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  1. Jon Cogburn & Mark Allan Ohm (2014). Actual Qualities of Imaginative Things: Notes Towards an Object-Oriented Literary Theory. Speculations:180-224.
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  2. Jon Cogburn & Mark Silcox (2014). Against Brain-in-a-Vatism: On the Value of Virtual Reality. Philosophy and Technology 27 (4):561-579.
    The term “virtual reality” was first coined by Antonin Artaud to describe a value-adding characteristic of certain types of theatrical performances. The expression has more recently come to refer to a broad range of incipient digital technologies that many current philosophers regard as a serious threat to human autonomy and well-being. Their concerns, which are formulated most succinctly in “brain in a vat”-type thought experiments and in Robert Nozick's famous “experience machine” argument, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that (...)
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  3. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Safety and the True–True Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
    Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.
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  4. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2012). Strong, Therefore Sensitive: Misgivings About DeRose's Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):237-253.
    According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf (...)
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  5. Jon Cogburn (2011). Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):465-476.
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  6. Jon Cogburn & Mark Silcox (2011). Computability Theory and Ontological Emergence. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):63.
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  7. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
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  8. Jon Cogburn (2010). Critical Notice of Robert Brandom's Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Philosophical Books 51 (3):160-174.
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  9. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
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  10. Jon Cogburn (2009). Philosophy Through Video Games. Routledge.
    I, player : the puzzle of personal identity (MMORPGS and Virtual Communities) -- The game inside the mind, the mind inside the game (The Nintendo Wii Gaming Console) -- Realistic blood and gore : do violent games make violent gamers? (First-person Shooters) -- Games and God's goodness (World-builder and Tycoon Games) -- The metaphysics of interactive art (Puzzle and Adventure Games) -- Artificial and human intelligence (Single-player RPGS) -- Epilogue: Video games and the meaning of life.
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  11. Mark Silcox & Jon Cogburn (2006). Computability Theory and Literary Competence. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):369-386.
    criticism defend the idea that an individual reader's understanding of a text can be a factor in determining the meaning of what is written in that text, and hence must play a part in determining the very identity conditions of works of literary art. We examine some accounts that have been given of the type of readerly ‘competence’ that a reader must have in order for her responses to a text to play this sort of constitutive role. We argue that (...)
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  12. Jon Cogburn (2005). The Logic of Logical Revision Formalizing Dummett's Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.
    Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement (...)
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  13. Jon Cogburn & Roy Cook (2005). Inverted Space: Minimal Verificationism, Propositional Attitudes, and Compositionality. Philosophia 32 (1-4):73-92.
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  14. Jon Cogburn & Mark Silcox (2005). Computing Machinery and Emergence: The Aesthetics and Metaphysics of Video Games. Minds and Machines 15 (1):73-89.
    We build on some of Daniel Dennett’s ideas about predictive indispensability to characterize properties of video games discernable by people as computationally emergent if, and only if: (1) they can be instantiated by a computing machine, and (2) there is no algorithm for detecting instantiations of them. We then use this conception of emergence to provide support to the aesthetic ideas of Stanley Fish and to illuminate some aspects of the Chomskyan program in cognitive science.
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  15. Jason L. Megill & Jon Cogburn (2005). Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States. Ratio 18 (3):306-316.
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  16. Josh Parsons & Jon Cogburn (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
    Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement (...)
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  17. Jon Cogburn (2004). Inferentialism and Tacit Knowledge. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):503 - 524.
    A central tenet of cognitivism is that knowing how is to be explained in terms of tacitly knowing that a theory is true. By critically examining canonical anti-behaviorist arguments and contemporary appeals to tacit knowledge, I have devised a more explicit characterization in which tacitly known theories must act as justifiers for claims that the tacit knower is capable of explicitly endorsing. In this manner the new account is specifically tied to verbal behavior. In addition, if the analysis is correct (...)
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  18. Jon Cogburn (2004). Paradox Lost. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):195 - 216.
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  19. Jon Cogburn (2004). Tonking a Theory of Content: An Inferentialist Rejoinder. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:31-55.
    If correct, Christopher Peacocke’s [20] “manifestationism without verificationism,” would explode the dichotomy between realism and inferentialism in the contemporary philosophy of language. I first explicate Peacocke’s theory, defending it from a criticism of Neil Tennant’s. This involves devising a recursive definition for grasp of logical contents along the lines Peacocke suggests. Unfortunately though, the generalized account reveals the Achilles’ heel of the whole theory. By inventing a new logical operator with the introduction rule for the existential quantifier and the elimination (...)
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  20. Jon Cogburn (2004). The Philosophical Basis of What? The Anti-Realist Route to Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press.
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  21. Jon Cogburn (2003). Manifest Invalidity: Neil Tennant's New Argument for Intuitionism. Synthese 134 (3):353 - 362.
    In Chapter 7 of The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant provides a new argument from Michael Dummett's ``manifestation requirement'' to the incorrectness of classical logic and the correctness of intuitionistic logic. I show that Tennant's new argument is only valid if one interprets crucial existence claims occurring in the proof in the manner of intuitionists. If one interprets the existence claims as a classical logician would, then one can accept Tennant's premises while rejecting his conclusion of logical revision. Thus, (...)
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  22. Jon Cogburn (2002). Logical Revision Re-Revisited: On the Wright/Salerno Case for Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 110 (3):231--248.
    In ``Revising the Logic of LogicalRevision'' (Philosophical Studies 99,211–227) J. Salerno attempts to undermineCrispin Wright's recent arguments forintuitionism, and to replace Wright andDummett's arguments with a revisionary argumentof his own. I show that Salerno's criticismsof Wright involve both attributing an inferenceto Wright that no intuitionist would make andfallaciously treating a negative universal asan existential negative. Then I show how verygeneral considerations about the nature ofwarrant undermine both Wright and Salerno'sarguments, when these arguments are applied todiscourses (...)
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  23. Roy T. Cook & Jon Cogburn (2000). What Negation is Not: Intuitionism and ‘0=1’. Analysis 60 (265):5–12.
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