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Profile: Jonathan Weinberg (University of Arizona)
  1. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...)
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  2. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...)
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  3. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
    Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent (...)
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  4. Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
    It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that (...)
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  5. Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.
    Bibliography of works in experimental philosophy.
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  6. Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethnoepistemology. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics. Ashgate 227--247.
    Throughout the 20th century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments, whose origins can be traced back to Descartes, played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the 20th century, including Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers. (e.g., Cohen 1999, DeRose 1995, (...)
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  7. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
    Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
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  8.  46
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2014). Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):545-553.
    In order for Herman Cappelen to argue in his Philosophy Without Intuitions that philosophers have been on the whole mistaken in thinking that we actually use intuitions much at all in our first-order philosophizing, he must attempt the task of characterizing what something must be, in order to be an intuition.My discussion here is focused on the latter half of the book concerning the “argument from philosophical practice. I am in wholehearted agreement with the first half’s thesis that the usage (...)
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  9.  15
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (forthcoming). Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A Methodological Argument for JTB? In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.), Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford
    The developing body of empirical work on the "Gettier effect" indicates that, in general, the presence of a Gettier-type structure in a case makes participants less likely to attribute knowledge in that case. But is that a sufficient reason to diverge from a JTB theory of knowledge? I argue that considerations of good model selection, and worries about noise and overfitting, should lead us to consider that a live, open question. The Gettier effect is perhaps so transient, and (...)
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  10.  12
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2016). Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy Inferences. In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Methodology. Bloomsbury
    Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's sources of evidence, (...)
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  11. Stephen P. Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2001). Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.
  12.  8
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2015). The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy. Discipline Filosofiche 25:23-42.
    Must philosophers incorporate tools of experimental science into their methodological toolbox? I argue here that they must. Tallying up all the resources that are now part of standard practice in analytic philosophy, we see the problem that they do not include adequate resources for detecting and correcting for their own biases and proclivities towards error. Methodologically sufficient resources for error- detection and error-correction can only come, in part, from the deployment of specific methods from the sciences. However, we need not (...)
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  13. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Aaron Meskin (2006). Puzzling Over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions. In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford 175-202.
     
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  14.  27
    Ron Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323-344.
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  15. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Intuition & Calibration. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):15.
    The practice of appealing to esoteric intuitions, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options (...)
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  16.  98
    Aaron Meskin & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):18-34.
    Recent theorists suggest that our capacity to respond affectively to fictions depends on our ability to engage in simulation: either simulating a character in the fiction, or simulating someone reading or watching the fiction as though it were fact. We argue that such accounts are quite successful at accounting for many of the basic explananda of our affective engagements in fiction. Nonetheless, we argue further that simulationist accounts ultimately fail, for simulation involves an ineliminably ego-centred element that is atypical of (...)
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  17.  32
    Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323–344.
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  18.  33
    Jonathan M. Weinberg, Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & Shane Reuter (2013). Restrictionism and Reflection. The Monist 95 (2):200-222.
    It has become increasingly popular to respond to experimental philosophy by suggesting that experimental philosophers haven’t been studying the right kind of thing. One version of this kind of response, which we call the reflection defense, involves suggesting both that philosophers are interested only in intuitions that are the product of careful reflection on the details of hypothetical cases and the key concepts involved in those cases, and that these kinds of philosophical intuitions haven’t yet been adequately studied by experimental (...)
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  19. Richard Corry, Robert N. Brandon, H. Frederik Nijhout, Richard Dawid, Ron Mallon, Jonathan M. Weinberg & Hong Yu Wong (2006). Causal Realism and the Laws of Nature. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan 261-276.
  20. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2009). On Doing Better, Experimental-Style. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455 - 464.
    Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies (...)
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  21. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals. Episteme 4 (1):66-92.
    Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we fi nd ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of (...)
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  22.  8
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2016). What is the a Priori, That Thou Art Mindful of It?: A Comment on Albert Casullo, Essays on a Priori Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1695-1703.
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  23.  70
    Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.
    Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But (...)
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  24.  13
    Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2008). Living with Innateness (and Environmental Dependence Too). Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):415 – 424.
    Griffiths and Machery contend that the concept of innateness should be dispensed with in the sciences. We contend that, once that concept is properly understood as what we have called 'closed process invariance', it is still of significant use in the sciences, especially cognitive science.
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  25.  10
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2013). Experimentalist Rationalism, or Why It's OK If the A Priori Is Only 99.44 Percent Empirically Pure. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. OUP Oxford 92.
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  26. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2008). Configuring the Cognitive Imagination. In Kathleen Stock & Katherine Thomsen-Jones (eds.), New Waves in Aesthetics. Palgrave Macmillan 203-223.
  27.  11
    Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2001). Review: Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637 - 643.
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  28.  8
    Aaron Meskin & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2011). 1. The Puzzle (s) of Imaginative Resistance. In Elisabeth Schellekens & Peter Goldie (eds.), The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press 239.
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  29.  39
    Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen Crowley (2009). The X-Phi(Les): Unusual Insights Into the Nature of Inquiry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):227-232.
    Experimental philosophy (henceforth “XΦ”) takes seriously the idea that philosophical inquiry may benefit directly from quantitative empirical research. That view strikes many as deeply misguided, perhaps oxymoronic: experimentation is simply the wrong kind of investigatory technique for solving philosophical puzzles. But to think XΦ an oxymoron is to have an opinion about the relationship between scientific and philosophical inquiry – in particular, that philosophy and science are distinct, independent enterprises each pursuable on its own terms. We argue that this ‘separate (...)
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  30.  6
    Chad Gonnerman & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Two Uneliminated Uses for “Concepts”: Hybrids and Guides for Inquiry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):211-212.
    Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
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  31. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Aaron Meskin (2006). Imagine That! In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Blackwell Publishing 222-235.
     
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  32.  37
    Jonathan M. Weinberg, Daniel Yarlett, Michael Ramscar, Dan Ryder & Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Jesse J. Prinz,Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. [REVIEW] Metascience 12 (3):279-303.
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  33.  35
    Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ellie Wang (2010). Naturalism's Perils, Naturalism's Promises: A Comment on Appiah's Experiments in Ethics. Neuroethics 3 (3):215-222.
    In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as (...)
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  34.  30
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (1998). John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), XXIV + 191 Pp. [REVIEW] Noûs 32 (2):247–264.
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  35.  29
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2008). Naturalism and Intuitions: Commentary on Steven Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):263 – 270.
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  36.  7
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2011). What is Evaluative Normativity, That We (Maybe) Should Avoid It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):274-275.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
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  37. Otasio Bueno, Henry Jackman, Jonathan M. Weinberg & Steven D. Hales (2008). Book Symposium: Steven D. Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy (MIT Press, 2006). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2).
     
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  38. Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg, Empirical Challenges to the Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy, or Why We Are Not “Judgment Skeptics”.
    Bealer, G. (1998). “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in M. DePaul & W. Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
     
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