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  1. Owen J. Flanagan Jr & Jonathan E. Adler (forthcoming). Impartiality and Particularity. Social Research.
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  2. Jonathan Adler (2013). Are Conductive Arguments Possible? Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...)
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  3. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  4. Jonathan H. Adler (2012). Is the Common Law a Free-Market Solution to Pollution? Critical Review 24 (1):61-85.
    Whereas conventional analyses characterize environmental problems as examples of market failure, proponents of free-market environmentalism (FME) consider the problem to be a lack of markets and, in particular, a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights. Enforcing property rights alleviates disputes about, as well as the overuse of, most natural resources. FME diagnoses of pollution are much weaker, however. Most FME proponents suggest that common-law tort suits can adequately protect private property and ecological resources from pollution. Yet such claims have (...)
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  5. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  6. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  7. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm. Analysis 69 (3):407-411.
    The knowledge norm of assertion is mainly in competition with a high probability or rational credibility norm. The argument for the knowledge norm that I offer turns on cases in which a hearer responds to a speaker's assertion by asserting another sentence that would lower the probability of the speaker's assertion, were its probability less than one. In cases like this, though with qualifications, is the hearer's contribution a challenge to the speaker's assertion or complementary to it? My answer is (...)
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  8. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Review of Sanford C. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
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  9. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Resisting the Force of Argument. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):339-364.
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  10. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Why Fallibility has Not Mattered and How It Could. In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press. 83.
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  11. Jonathan H. Adler (2009). Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called (FME), is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely to contribute (...)
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  12. Jonathan Adler, Epistemological Problems of Testimony. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  13. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Conversation is the Folks' Epistemology. Philosophical Forum 39 (3):337-348.
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  14. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Presupposition, Attention, and Why Questions. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. 748--764.
     
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  15. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Surprise. Educational Theory 58 (2):149-173.
    Surprise is of great value for learning, especially in cases where deep‐seated preconceptions and assumptions are upset by vivid demonstrations. In this essay, Jonathan Adler explores the ways in which surprise positively affects us and serves as a valuable tool for motivating learning. Adler considers how students’ attention is aroused and focused self‐critically when their subject matter–related expectations are not borne out. These “surprises” point students toward discoveries about gaps or weaknesses or false assumptions within their subject matter understanding; as (...)
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  16. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Sticks and Stones: A Reply to Warren. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):639-655.
  17. Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) (2008). Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents (...)
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  18. Jonathan Adler & Iakovos Vasiliou (2008). Inferring Character From Reasoning: The Example of Euthyphro. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):43 - 56.
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  19. Jonathan Adler (2007). Argumentation and Distortion. Episteme 4 (3):382-401.
    Why is there so much misrepresentation of arguments in public forums? Standard explanations, such as self-interested biases, are insufficient. An additional part of the explanation is our commitment to, or belief in, norms that disallow responses that amount to no firm judgment, as contrasted with definite agreement or disagreement. In disallowing no-firm-judgment responses, these norms deny not only degrees of support or dissent and a variety of ways of suspending judgment, but also indifference. Since these norms leave us with only (...)
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  20. Jonathan E. Adler, Commentary on Cohen.
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  21. Jonathan E. Adler, Distortion and Excluded Middles.
    Why is there so much distortion in ordinary, political, social, and ethical argument? Since we have a pervasive interest in reasoning well and corresponding abilities, the extent of distortion invites explanation. The leading candidates are the need to economize, widespread, fallacious heuristics or assumptions, and self-defensive biases. I argue that these are not sufficient. An additional force is the intellectual pressure generated by acceptance of norms of conversation and argument, which exclude ‘middles’ of, prominently, neither accept nor reject . I (...)
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  22. Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
     
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  23. Jonathan E. Adler (2006). Withdrawal and Contextualism. Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
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  24. Jonathan Eric Adler (2006). Confidence in Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.
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  25. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues. Veritas 50 (4):37-52.
    A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa (...)
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  26. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Epistemic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):739-742.
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  27. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  28. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
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  29. Jonathan E. Adler (2004). Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW] Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.
    Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the ‘dialectical tier’ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson’s dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a (...)
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  30. Jonathan E. Adler, Martin Benjamin, James P. Cadello, Steven M. Cahn, Joan C. Callahan, Jo A. Chern, Stephen H. Daniel, Juli Eflin, Carrie Figdor, Newton Garver, Theodore A. Gracyk, Lawrence H. Hinman, Eugene Kelly, David Martens, Michael Martin, John McCumber, John J. McDermott, Marshall Missner, Kathleen Dean Moore, Ronald Moore, Louis P. Pojman, Anthony Weston, Merold Westphal, V. Alan White & Celia Wolf-Devine (2004). Teaching Philosophy: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Suggestions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Here, two dozen distinguished philosophers share their insights and practical suggestions on a diverse range of pedagogic issues with essays on how to motivate students, constructing syllabi for particular courses, teaching particularly complex concepts, and constructing creative examinations.
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  31. Jonathan Adler (2003). The Revisability Paradox. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):383–390.
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  32. Jonathan E. Adler, Commentary on Kauffeld & Fields.
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  33. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  34. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Conundrums of Belief Self-Control. The Monist 85 (3):456-467.
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  35. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Review of Renee Elio (Ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (11).
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  36. Jonathan Adler & Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87-97.
    Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the “generality problem” is illusory.
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  37. Jonathan Adler, Commentary on Hitchcock.
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  38. Jonathan Adler, Commentary on Powers.
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  39. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). First-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):577-580.
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  40. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  41. Jonathan E. Adler & J. Anthony Blair (2000). Belief and Negation. Informal Logic 20 (3).
    This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
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  42. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). Affirming a Straw Man: A Reply to Bowles. [REVIEW] Argumentation 13 (1):17-26.
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  43. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). Epistemic Dependence, Diversity of Ideas, and a Value of Intellectual Vices. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:117-129.
    The present argument assumes that teaching through modeling attempts to teach the intellectual virtues not primarily as an independent goal of education as, for example, a way to build good character, but for its value to inquiry. I argue that intellectual vices (such as being gullible, dogmatic, pigheaded, or prejudiced)—while harmful to inquiry in certain ways—are essential to its well functioning. Furthermore, to the extent that teaching models critical inquiry, there are educational lessons for which some students ought to take (...)
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  44. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
  45. Jonathan Adler, Arguing From Ignorance.
    Arguments from ignorance should be schematized: It has not been proven false that p. So it is possible that p. So, it is reasonable to believe p. Also, in opposition to standard views they should be distinguished from burden of proof and absence of evidence arguments. Much of the persuasiveness of such arguments can be located in the slippery uses of "possible." Besides equivocations on "possible" the argument is a fallacy for two reasons. First, the possibility implied by the first (...)
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  46. Jonathan Adler, Commentary on Pinto.
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  47. Jonathan Adler (1997). Report of a Year Working on Inlproving Teaching and Learning. Inquiry 16 (3):35-41.
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  48. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot (...)
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  49. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Fallacies Not Fallacious: Not! Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):333 - 350.
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