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Jonah N. Schupbach [12]Jonah N. Schupbach [1]
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Profile: Jonah N. Schupbach (University of Utah)
  1. Jonah N. Schupbach (2013). Is the Bad Lot Objection Just Misguided? Erkenntnis (1):1-10.
    In this paper, I argue that van Fraassen’s “bad lot objection” against Inference to the Best Explanation [IBE] severely misses its mark. First, I show that the objection holds no special relevance to IBE; if the bad lot objection poses a serious problem for IBE, then it poses a serious problem for any inference form whatever. Second, I argue that, thankfully, it does not pose a serious threat to any inference form. Rather, the objection misguidedly blames a form of inference (...)
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  2. Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, they suggest (...)
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  3. Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
    I show that the two most devastating objections to Shogenji's formal account of coherence necessarily involve information sets of cardinality . Given this, I surmise that the problem with Shogenji's measure has more to do with his means of generalizing the measure than with the measure itself. I defend this claim by offering an alternative generalization of Shogenji's measure. This alternative retains the intuitive merits of the original measure while avoiding both of the relevant problems that befall it. In the (...)
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  4. Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):813-829.
    Recently, in attempting to account for explanatory reasoning in probabilistic terms, Bayesians have proposed several measures of the degree to which a hypothesis explains a given set of facts. These candidate measures of "explanatory power" are shown to have interesting normative interpretations and consequences. What has not yet been investigated, however, is whether any of these measures are also descriptive of people’s actual explanatory judgments. Here, I present my own experimental work investigating this question. I argue that one measure in (...)
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  5. Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Studies in the Logic of Explanatory Power. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Human reasoning often involves explanation. In everyday affairs, people reason to hypotheses based on the explanatory power these hypotheses afford; I might, for example, surmise that my toddler has been playing in my office because I judge that this hypothesis delivers a good explanation of the disarranged state of the books on my shelves. But such explanatory reasoning also has relevance far beyond the commonplace. Indeed, explanatory reasoning plays an important role in such varied fields as the sciences, philosophy, theology, (...)
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  6. Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger (2011). The Logic of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.
    This article introduces and defends a probabilistic measure of the explanatory power that a particular explanans has over its explanandum. To this end, we propose several intuitive, formal conditions of adequacy for an account of explanatory power. Then, we show that these conditions are uniquely satisfied by one particular probabilistic function. We proceed to strengthen the case for this measure of explanatory power by proving several theorems, all of which show that this measure neatly corresponds to our explanatory intuitions. Finally, (...)
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  7. Stephan Hartmann & Jonah N. Schupbach (2010). Review of Michael Strevens, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6).
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  8. Jonah N. Schupbach (2010). Review of Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 63 (3):722-724.
  9. Jonah N. Schupbach (2008). On the Alleged Impossibility of Bayesian Coherentism. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):323-331.
    The success of Bovens and Hartmann’s recent “impossibility result” against Bayesian Coherentism relies upon the adoption of a specific set of ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, I argue that these conditions are not clearly appropriate; certain proposed coherence measures motivate different such conditions and also call for the rejection of at least one of Bovens and Hartmann’s conditions. I show that there exist sets of intuitively plausible ceteris paribus conditions that allow one to sidestep the impossibility result. This shifts (...)
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  10. Jonah N. Schupbach (2007). Must the Scientific Realist Be a Rationalist? Synthese 154 (2):329-334.
    Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen’s primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an “inferential wand” must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the (...)
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  11. Jonah N. Schupbach (2005). Paley's Inductive Inference to Design. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):491-502.
    In a recent article, Graham Oppy offers a lucid and intriguing examination of William Paley's design argument. Oppy sets two goals for his article. First, he sets out to challenge the "almost universal assumption" that Paley's argument is inductive by revealing it actually to be a deductive argument. Second, he attempts to expose Paley's argument as manifestly poor when interpreted in this way. I will argue that Oppy is unsuccessful in accomplishing his first goal, leaving his second goal quite irrelevant. (...)
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  12. Jonah N. Schupbach (2005). On a Bayesian Analysis of the Virtue of Unification. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):594-607.
    In three recent papers, Wayne Myrvold (1996, 2003) and Timothy McGrew (2003) have developed Bayesian accounts of the virtue of unification. In his account, McGrew demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, a hypothesis that unifies its evidence will have a higher posterior probability than a hypothesis that does not. Myrvold, on the other hand, offers a specific measure of unification that can be applied to individual hypotheses. He argues that one must account for this measure in order to calculate correctly the degree (...)
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  13. Michael Strevens, John Earman, Laura Ruetsche, Max Albert, Jonah N. Schupbach & Sean Allen‐Hermanson (2005). 10. Kent Staley: The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity and Bias in Collaborative Experimentation, Kent Staley: The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity and Bias in Collaborative Experimentation,(Pp. 659-661). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 72 (4).
     
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