Search results for 'Jonathan Eric Adler' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) (2008). Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.score: 870.0
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents (...)
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  2. Jonathan Eric Adler (2006). Confidence in Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.score: 870.0
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  3. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner (eds.) (2001). Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives. University of Chicago Press.score: 480.0
    Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used governmental evaluation tool, though academics remain skeptical. This volume gathers prominent contributors from law, economics, and philosophy for discussion of cost-benefit analysis, specifically its moral foundations, applications and limitations. This new scholarly debate includes not only economists, but also contributors from philosophy, cognitive psychology, legal studies, and public policy who can further illuminate the justification and moral implications of this method and specify alternative measures. These articles originally appeared in the Journal of Legal Studies. (...)
     
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  4. J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.score: 300.0
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  5. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.score: 240.0
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  6. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm. Analysis 69 (3):407-411.score: 240.0
  7. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.score: 240.0
  8. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Testimony, Trust, Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.score: 240.0
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  9. Jonathan Adler, Epistemological Problems of Testimony. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 240.0
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  10. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.score: 240.0
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  11. Jonathan H. Adler (2009). Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.score: 240.0
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called (FME), is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely to contribute (...)
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  12. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.score: 240.0
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  13. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Resisting the Force of Argument. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):339-364.score: 240.0
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  14. Jonathan E. Adler (1975). Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):167 – 170.score: 240.0
  15. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Conversation is the Folks' Epistemology. Philosophical Forum 39 (3):337-348.score: 240.0
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  16. Jonathan Adler (2007). Argumentation and Distortion. Episteme 4 (3):382-401.score: 240.0
    Why is there so much misrepresentation of arguments in public forums? Standard explanations, such as self-interested biases, are insufficient. An additional part of the explanation is our commitment to, or belief in, norms that disallow responses that amount to no firm judgment, as contrasted with definite agreement or disagreement. In disallowing no-firm-judgment responses, these norms deny not only degrees of support or dissent and a variety of ways of suspending judgment, but also indifference. Since these norms leave us with only (...)
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  17. Jonathan Adler & Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87-97.score: 240.0
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  18. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.score: 240.0
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  19. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.score: 240.0
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  20. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.score: 240.0
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  21. Jonathan E. Adler (1989). Epistemics and the Total Evidence Requirement. Philosophia 19 (2-3):227-243.score: 240.0
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  22. Jonathan E. Adler (2006). Withdrawal and Contextualism. Analysis 66 (4):280–285.score: 240.0
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  23. Jonathan E. Adler (1987). Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.score: 240.0
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  24. Jonathan E. Adler (1987). Luckless Desert is Different Desert. Mind 96 (382):247-249.score: 240.0
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  25. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Sticks and Stones: A Reply to Warren. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):639-655.score: 240.0
  26. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Review of Sanford C. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).score: 240.0
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  27. Jonathan E. Adler (1981). Skepticism and Universalizability. Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.score: 240.0
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  28. Jonathan E. Adler (1983). A Note on Defeasibility and Skepticism. Philosophia 12 (3-4):299-305.score: 240.0
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  29. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Transmitting Knowledge. Noûs 30 (1):99-111.score: 240.0
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  30. Jonathan E. Adler (1990). Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation. Mind 99 (396):559-570.score: 240.0
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  31. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism. Analysis 56 (2):80–84.score: 240.0
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  32. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.score: 240.0
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  33. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.score: 240.0
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot (...)
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  34. Jonathan E. Adler (1983). Gareth Matthews on Philosophy and the Young Child. Metaphilosophy 14 (1):63–71.score: 240.0
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  35. Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Crime Rates by Race and Causal Relevance: A Reply to Levin. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1):176-184.score: 240.0
  36. Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Indirect Learning and the Aims-Curricula Fallacy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 27 (2):223–232.score: 240.0
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  37. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). If the Base Rate Fallacy is a Fallacy, Does It Matter How Frequently It is Committed? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):774-775.score: 240.0
    In many base rate studies, a judgment is required for which the base rates are relevant, and subjects do not use them. It is inferred that the base rates are ignored; I question this inference. Second, I argue that the base rate fallacy is not less significant for what it reveals about human reasoning, if it occurs less frequently than has been alleged.
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  38. David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton (1980). Critical Notice. Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.score: 240.0
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  39. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). First-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):577-580.score: 240.0
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  40. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Surprise. Educational Theory 58 (2):149-173.score: 240.0
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  41. Jonathan E. Adler (1995). Book Review:Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Mark Johnson. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (2):401-.score: 240.0
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  42. Jonathan Adler (2013). Are Conductive Arguments Possible? Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.score: 240.0
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...)
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  43. Jonathan E. Adler (1984). Abstraction is Uncooperative. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):165–181.score: 240.0
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  44. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.score: 240.0
  45. Jonathan Adler (2003). The Revisability Paradox. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):383–390.score: 240.0
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  46. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). More on Race and Crime: Levin's Reply. Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2):105-114.score: 240.0
  47. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy. Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):329 - 343.score: 240.0
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  48. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):271 – 282.score: 240.0
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  49. Jonathan E. Adler (1991). Critical Thinking, A Deflated Defense: A Critical Study of John E. McPeck's Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic. Informal Logic 13 (2).score: 240.0
    A critical study of McPeck's recent book, in which he strengthens and develops his arguments against teaching critical thinking (CT). Accepting McPeck's basic claim that there is no unitary skill of reasoning or thinking, I argue that his strictures on CT courses or programs do not follow. I set out what I consider the proper justification that programs in CT have to meet, and argue both that McPeck demands much more than is required, and also that it is plausible that (...)
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  50. Jonathan E. Adler (1981). Why Be Charitable? Informal Logic 4 (2).score: 240.0
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