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Profile: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
  1. Jonathan Kvanvig, Further Thoughts on the Swamping Problem.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new valuedriven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. Issues concerning epistemic value, however, are not new. We can find them first in Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno have a discussion about what type of guide one should prefer if one wants to get to Larissa. The first suggestion is that one should want a guide who knows the way, but Socrates notes that a guide with true (...)
     
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  2. Jonathan Kvanvig, Heaven and Hell.
    Philosophical reflection concerning heaven and hell has focused on the place of such doctrines in the great monotheistic religions emanating from the religion of the ancient people of Israel--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The philosophical issues that arise concerning these doctrines is not limited to such traditions, however. Consider, for example, the doctrine of hell. Any religion promises certain benefits to its adherents, and these benefits require some contrast that befalls, or might befall, those who fail to adhere to the religion (...)
     
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  3. Jonathan Kvanvig, Jonathan Edwards on Hell.
    Every religion offers both hope and fear. They offer hope in virtue of the benefits promised to adherents, and fear in virtue of costs incurred by adversaries. In traditional Christianity, the costs incurred are expressed in terms of the doctrine of hell, according to which each person consigned to hell receives the same infinite punishment. This strong view of hell involves four distinct theses. First, it maintains that those in hell exist forever in that state (the Existence Thesis) and that (...)
     
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  4. Jonathan Kvanvig, Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
    Craig claims that my treatment of temporal indexicals such as ‘now’ is inadequate, and that my theory gives no general account of tense. Craig’s argument misunderstands the theory of indexicals I give, and I show how to extend the theory to give a general account of tense.
     
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  5. Jonathan Kvanvig, Response to Flint.
    In defending his rejection of Maverick Molinism (Faith and Philosophy 20.1, (January 2003), pp. 91-100) from my criticisms (Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357), Tom Flint attributes three central claims to my argument, and disagrees with two of them. He also notes my request for a defense of the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, which his argument employs. He portrays that discussion as taking “potshots” at his argument, in part because I denied that concerns about the Law are compelling, (...)
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  6. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Epistemic Paradoxes.
    The four primary epistemic paradoxes are the lottery, preface, knowability, and surprise examination paradoxes. The lottery paradox begins by imagining a fair lottery with a thousand tickets in it. Each ticket is so unlikely to win that we are justified in believing that it will lose.
     
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  7. Jonathan Kvanvig, Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
     
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  8. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (unknown). Phil 418: Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 99:211 - 227.
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  9. Jonathan Kvanvig, “Five Questions” by Jonathan L. Kvanvig.
    I came to epistemology through an interest in the concept of rationality, and especially through the attacks on the rationality of religious believers. My thoughts at the time focused on the disappointing quality of the arguments for and against religious belief, and I recall being astonished at the time that philosophers capable of such penetrating insight in other areas had nothing that seemed either penetrating or original. The defenders sounded too much like mere apologists for the faith, and the attackers (...)
     
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  10. Jonathan Kvanvig, Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell.
    Philosophical reflection concerning the afterlife has focused on the place of such doctrines in the great monotheistic religions of the Abrahamic tradition--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The philosophical issues that arise concerning these doctrines is not limited to such traditions, however. Consider, for example, the doctrine of hell. Any religion promises certain benefits to its adherents, and these benefits require some contrast that befalls, or might befall, those who fail to adhere to the religion in question. This contrast to the benefits (...)
     
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  11. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Traditional and Limited Doctrines of Omniscience.
     
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  12. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (forthcoming). , An Epistemic Theory of Creation. In Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology. 233-297 ms..
  13. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Affective Theism and People of Faith. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  14. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Theories of Providence and Creation. Res Philosophica 90 (1):49-67.
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  15. Jonathan Kvanvig (2012). Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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  16. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
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  17. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Disagreement and Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), New Essays on Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Epistemic Encroachment and Responsibility: Two Approaches to Norms of Assertion&Quot. In John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  19. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument&Quot. In Peter Klein & John Turri (eds.), Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  20. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Skeptical Theism&Quot. In Trent Dougherty, Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), New Essays on Skeptical Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  21. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Kelly Becker (ed.), New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  22. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). Norms of Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 233--250.
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  23. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). Of Reflective Ascent. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 34.
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  24. Jonathan Kvanvig (2011). The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  25. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    Instead, it is a theory of what one should do, and assesses decisions based on probabilities and utilities. ... Adopting the plan of applying modern decision theory to one's choices might have lower expected utility than using other ...
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  26. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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  27. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (2011). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
     
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  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). ``The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  29. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). Epistemic Justification. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 25--36.
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  30. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox. Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105.
    The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the extent (...)
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  31. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Coherentism&Quot. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press.
     
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  32. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Epistemic Justification&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
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  33. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  34. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Sosa's Virtue Epistemology. Critica 42 (125):47 - 62.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that (...)
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  35. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 89-112.
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  36. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Virtue Epistemology&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
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  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Virtue Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 199--207.
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  38. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
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  39. Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) (2009). Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2. OUP Oxford.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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  40. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). ``Precìs of T He Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding &Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309-313.
    Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely (...)
     
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  41. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Restriction Strategies for Knowability : Some Lessons in False Hope. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. (...)
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  42. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Responses to Critics. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oup Oxford.
    I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown.
     
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  43. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95--112.
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  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries&Quot. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
     
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  45. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Précis of the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309--313.
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  46. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell&Quot. In Charles Taliaferro & Paul Draper (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 630-639.
     
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  47. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
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  48. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope&Quot. In Joseph Salerno (ed.), New Essays on Knowability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 205-222.
  49. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339-353.
     
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  50. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``The Value of Understanding&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95-112.
     
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