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  1. Jonathan Knowles & Henrik Rydenfelt (eds.) (forthcoming). Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism. Peter Lang Publishing.
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  2. Jonathan Knowles (2013). Scientific Metaphysics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):210-211.
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  3. Jonathan Knowles (2013). Scientific Metaphysics: Ross Don, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (Eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. X+ 243,£ 35 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  4. Jonathan Knowles (2011). Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, Eds. , Naturalism and Normativity . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 31 (1):11-15.
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  5. Truls Wyller, Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.) (2011). Kant, Here, Now, and How: Essays in Honour of Truls Wyller. Mentis.
     
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  6. Jonathan Knowles (2008). What is Naturalism? Towards a Univocal Theory. SATS 9 (2):28-57.
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  7. Jonathan Knowles (2006). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1).
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  8. Jonathan Knowles (2006). Theory of Science: A Short Introduction. Tapir Akademisk Forlag.
  9. Jonathan Knowles (2005). Book Reviews - Tim Crane, the Mechanical Mind, 2nd Edition, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, XI + 259, $22.95, ISBN 0-415-29030-9 (Hardback), 0-415-29031-7 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (2):259-264.
  10. Jonathan Knowles (2003). Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology. Palgrave.
    Jonathan Knowles argues against theories that seek to provide specific norms for the formation of belief on the basis of empirical sources: the project of naturalized epistemology. He argues that such norms are either not genuinely normative for belief, or are not required for optimal belief formation. An exhaustive classification of such theories is motivated and each variety is discussed in turn. He distinguishes naturalized epistemology from the less committal idea of naturalism, which provides a sense in which we can (...)
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  11. Jonathan Knowles (2002). Is Folk Psychology Different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
    In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very (...)
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  12. Jonathan Knowles (2002). Naturalised Epistemology Without Norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):283-297.
    I seek to show that we do not need norms in a genuinely naturalistic epistemology. The argumentation is launched against a common conception of such norms as derived through a process of wide reflective equilibrium, where one aims to bring general normative statements into accord with concrete, possibly expert, intuitions about particular cases, taking simultaneously into account relevant scientific findings -- including facts about human psychological abilities -- and philosophical theories. According to this line, it is possible thus to arrive (...)
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  13. Jonathan Knowles (2002). What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.
    The article presents a critical discussion of Larry Laudan's naturalistic metamethodological theory known as normative naturalism (NN). I examine the strongest extant objection to NN, and, with reference to ideas in Freedman ( Philosophy of Science , 66 (Proceedings), pp. S526-S537, 1999), show how NN survives it. I then go on to outline two problems that really do compromise NN. The first revolves around Laudan's conception of the relationship between scientific values and the history of science. Laudan argues we can (...)
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  14. Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the (...)
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  15. Jonathan Knowles (2000). Knowledge of Grammar as a Propositional Attitude. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):325 – 353.
    Noam Chomsky claims that we know the grammatical principles of our languages in pretty much the same sense that we know ordinary things about the world (e.g. facts), a view about linguistic knowledge that I term ''cognitivism''. In much recent philosophy of linguistics (including that sympathetic to Chomsky's general approach to language), cognitivism has been rejected in favour of an account of grammatical competence as some or other form of mental mechanism, describable at various levels of abstraction (''non-cognitivism''). I argue (...)
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  16. Jonathan Knowles (1999). Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):164-81.
    I focus on Fodor’s model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor’s picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau’s and Macdonald’s (...)
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  17. Jonathan Knowles (1998). The Language of Thought and Natural Language Understanding. Analysis 58 (4):264-272.
    Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis have recently argued that certain kinds of regress arguments against the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis as an account of how we understand natural languages have been answered incorrectly or inadequately by supporters of LOT ('Regress arguments against the language of thought', Analysis, 57 (1), 60-6, J 97). They argue further that this does not undermine the LOT hypothesis, since the main sources of support for LOT are (or might be) independent of it providing an (...)
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