9 found
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Jon Tresan [9]Jonathan Andrew Tresan [1]
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Profile: Jon Tresan (University of Rochester)
Profile: Jon Tresan (University of Rochester)
  1.  62
    Jon Tresan (2009). The Challenge of Communal Internalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):179-199.
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  2.  83
    Jon Tresan (2006). De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism. Noûs 40 (1):143–165.
  3.  67
    Jon Tresan (2009). Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51 - 72.
    ‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified (...)
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  4. Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan (2013). Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan. Acta Analytica 28 (2):229-235.
    We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possess justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very assumption (...)
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  5. Jon Tresan (2010). Question Authority: In Defense of Moral Naturalism Without Clout. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
    Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must reject. I argue that that (...)
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  6.  11
    Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan (2015). Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It? Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such (...)
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  7.  22
    Jon Tresan (2009). Role-Based Interpretations of Moral Judgments. Social Theory and Practice 35 (3):369-391.
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  8. Jon Tresan (2009). Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51-72.
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  9.  46
    Jon Tresan (2009). Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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