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Profile: Jonathan Kvanvig (Washington University in St. Louis)
  1. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Pursuit of Knowledge and the Value of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely (...)
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  2.  33
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press 140--160.
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  3. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 339-353.
     
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  4.  65
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Pointless Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.
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  5. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 95-112.
     
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  6. Jonathan Kvanvig (2012). Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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  7. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by ...
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  8.  30
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 95--112.
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  9. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). ``Truth and the Epistemic Goal&Quot. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell 285-295.
     
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  10. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
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  11. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1992). The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
     
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  12.  63
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). Norms of Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 233--250.
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  13. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism. Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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  14.  54
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 89-112.
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  15.  88
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). ``Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):3-18.
    The flight from foundationalism in the earlier part of this century left several options in its wake. Distress over the possibility of foundationalist replies to the regress problem, coupled with consternation over the thought of circular reasoning mysteriously becoming acceptable as the circle gets large led to the attraction of holistic theories of a coherentist variety. Yet, such coherentisms seemed to leave the belief system cut off from the world, and perhaps a better idea was to abandon the approach to (...)
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  16. Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  17.  50
    Jon Kvanvig (ed.) (2008). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy ...
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  18.  5
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2014). Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think. OUP Oxford.
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.
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  19.  86
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
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  20.  17
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    Instead, it is a theory of what one should do, and assesses decisions based on probabilities and utilities. ... Adopting the plan of applying modern decision theory to one's choices might have lower expected utility than using other ...
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  21. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  22. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Restriction Strategies for Knowability : Some Lessons in False Hope. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. (...)
     
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  23.  75
    Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.
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  24. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
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  25. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
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  26.  31
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co. 43-62.
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  27.  47
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 456-484.
  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel (1990). The Basic Notion of Justification. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
    Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification (...)
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  29.  94
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
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  30.  91
    Jonathan Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153 - 158.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  31.  74
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: "Meno" Problems and Epistemological Axiology. The Monist 81 (3):426 - 451.
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  32.  48
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Affective Theism and People of Faith. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  33.  83
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?&Quot. The Monist 81 (3):426--451.
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  34.  63
    Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). Coherentists' Distractions. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):257-274.
    The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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  35.  85
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
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  36.  51
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). Subjective Justification. Mind 93 (369):71-84.
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  38.  59
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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  39.  57
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz 'Lapse'. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):137-146.
    Alvin Plantinga thinks Leibniz made a mistake. Leibniz claimed that God could have created any possible world, but Plantinga thinks this view amounts to a lapse in judgment on Leibniz =s part. = Plantinga terms this mistake ALeibniz= Lapse,@ and his rejection of this Leibuizian claim plays an important role in Plantinga =s free wili defense against the problem of evil. I will argue that Plantinga fails to show that Leibniz lapsed in thinking about which worlds are actualizable by God; (...)
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  40.  44
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
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  41. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Responses to Critics. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. OUP Oxford
    I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown.
     
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  42.  13
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Précis of the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 309--313.
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  43.  40
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1993). The Problem of Hell. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This work develops an understanding of hell that is common to a broad variety of religious perspectives, and argues that the usual understandings of hell are ...
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  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, (...)
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  45.  6
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. London: Macmillan Press.
  46.  48
    Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). Epistemic Justification. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge 25--36.
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  47.  6
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Virtue Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge 199--207.
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  48. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
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  49. Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) (2008). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume I. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it will publish exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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  50. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). ``Precìs of T He Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding &Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 309-313.
    Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely (...)
     
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