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Profile: Jon Erling Litland (University of Texas at Austin)
  1.  63
    Jon Erling Litland (2013). On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding. Essays in Philosophy 14 (1):3.
    I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.
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  2.  46
    Jon Erling Litland (2015). Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality. Philosophical Review 124 (4):481-532.
    Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a “completely satisfactory explanation” to shed light on (...)
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  3.  60
    Jon Erling Litland (2016). An Infinitely Descending Chain of Ground Without a Lower Bound. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1361-1369.
    Using only uncontentious principles from the logic of ground I construct an infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound. I then compare the construction to the constructions due to Dixon and Rabin and Rabern.
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  4.  22
    Jon Erling Litland (2016). Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground. Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):531-577.
    A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a “many-many” logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta. In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine’s State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic (...)
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  5.  59
    Jon Erling Litland (2012). Topics in Philosophical Logic. Dissertation, Harvard
    In “Proof-Theoretic Justification of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct use-based meaning-theories for the logical constants. The assertability-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequence-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction rules \, what are the strongest elimination rules that are validated by an assertability (...)
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