114 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Jonathan L. Kvanvig [115]Jonathan Lee Kvanvig [1]
See also:
Profile: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
  1. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (unknown). Phil 418: Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 99:211 - 227.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Traditional and Limited Doctrines of Omniscience.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (forthcoming). , An Epistemic Theory of Creation. In Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology. 233-297 ms..
  4. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2014). Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think. Oup Oxford.
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Affective Theism and People of Faith. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  6. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2013). Theories of Providence and Creation. Res Philosophica 90 (1):49-67.
    Einstein was notoriously confident that God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Perhaps it is a confidence born of a deeper modal presumption: that Godcouldn’t play dice with the universe. If so, such confidence almost certainly disappoints. Even if God doesn’t play dice with the universe, he might. Thus arises the issue here addressed: what implications does this datum have for a proper understanding of divine providence? My interest is in theories that aim to present complete theories of providence, ones (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Disagreement and Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), New Essays on Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Epistemic Encroachment and Responsibility: Two Approaches to Norms of Assertion&Quot. In John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument&Quot. In Peter Klein & John Turri (eds.), Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Skeptical Theism&Quot. In Trent Dougherty, Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), New Essays on Skeptical Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Kelly Becker (ed.), New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    Instead, it is a theory of what one should do, and assesses decisions based on probabilities and utilities. ... Adopting the plan of applying modern decision theory to one's choices might have lower expected utility than using other ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (2011). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). ``The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent&Quot. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Coherentism&Quot. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Epistemic Justification&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Sosa's Virtue Epistemology. Critica 42 (125):47 - 62.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 89-112.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Virtue Epistemology&Quot. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). Virtue Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 199--207.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries&Quot. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Précis of the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309--313.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell&Quot. In Charles Taliaferro & Paul Draper (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 630-639.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope&Quot. In Joseph Salerno (ed.), New Essays on Knowability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 205-222.
  29. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339-353.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). The Value of Understanding. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95-112.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 456-484.
  32. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Contrastivism and Closure&Quot. Social Epistemology 22:247-256.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). Five Questions About Epistemology. In Duncan Pritchard & Vincent Hendricks (eds.), Epistemology: 5 Questions. London: Automatic Press/Vip.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Hell&Quot. In Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 413-427.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Pointless Truth&Quot. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32:199-212.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). Closure Principles. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``Epistemic Closure Principles&Quot. Philosophy Compass 1:256-267.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``The Value of Knowledge and Truth&Quot. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Macmillan Reference Books.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism. Veritas 50 (4):173-190.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). Ontology, Identity, and Modality. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):105-106.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). ``Truth and the Epistemic Goal&Quot. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. 285-295.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). ``Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure&Quot. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):351-364.
    Nozick’s contribution to the epistemology of the last half of the twentieth century includes addressing the question of whether knowledge is closed under known implication. I argue that the question of closure provides a serious obstacle to Nozickian approaches to epistemology.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Review of John Greco (Ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (12).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. 43-62.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Jonathan Edwards on Hell&Quot. In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian. Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. 1-12.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Thomas F. Crisp (ed.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. 193-214.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Pursuit of Knowledge and the Value of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 114