125 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Jonathan L. Kvanvig [125]Jonathan Lee Kvanvig [1]
See also:
Profile: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
  1. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Pursuit of Knowledge and the Value of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   117 citations  
  2. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 95-112.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  3. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  4. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1992). The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  5. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). ``Truth and the Epistemic Goal&Quot. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell 285-295.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  6.  3
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2014). Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think. OUP Oxford.
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 339-353.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  8.  53
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 89-112.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  16
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    Instead, it is a theory of what one should do, and assesses decisions based on probabilities and utilities. ... Adopting the plan of applying modern decision theory to one's choices might have lower expected utility than using other ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10.  84
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  11. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  12.  73
    Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  13.  28
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co. 43-62.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  14. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  46
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 456-484.
  17.  43
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  18.  80
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?&Quot. The Monist 81 (3):426--451.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  19.  46
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  20.  52
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  73
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: "Meno" Problems and Epistemological Axiology. The Monist 81 (3):426 - 451.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  13
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Précis of the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 309--313.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23.  40
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1993). The Problem of Hell. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This work develops an understanding of hell that is common to a broad variety of religious perspectives, and argues that the usual understandings of hell are ...
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  24.  85
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  56
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz 'Lapse'. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):137-146.
    Alvin Plantinga thinks Leibniz made a mistake. Leibniz claimed that God could have created any possible world, but Plantinga thinks this view amounts to a lapse in judgment on Leibniz =s part. = Plantinga terms this mistake ALeibniz= Lapse,@ and his rejection of this Leibuizian claim plays an important role in Plantinga =s free wili defense against the problem of evil. I will argue that Plantinga fails to show that Leibniz lapsed in thinking about which worlds are actualizable by God; (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel (1990). The Basic Notion of Justification. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
    Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  27. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). Subjective Justification. Mind 93 (369):71-84.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  6
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. London: Macmillan Press.
  30.  6
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Virtue Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge 199--207.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by addressing eschatological matters and the doctrines of heaven and hell and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation. Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential control over all aspects of creation, with a conception of human beings who are free and (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  26
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34.  82
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  35
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). ``He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz' Lapse&Quot. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):137-146.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  24
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37.  40
    Hugh J. McCann & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1991). The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism. Philosophical Perspectives 5:587-615.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  38.  71
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). A Critique of Van Fraassen's Voluntaristic Epistemology. Synthese 98 (2):325-348.
    Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39.  45
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Affective Theism and People of Faith. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  40. Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Tennant on Knowability&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:422-428.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41.  56
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Conservatism and its Virtues. Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.
  42.  18
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):173-190.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). ``The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Boston: Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46.  58
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
    attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting in some sense. Thus, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  83
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
    Foundationalism came under attack in two areas in the first half of this century. First, some doubted whether the foundations were adequate to support the entire structure of knowledge, and second, the doctrine of the Agiven@ came under serious attack. = However, many epistemologists were not convinced that foundationalism was to be abandoned even if the criticisms were granted. According to these epistemologist, far from having shown that foundationalism itself was at fault, the critics of foundationalism had only been attacking (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Hugh J. McCann (1988). ``Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World&Quot. In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 13-49.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Pointless Truth&Quot. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32:199-212.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  18
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2001). ``Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):369-376.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 125