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Jonathan Matheson [13]Jonathan D. Matheson [3]
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Profile: Jonathan Matheson (University of Rochester)
Profile: Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)
  1. Jonathan Matheson (2015). Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating? Social Epistemology 29 (2):145-159.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be problematic. In this paper, I examine (...)
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  2. Jonathan Matheson (2015). Epistemic Norms and Self Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (2):26-32.
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  3. Jonathan D. Matheson (2015). Is There a Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem? Philosophical Studies 172 (2):459-468.
    The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the generality problem—well-founded reliabilism. According to (...)
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  4. Jonathan Matheson (2014). A Puzzle About Disagreement and Rationality. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (4):1-3.
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  5. Jonathan Matheson (2014). Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday. In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press 315-330.
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  6. Jonathan Matheson (2014). Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism. In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. 3-20.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is friendly to (...)
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  7. Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.) (2014). The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press.
    How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and (...)
     
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  8. Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey (2013). How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View? In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge 131-149.
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  9. Jonathan Matheson (2012). Epistemic Relativism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 161-179.
  10. Jonathan Matheson (2012). Henderson, David and Terence Horgan. The Epistemological Spectrum. Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):875-877.
  11. Jonathan Matheson (2012). Understanding Knowledge. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (2):471-474.
    Book review of Knowledge by Evans and Smith.
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  12. Jonathan Matheson (2011). The Case for Rational Uniqueness. Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.
    The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation (...)
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  13. Jonathan D. Matheson (2011). Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism. Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):323-331.
    Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
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  14. Jason Rogers & Jonathan Matheson (2011). Bergmann's Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):55 - 80.
    Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of "weak awareness internalism" that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the "Subject's Perspective Objection" horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of "strong awareness internalism" that do not fall prey to the dilemma's "vicious regress" horn. We note along the way that (...)
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  15. Jonathan D. Matheson (2010). Dealing with Disagreement: Uniqueness and Conciliation. Dissertation, Proquest
  16. Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).
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