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Profile: Jonathan Quong (University of Southern California)
  1. Jonathan Quong (forthcoming). Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
    In this paper, I offer two arguments in support of the proposition that there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to impose harm on nonliable persons. The first argument begins with a famous case where most people intuitively agree it is permissible to perform an act that results in an innocent person’s death, and where there is no liability-based or consequentialist justification for acting. I show that this case is relevantly analogous to a case involving the intentional imposition of lethal defensive harm (...)
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  2. Jonathan Quong (forthcoming). Review: Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations.
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  3. Jonathan Quong (2014). Introduction to the Symposium on Fabre's Cosmopolitan War. Law and Philosophy 33 (3):265-280.
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  4. Jonathan Quong (2014). Tan , Kok-Chor . Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 208. $55.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (2):440-444.
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  5. Jonathan Quong (2014). What is the Point of Public Reason? Philosophical Studies 170 (3):545-553.
    Jerry Gaus is the most important philosopher of public reason since John Rawls. His path-breaking work on this topic has deeply influenced a large group of moral and political philosophers, a group to which I happily belong. In this short paper I examine one feature of the account developed in his incredibly rich and illuminating book, The Order of Public Reason.Gaus (2011), cited hereafter as OPR. I argue Gaus’s theory struggles to resolve a crucial question: how can we be confident (...)
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  6. Jonathan Quong, Public Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  7. Joanna Mary Firth & Jonathan Quong (2012). Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive Harm. Law and Philosophy 31 (6):673-701.
    A person who is liable to defensive harm has forfeited his rights against the imposition of the harm, and so is not wronged if that harm is imposed. A number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan, argue for an instrumental account of liability, whereby a person is liable to defensive harm when he is either morally or culpably responsible for an unjust threat of harm to others, and when the imposition of defensive harm is necessary to avert the threatened unjust (...)
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  8. Jonathan Quong (2012). Liability to Defensive Harm. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (1):45-77.
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  9. Jonathan Quong (2012). Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, and Bocchiola. Philosophy and Public Issues 2 (2):51-79.
  10. Jonathan Quong (2012). Liberalism Without Perfection. A Précis. Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
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  11. Jonathan Quong (2011). Left-Libertarianism: Rawlsian Not Luck Egalitarian. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):64-89.
  12. Jonathan Quong (2010). Justice Beyond Equality. Social Theory and Practice 36 (2):315-340.
    This essay reviews G.A. Cohen’s final major work, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In the book, Cohen challenges the Rawlsian account of the content and the concept of justice. This essay offers a summary of Cohen’s main arguments, and develops objections to several of those arguments, particularly Cohen’s claim that his proposed egalitarian ethos is not vulnerable to a well-known trilemma (liberty, equality, efficiency) that might be pressed against it. The essay’s final section offers critical reflections on the important differences between (...)
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  13. Jonathan Quong (2010). Liberalism Without Perfection. OUP Oxford.
    A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterised by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. In this book Jonathan Quong rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. Quong argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor trying to make sure that individuals live (...)
     
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  14. Jonathan Quong (2009). Killing in Self‐Defense. Ethics 119 (3):507-537.
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  15. Jonathan Quong (2007). Contractualism, Reciprocity, and Egalitarian Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (1):75-105.
    Can contractualism yield a suitably egalitarian conception of social justice? G.A. Cohen has forcefully argued that it cannot - that one cannot be both a contractualist and an egalitarian. Cohen presents a number of arguments to this effect, the particular target of which is John Rawls’s version of contractualism. In this article, I show that, contra Cohen, the Rawlsian model of contractualism, and the ideal of reciprocity on which it relies, can coherently yield egalitarian principles of distributive (...)
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  16. Jonathan Quong (2007). Political Liberalism Without Scepticism. Ratio 20 (3):320–340.
    Political liberalism famously requires that fundamental political matters should not be decided by reference to any controversial moral, religious or philosophical doctrines over which reasonable people disagree. This means we, as citizens, must abstain from relying on what we believe to be the whole truth when debating or voting on fundamental political matters. Many critics of political liberalism contend that this requirement to abstain from relying on our views about the good life commits political liberalism to a kind of scepticism: (...)
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  17. Jonathan Quong (2006). Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal Opportunities. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):53–71.
  18. Jonathan Quong (2005). Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (3):301-330.
    Reasonable people disagree deeply about the nature of the good life. But reasonable people also disagree fundamentally about principles of justice. If this is true, then why does political liberalism permit the state to act on reasons of justice, but not for reasons grounded in conceptions of the good life? There appears to be an indefensible asymmetry in the way political liberalism treats disagreements about justice and disagreements about the good life. This is the asymmetry objection to political liberalism. The (...)
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  19. Jonathan Quong (2004). Disputed Practices and Reasonable Pluralism. Res Publica 10 (1):43-67.
    This paper addresses the problem of disputed cultural practices within liberal, deliberative democracies, arguing against the currently dominant view, advocated by Susan Okin among others, that such problems represent a fundamental tension between two liberal values: gender equality and cultural autonomy. Such an approach, I argue, requires the state to render normative judgements about conceptions of the good life, something which is both arbitrary and unfair in societies characterised by reasonable pluralism. Disputed practices, I claim, are defined by the existence (...)
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  20. Jonathan Quong (2004). The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens. Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (3):314–335.
  21. Jonathan Quong (2003). Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (5):347-349.
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  22. Jonathan Quong (2002). Are Identity Claims Bad for Deliberative Democracy?1. Contemporary Political Theory 1 (3):307.
  23. Jonathan Quong (2002). Anthony Simon Laden, Reasonably Radical: Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (6):419-421.
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