4 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
  1. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (forthcoming). Justification is Potential Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Justification is potential knowledge. . ???aop.label???
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2013). Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):282-292.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) makes a strong prima facie case for the identification of a subject's total evidence with the subject's total knowledge (E = K). However, as Brian Weatherson (Ms) has observed, there are intuitively problematic consequences of E = K. In this article, I'll offer a contextualist implementation of E = K that provides the resources to respond to Weatherson's argument; the result will be a novel approach to knowledge and evidence that is suggestive of an unexplored contextualist approach (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2013). The Rules of Thought. Oxford University Press.
    Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought 1 (1):49-55.
    I argue that evaluating the knowledge norm of practical reasoning is less straightforward than is often assumed in the literature. In particular, cases in which knowledge is intuitively present, but action is intuitively epistemically unwarranted, provide no traction against the knowledge norm. The knowledge norm indicates what it is appropriately to hold a particular content as a reason for action; it does not provide a theory of what reasons are sufficient for what actions. Absent a general theory about what sorts (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation