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  1. Eva Feder Kittay, Carol Gilligan, Annette C. Baier, Michael Stocker, Christina H. Sommers, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Virginia Held, Thomas E. Hill Jr, Seyla Benhabib, George Sher, Marilyn Friedman, Jonathan Adler, Sara Ruddick, Mary Fainsod, David D. Laitin, Lizbeth Hasse & Sandra Harding (1989). Women and Moral Theory. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  2. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Testimony, Trust, Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
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  3.  11
    Jonathan E. Adler (1994). More on Race and Crime: Levin's Reply. Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2):105-114.
  4. Jonathan Adler (2008). Epistemological Problems of Testimony. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
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  6.  71
    Jonathan E. Adler (2006). Withdrawal and Contextualism. Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
  7. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm. Analysis 69 (3):407-411.
    The knowledge norm of assertion is mainly in competition with a high probability or rational credibility norm. The argument for the knowledge norm that I offer turns on cases in which a hearer responds to a speaker's assertion by asserting another sentence that would lower the probability of the speaker's assertion, were its probability less than one. In cases like this, though with qualifications, is the hearer's contribution a challenge to the speaker's assertion or complementary to it? My answer is (...)
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  8. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Transmitting Knowledge. Noûs 30 (1):99-111.
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  9.  26
    Jonathan Adler (2013). Are Conductive Arguments Possible? Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...)
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  10. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
  11.  78
    Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  12. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  13.  78
    Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  14. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment, Methods and Contextualism. Analysis 72 (3):526-534.
    Defence of conditions to withdraw an assertion that require evidence or epistemic reasons that the assertion is not true or warranted. (Adler, J. 2006. Withdrawal and contextualism. Analysis 66: 280–85) The defence replies to the claim that better methods justify withdrawal without meeting that requirement and without pragmatic encroachment.
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  15. Jonathan E. Adler (1987). Luckless Desert is Different Desert. Mind 96 (382):247-249.
  16.  93
    Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
  17. Jonathan H. Adler (2009). Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called (FME), is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely to contribute (...)
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  18.  13
    Jonathan Adler (2003). The Revisability Paradox. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):383–390.
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  19. Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press
  20.  11
    Jonathan E. Adler (1984). Abstraction is Uncooperative. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):165–181.
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  21.  67
    Jonathan E. Adler (1990). Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation. Mind 99 (396):559-570.
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  22.  8
    Jonathan E. Adler (2004). Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW] Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.
    Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the ‘dialectical tier’ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson’s dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a (...)
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  23.  9
    Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy. Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):329 - 343.
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  24.  14
    Jonathan E. Adler & J. Anthony Blair (2000). Belief and Negation. Informal Logic 20 (3).
    This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
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  25.  39
    Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Sticks and Stones: A Reply to Warren. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):639-655.
  26.  35
    Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Conundrums of Belief Self-Control. The Monist 85 (3):456-467.
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  27.  60
    Jonathan E. Adler (1975). Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):167 – 170.
  28.  83
    Jonathan Adler (2007). Argumentation and Distortion. Episteme 4 (3):382-401.
    Why is there so much misrepresentation of arguments in public forums? Standard explanations, such as self-interested biases, are insufficient. An additional part of the explanation is our commitment to, or belief in, norms that disallow responses that amount to no firm judgment, as contrasted with definite agreement or disagreement. In disallowing no-firm-judgment responses, these norms deny not only degrees of support or dissent and a variety of ways of suspending judgment, but also indifference. Since these norms leave us with only (...)
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  29.  63
    Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  30.  68
    Jonathan E. Adler (1989). Epistemics and the Total Evidence Requirement. Philosophia 19 (2-3):227-243.
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  31.  17
    Jonathan E. Adler (1982). Jennifer Trusted, "The Logic of Scientific Inference". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 32 (28):291.
  32.  15
    Jonathan E. Adler (1983). Human Rationality: Essential Conflicts, Multiple Ideals. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245.
  33.  32
    Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Reasonableness, Bias, and the Untapped Power of Procedure. Synthese 94 (1):105 - 125.
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  34.  51
    Jonathan E. Adler (1981). Skepticism and Universalizability. Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.
  35.  25
    Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Crime Rates by Race and Causal Relevance: A Reply to Levin. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1):176-184.
  36.  3
    Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Testimony, Trust, Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
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  37.  42
    David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton (1980). Critical Notice. Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.
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  38.  14
    Jonathan Adler, Arguing From Ignorance.
    Arguments from ignorance should be schematized: It has not been proven false that p. So it is possible that p. So, it is reasonable to believe p. Also, in opposition to standard views they should be distinguished from burden of proof and absence of evidence arguments. Much of the persuasiveness of such arguments can be located in the slippery uses of "possible." Besides equivocations on "possible" the argument is a fallacy for two reasons. First, the possibility implied by the first (...)
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  39.  17
    Jonathan E. Adler (1986). Knowing, Betting and Cohering. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):243-257.
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  40.  11
    Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):271 – 282.
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  41.  39
    Jonathan E. Adler (2000). First-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):577-580.
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  42.  11
    Jonathan Adler (1990). Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin. Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):711-716.
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  43. Jonathan E. Adler (1987). Exercises in Naturalistic Epistemology. Behaviorism 15 (2):161-164.
     
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  44.  44
    Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  45. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Resisting the Force of Argument. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):339-364.
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  46.  16
    Jonathan E. Adler (1977). Book Review:Local Induction Radu J. Bogdan. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 44 (1):173-.
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  47.  15
    Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):37-52.
    A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa (...)
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  48.  17
    Jonathan E. Adler (1991). Critical Thinking, A Deflated Defense: A Critical Study of John E. McPeck's Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic. Informal Logic 13 (2).
    A critical study of McPeck's recent book, in which he strengthens and develops his arguments against teaching critical thinking (CT). Accepting McPeck's basic claim that there is no unitary skill of reasoning or thinking, I argue that his strictures on CT courses or programs do not follow. I set out what I consider the proper justification that programs in CT have to meet, and argue both that McPeck demands much more than is required, and also that it is plausible that (...)
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  49.  9
    Jonathan E. Adler (1986). Motivated Irrationality by David Pears. Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):119-123.
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  50.  9
    Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Fallacies Not Fallacious: Not! Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):333 - 350.
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