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  1. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (ed.) (1989). Bias in Human Reasoning Causes and Consequences. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    This book represents the first major attempt by any author to provide an integrated account of the evidence for bias in human reasoning across a wide range of disparate psychological literatures. The topics discussed involve both deductive and inductive reasoning as well as statistical judgement and inference. In addition, the author proposes a general theoretical approach to the explanations of bias and considers the practical implications for real world decision making. The theoretical stance of the book is based on a (...)
     
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  2. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1982). The Psychology of Deductive Reasoning. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  3. Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers (1998). Rationality and Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.
     
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  4.  11
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2004). If. Oxford University Press.
    'IF' is one of the most important and interesting words in the English language, being used to express hypothetical thought. The use of conditionals such as 'if' also distinguishes human intelligence from that of all other animals. In this volume, Jonathan Evans and David Over present a new theoretical approach to understanding hypothetical thought. The book draws on studies from the psychology of judgement and decision making, as well as philosophical logic.
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  5. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2010). Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain. OUP Oxford.
    This book explores the idea that much of our behaviour is controlled by automatic and intuitive mental processes, which shape and compete with our conscious thinking and decision making. Accessibly written, and assuming no prior knowledge of the field, the book will be fascinating reading for all those interested in human behaviour.
     
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  6.  56
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2012). Questions and Challenges for the New Psychology of Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
    In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...)
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  7.  20
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
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  8.  12
    Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2013). Rationality in the New Paradigm: Strict Versus Soft Bayesian Approaches. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.
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  9.  42
    David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence. Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
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  10.  76
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2007). On the Resolution of Conflict in Dual Process Theories of Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339.
    In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic (...)
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  11.  18
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2014). Two Minds Rationality. Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):129-146.
    I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore (...)
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  12. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2009). How Many Dual Process Theories Do We Need: One, Two or Many? In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. OUP Oxford
  13.  23
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2013). Reasoning to and From Belief: Deduction and Induction Are Still Distinct. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  14.  64
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes (2005). Rapid Responding Increases Belief Bias: Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.
    In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, (...)
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  15.  71
    Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans, The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  16.  43
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1998). Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand It After 25 Years? Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45 – 110.
    The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...)
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  17.  12
    Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jamie I. D. Campbell (2013). Matching Bias on the Selection Task: It's Fast and Feels Good. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):431-452.
    We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...)
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  18. Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen (1992). The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning. Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
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  19.  22
    Valerie Thompson & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2012). Belief Bias in Informal Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310.
    In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the (...)
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  20.  81
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2009). Does Rational Analysis Stand Up to Rational Analysis? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):88-89.
    I agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.
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  21.  5
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2010). Conditional Truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):5.
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  22.  19
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2005). The Social and Communicative Function of Conditional Statements. Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
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  23. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1993). The Mental Model Theory of Conditional Reasoning: Critical Appraisal and Revision. Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
    Johnson-Laird and Byrne present a theory of conditional inference based upon the manipulation of mental models. In the present paper, the theory is critically examined with regard to its ability to account for psychological data, principally with respect to the rate at which people draw the four basic inferences of modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens. It is argued first that the theory is unclear in its definition and in particular with regard to (...)
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  24.  13
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson (2000). Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems. Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  25.  1
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1993). On Rules, Models and Understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345.
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  26.  82
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2009). Introspection, Confabulation, and Dual-Process Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-143.
    This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
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  27.  76
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2008). Whole Mind Theory: Massive Modularity Meets Dual Processes. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.
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  28.  23
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (1999). Explicit Representations in Hypothetical Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
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  29.  29
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2012). Spot the Difference: Distinguishing Between Two Kinds of Processing. Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.
    Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr’s computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct (...)
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  30.  18
    Simon J. Handley & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2000). Supposition and Representation in Human Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):273 – 311.
    We report the results of three experiments designed to assess the role of suppositions in human reasoning. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning. Our first experiment compared two types of problem that could be solved by a suppositional strategy. Our results showed no difference in difficulty between problems requiring affirmative or negative suppositions and very low logical solution rates throughout. Further analysis of the error data showed a (...)
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  31.  40
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2002). The Role of Language in the Dual Process Theory of Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):684-685.
    Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that (...)
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  32.  30
    Aidan Feeney, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & John Clibbens (2000). Background Beliefs and Evidence Interpretation. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (2):97 – 124.
    In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one's background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just (...)
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  33.  29
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam (2007). Dual-Processing Explains Base-Rate Neglect, but Which Dual-Process Theory and How? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):261-262.
    We agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.
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  34.  27
    Stephen E. Newstead, Peter Bradon, Simon J. Handley, Ian Dennis & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2006). Predicting the Difficulty of Complex Logical Reasoning Problems. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):62 – 90.
    The aim of the present research was to develop a difficulty model for logical reasoning problems involving complex ordered arrays used in the Graduate Record Examination. The approach used involved breaking down the problems into their basic cognitive elements such as the complexity of the rules used, the number of mental models required to represent the problem, and question type. Weightings for these different elements were derived from two experimental studies and from the reasoning literature. Based on these weights, difficulty (...)
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  35.  4
    Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1993). Mental Models as an Explanation of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning. Cognition 46 (1):93-97.
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  36.  18
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2011). A Farewell Editorial. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (4):351 - 352.
    Thinking & Reasoning, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 351-352, November 2011.
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  37.  6
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1994). Normative and Descriptive Consequentialism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15.
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  38.  2
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1991). Adaptive Cognition: The Question is How. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):493-494.
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  39. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1990). Reasoning with Knights and Knaves: A Discussion of Rips. Cognition 36 (1):85-90.
     
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  40.  15
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2011). Publication Policy: Reminder and Update. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):317-318.
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  41.  12
    Jonathan ST B. T. Evans (1989). Concepts and Inference. Mind and Language 4 (1-2):29-34.
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  42.  11
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2002). Matching Bias and Set Sizes: A Discussion of Yama (2001). Thinking and Reasoning 8 (2):153 – 163.
    Yama (2001) has presented an ingenious series of experiments in which he attempts to separate two accounts in the literature of the cause of "matching bias" in conditional reasoning. One account is that the bias arises from the way in which people process negations and the other is that it is due to the larger set sizes associated with negative propositions, rather than negation per se . Yama's experiments show influences of both negation and set size, from which he concludes (...)
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  43.  4
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2014). The Presumption of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):26-27.
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  44. William F. Brewer, Laura A. Carlson-Radvansky, G. Cossu, Catharine H. Echols, Karen Emmorey, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Alan Garnham, David E. Irwin, John J. Kim & Stephen M. Kosslyn (1993). Bellugi, Ursula, 139 Berent, Iris, 203. Cognition 46:299.
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  45. Jonathan St B. T. Evans & De Over (1997). The Contribution of Amos Tversky. Thinking and Reasoning 3:1-8.
     
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