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Profile: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
  1. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2013). The Rules of Thought. Oxford University Press.
    Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
     
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    Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2015). Ignorance and Presuppositions. Mind 124 (496):1207-1219.
    I develop a class of counterexamples to Blome-Tillmann’s ‘Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism’. There are cases in which subjects are ignorant of key propositions that are inconsistent with the pragmatic presuppositions in conversational contexts in which they are discussed; in such contexts, PEC wrongly predicts the subjects to satisfy certain ‘knows’ attributions.
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  3. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
    I argue that evaluating the knowledge norm of practical reasoning is less straightforward than is often assumed in the literature. In particular, cases in which knowledge is intuitively present, but action is intuitively epistemically unwarranted, provide no traction against the knowledge norm. The knowledge norm indicates what it is appropriately to hold a particular content as a reason for action; it does not provide a theory of what reasons are sufficient for what actions. Absent a general theory about what sorts (...)
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  4. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2014). Justification is Potential Knowledge. 44 (2):184-206.
    This paper will articulate and defend a novel theory of epistemic justification; I characterize my view as the thesis that justification is potential knowledge . My project is an instance of the ‘knowledge-first’ programme, championed especially by Timothy Williamson. So I begin with a brief recapitulation of that programme.
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    Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2013). Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):282-292.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) makes a strong prima facie case for the identification of a subject's total evidence with the subject's total knowledge (E = K). However, as Brian Weatherson (Ms) has observed, there are intuitively problematic consequences of E = K. In this article, I'll offer a contextualist implementation of E = K that provides the resources to respond to Weatherson's argument; the result will be a novel approach to knowledge and evidence that is suggestive of an unexplored contextualist approach (...)
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  6. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis (2013). The Rules of Thought. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Rules of Thought develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Ichikawa and Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike. Part I develops a Fregean theory of mental content, according to which rational relations between propositions play a central role in individuating contents; the theory is sensitive not only to Frege's puzzle and other data that (...)
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  7. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis (2016). The Rules of Thought. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
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