pivotal Skill in Autism? In Uta Frith & Elisabeth Hill (eds.), Autism: Mind and Brain. OUP Oxford
     
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  38.  28
    Christopher Mole (2005). Review of Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, Johannes Roessler (Eds), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds -- Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  39.  3
    Henrike Moll & Andrew N. Meltzoff (2011). Foundation in Joint Attention. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press 286.
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  40.  3
    Takeshi Konno & Masayoshi Shibata (2011). Joint-Attention-Robots Aiming at Recursive Understanding of Intentions. Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):2_29-2_45.
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  41. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Reply to Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins
     
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  42. Petr Urban (2013). Joint Attention as the Key to the Distinction Between Man and Animal? Filosoficky Casopis 61 (4):483-496.
     
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  43.  14
    Michael Scaife & Jerome Bruner (1975). The Capacity for Joint Visual Attention in the Infant. Nature 253:265-266.
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  44.  3
    Chen Yu & Linda B. Smith (2016). Multiple Sensory‐Motor Pathways Lead to Coordinated Visual Attention. Cognitive Science 40 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Joint attention has been extensively studied in the developmental literature because of overwhelming evidence that the ability to socially coordinate visual attention to an object is essential to healthy developmental outcomes, including language learning. The goal of this study was to understand the complex system of sensory-motor behaviors that may underlie the establishment of joint attention between parents and toddlers. In an experimental task, parents and toddlers played together with multiple toys. We objectively measured (...) attention—and the sensory-motor behaviors that underlie it—using a dual head-mounted eye-tracking system and frame-by-frame coding of manual actions. By tracking the momentary visual fixations and hand actions of each participant, we precisely determined just how often they fixated on the same object at the same time, the visual behaviors that preceded joint attention and manual behaviors that preceded and co-occurred with joint attention. We found that multiple sequential sensory-motor patterns lead to joint attention. In addition, there are developmental changes in this multi-pathway system evidenced as variations in strength among multiple routes. We propose that coordinated visual attention between parents and toddlers is primarily a sensory-motor behavior. Skill in achieving coordinated visual attention in social settings—like skills in other sensory-motor domains—emerges from multiple pathways to the same functional end. (shrink)
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  45.  5
    George Butterworth (2004). Joint Visual Attention in Infancy. In Gavin Bremner & Alan Slater (eds.), Theories of Infant Development. Blackwell 317--354.
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  46. Tetsuo Ono, Takanori Komatsu, Jun-Ichi Akita, Kiyohide Ito & Makoto Okamoto (2006). Blind and Visually Impaired People: Mobility and Orientation-CyARM: Interactive Device for Environment Recognition and Joint Haptic Attention Using Non-Visual Modality. In O. Stock & M. Schaerf (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag 1251-1258.
  47.  74
    Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll (2005). Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...)
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  48.  24
    Natalie Sebanz & Guenther Knoblich (2009). Prediction in Joint Action: What, When, and Where. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):353-367.
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  49. Joel Krueger (2011). Doing Things with Music. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):1-22.
    This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an esthetic technology to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or nested acoustic environment that further affords possibilities for, among other (...)
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  50.  11
    Michael Tomasello (2008). Origins of Human Communication. MIT Press.
    In this original and provocative account of the evolutionary origins of human communication, Michael Tomasello connects the fundamentally cooperative structure of human communication (initially discovered by Paul Grice) to the especially ...
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