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Profile: Jonas Olson (Stockholm University)
  1. Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.) (forthcoming). Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Jonas Olson (forthcoming). Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  3. Jonas Olson (forthcoming). Review of Simon Kirchin (Ed.), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  4. Jonas Olson (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oup Oxford.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  5. Jonas Olson (2014). The Personal and the Fitting. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):341-352.
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  6. Jonas Olson (2013). Buck‐Passing Accounts. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  7. Jonas Olson (2013). Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (Ed.). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):821-824.
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  8. Jonas Olson (2013). Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R.(Ed.) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, Pp. Xiv+ 352,£ 74.00 (Hardback). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):821-824.
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  9. Jonas Olson (2013). Review of Hume on Is and Ought, Edited by CR Pigden. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91:821-824.
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  10. Jonas Olson & Mark Timmons (2013). Ewing, AC. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  11. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2012). Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.
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  12. Jonas Olson (2012). Skorupski's Middle Way in Metaethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):192-200.
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  13. Jonas Olson (2011). Error Theory and Reasons for Belief. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  14. Jonas Olson (2011). Getting Real About Moral Fictionalism1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:181.
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  15. Jonas Olson (2011). In Defense of Moral Error Theory. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  16. Jonas Olson (2011). Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics. Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
    Commentators have attributed to Hume a wide variety of metaethical views. The main questions to be considered in this essay are whether Hume is a moral projectivist and whether he is a moral error theorist. Not surprisingly, these questions cannot be answered with an unqualified ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ We first need to get clear about what is meant by ‘moral projectivism’ and ‘moral error theory.’ I shall argue that Hume is a moral projectivist, and I shall identify two senses in (...)
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  17. Jonas Olson & Mark Timmons (2011). A.C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts About Metaethics. In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oup Oxford.
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  18. Jonas Olson (2010). The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It. Ratio 23 (1):87-101.
    Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and (...)
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  19. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  20. Jonas Olson (2009). Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365 - 378.
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...)
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  21. Jonas Olson (2009). Non-Naturalism. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press. 164.
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  22. Jonas Olson (2009). Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
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  23. Jonas Olson (2009). The Ethics of Care and Empathy • by M. Slote. Analysis 69 (1):190-192.
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  24. Jonas Olson (2009). The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 21 (2):225-232.
    The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.
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  25. Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson (2007). Brentano and the Buck-Passers. Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of (...)
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  26. Jonas Olson (2006). Welfare and Rational Care, by Stephen Darwall. Princeton University Press, 2002, Xi + 135 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):171-177.
  27. Jonas Olson (2006). G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
    Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said (...)
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  28. Jonas Olson (2006). Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
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  29. Jonas Olson (2006). Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Inuition and Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 115 (4):540-542.
  30. Jonas Olson (2006). Review of Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22:171-177.
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  31. Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson (2005). Regimenting Reasons. Theoria 61 (3):203-214.
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  32. Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such (...)
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  33. Jonas Olson (2004). Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...)
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  34. Jonas Olson (2003). Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different evaluative (...)
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  35. Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson (2003). A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict. Utilitas 15 (2):194-205.
    Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We (...)
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  36. Jonas Olson (2002). Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic? Inquiry 45 (1):89 – 96.
    In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tenability of the fetishist argument (as it has been (...)
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