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Jon D. Ringen [3]Jon Ringen [3]Jond Ringen [1]
  1. Jon Ringen (1996). The Behavior Therapist's Dilemma: Reflections on Autonomy, Informed Consent, and Scientific Psychology. In William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. 352.
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  2. Jon Ringen (1993). Dennett's Intentions and Darwin's Legacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):386.
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  3. Robert Arr1ngton, Gareth Matthews, William Bechtel, Joseph C. Pitt, Jonathan Bennett, Ut Place, Alan Berger, Jond Ringen, Richard Creel & Alexander Rosenberg (1989). Ron Amundson J. Christopher Maloney. Behaviorism 17:85.
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  4. Jon Ringen (1985). Operant Conditioning and a Paradox of Teleology. Philosophy of Science 52 (4):565-577.
    The ambiguity to which Porpora (1980) objects in Wright's (1972, 1976) analysis of goal-directedness permits certain counterexamples to Porpora's analysis to be easily accommodated by Wright's. As a consequence, Ringen's (1976) claim that some operant behavior is goal-directed is in accord with Wright's analysis and with certain features of common sense that Wright's analysis captures. However, the way our commonsense conception of goal-directedness accommodates some of the counterexamples to Porpora's analysis suggests an intimate connection between goal-directedness and intentional notions like (...)
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  5. Jon D. Ringen (1984). B. F. Skinner's Operationism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):567.
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  6. Jon D. Ringen (1982). The Explanatory Import of Dispositions: A Defense of Scientific Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:122 - 133.
    It is widely assumed that disposition predicates do not designate entities which could be causal factors in the production of natural phenomena. Yet, the fact that an object has a given dispositional property is often taken to help explain behavior exhibited by objects to which the disposition is ascribed. Instrumentalist, realist, and rationalist analyses of disposition predicates embody three quite distinct views of how both assumptions could be correct. It is argued that the instrumentalist fails to capture basic intuitions concerning (...)
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  7. Jon D. Ringen (1976). Explanation, Teleology, and Operant Behaviorism. Philosophy of Science 43 (June):223-253.
    B. F. Skinner's claim that "operant behavior is essentially the field of purpose" is systematically explored. It is argued that Charles Taylor's illuminating analysis of the explanatory significance of common-sense goal-ascriptions (1) lends some (fairly restricted) support to Skinner's claim, (2) considerably clarifies the conceptual significance of differences between operant and respondent behavior and conditioning, and (3) undercuts influential assertions (e.g., Taylor's) that research programs for behavioristic psychology share a "mechanistic" orientation. A strategy is suggested for assessing the plausibility of (...)
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