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Profile: Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham University)
  1. Jonathan Tallant (forthcoming). Immodest and Proud. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    In his ‘Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics’, Hofweber (Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 260–289, 2009a) puts forward arguments against positions in metaphysics that he describes as ‘immodest’; a position he identifies as defended by Jonathan Lowe. In this paper I reply to Hofweber’s arguments, offering a defence of immodest metaphysics of the type practiced by Lowe (The possibility of metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) inter alia.
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  2. Jonathan Tallant (2014). Against Mereological Nihilism. Synthese 191 (7):1511-1527.
    I argue that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer (what I describe as) the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs (the mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? I suggest that the answers given in the literature fail and that the obvious responses that could be made look to undermine the motivations for adopting nihilism in the first place.
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  3. Jonathan Tallant (2014). Defining Existence Presentism. Erkenntnis 79 (3):479-501.
    In this paper I argue in favour of a new definition of presentism that I call ‘existence presentism’ (EP). Typically, presentism is defined as the thesis that ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘nothing exists that is non-present’.1 I assume these statements to be equivalent. I call these statements of presentism ‘conventional presentism’ (CP). First, in §2, I rehearse arguments due to Ulrich Meyer that purport to show that presentism is not adequately defined as CP. In §§2.1–2.4 I show that considerations (...)
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  4. Jonathan Tallant (2014). Metaphysics, Intuitions and Physics. Ratio 27 (4):n/a-n/a.
    Ladyman and Ross do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work – provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this paper is to undermine some of their arguments against contemporary metaphysics as it is currently practiced.
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  5. Jonathan Tallant (2014). Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections. Theoria 80 (4).
    Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby past objects are derivative and depend for their existence upon present objects. I argue that this view should be rejected.
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  6. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Dubious by Nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):97-116.
    There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, (...)
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  7. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Intuitions in Physics. Synthese 190 (15):2959-2980.
    This paper is an exploration of the role of intuition in physics. The ways in which intuition is appealed to in physics are not well understood. To the best of my knowledge, there is no analysis of the different contexts in which we might appeal to intuition in physics, nor is there any analysis of the different potential uses to which intuition might be put. In this paper I look to provide data that goes some way to giving a sense (...)
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  8. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Pretense, Mathematics, and Cognitive Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs013.
    A pretense theory of a given discourse is a theory that claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we token (speak, write, and so on) when taking part in that discourse. Instead, according to pretense theory, we are speaking from within a pretense. According to pretense theories of mathematics, we engage with mathematics as we do a pretense. We do not use mathematical language to make claims that express propositions and, thus, we do (...)
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  9. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Optimus Prime: Paraphrasing Prime Number Talk. Synthese 190 (12):2065-2083.
    Baker (Mind 114:223–238, 2005; Brit J Philos Sci 60:611–633, 2009) has recently defended what he calls the “enhanced” version of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. In this paper I demonstrate that the nominalist can respond to Baker’s argument. First, I outline Baker’s argument in more detail before providing a nominalistically acceptable paraphrase of prime-number talk. Second, I argue that, for the nominalist, mathematical language is used to express physical facts about the world. In endorsing this line I follow moves (...)
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  10. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Problems of Parthood for Proponents of Priority. Analysis 73 (3):429-438.
    According to some views of reality, some objects are fundamental and other objects depend for their existence upon these fundamental objects. In this article, I argue that we have reason to reject these views.
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  11. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Quantitative Parsimony and the Metaphysics of Time: Motivating Presentism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):688-705.
    In this paper I argue that presentism—the view that only present objects exist—can be motivated, at least to some degree, by virtue of the fact that it is more quantitatively parsimonious than rival views.
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  12. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Recent Work: Time. Analysis 73 (2):369-379.
    Recent work on time. There is, at present, a lot of varied and interesting work being done in the philosophy of time; too much for me to fully engage with all of it here. I will focus on three debates that have been particularly busy over the last few years: how do presentists ground true propositions about the past? How does time pass? How do we experience time’s passing?
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  13. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Time. Analysis 73 (2):369-379.
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  14. Jonathan Tallant (2012). Craig Callender, Ed. , The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (2):93-95.
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  15. Jonathan Tallant (2012). (Existence) Presentism and the A-Theory. Analysis 72 (4):673-681.
    Next SectionIn this article I offer a new version of presentism and argue that this new version of presentism is not a species of the A-theory. Along the way, I argue that Rasmussen’s recent attempt to articulate a version of presentism that is not also a version of the A-theory does not succeed.
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  16. Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2012). Presentism and Distributional Properties. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 7. Oxford University Press.
    Ross Cameron proposes to reconcile presentism and truth-maker theory by invoking temporal distributional properties, instantiated by present entities, as the truth-makers for truths about the past. This chapter argues that Cameron's proposal fails because objects can change which temporal distributional properties they instantiate and this entails that the truth-values of truths about the past can change in an objectionable way.
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  17. Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2012). Time for Distribution? Analysis 72 (2):264-270.
    Presentists face a familiar problem. If only present objects exist, then what 'makes true' our true claims about the past? According to Ross Cameron, the 'truth-makers' for past and future tensed propositions are presently instantiated Temporal Distributional Properties. We present an argument against Cameron's view. There are two ways that we might understand the term 'distribute' as it appears. On one reading, the resulting properties are not up to the task of playing the truth-maker role; on the other, the properties (...)
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  18. Jonathan Tallant (2011). There's No Future in No-Futurism. Erkenntnis 74 (1):37-52.
    In two recent papers Button (Analysis 66:130–135, 2006, Analysis 67:325–332, 2007) has developed a particular view of time that he calls no-futurism. He defends his no-futurism against a sceptical problem that has been raised (by e.g. Bourne in Aust J Phil 80:359–371, 2002) for a similar growing block view—that of Tooley (Time, tense, and causation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). If Button is right, then we have an important third option available to us: a half-way house between presentism and eternalism. If, (...)
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  19. Jonathan Tallant (2010). A Sketch of a Presentist Theory of Passage. Erkenntnis 73 (1):133-140.
    In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed.
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  20. Jonathan Tallant (2010). Memory, Anticipation and the (Un)Reality of the Past and Future. In Jo Alyson Parker, Paul Harris & Christian Steineck (eds.), Time: Limits and Constraints. Brill. 13-89.
  21. Jonathan Tallant (2010). Not a Total Failure. Philosophia 38 (4):795-810.
    In this paper I offer a partial defence of Armstrong’s totality relation as a solution to the problem of so-called “negative existentials”.
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  22. Jonathan Tallant (2010). Still Cheating, Still Prospering. Analysis 70 (3):502-506.
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  23. Jonathan Tallant (2010). Time for Presence? Philosophia 38 (2):271-280.
    It is, I think, possible to generate a variation of McTaggart’s (Mind 17:457–474, 1908 ) paradox that infects all extant versions of presentism. This is not to say that presentism is doomed to failure. There may be ways to modify presentism and I can’t anticipate all such modifications, here. For the purposes of the paper I’ll understand ‘presentism’ to be the view that for all x , x is present (cf. Crisp ( 2004 : 18)). It seems only right that, (...)
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  24. Jonathan Tallant (2010). There's No Existent Like 'No Existence' Like No Existent I Know. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):387-400.
    The aim of this paper is to motivate and then defend a restricted version of the truth-maker theory. In defending such a theory I hope to do away with the perceived need for ‘negative existents’ such as totality facts and the like.
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  25. Jonathan Tallant (2009). Ontological Cheats Might Just Prosper. Analysis 69 (3):422-430.
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  26. Jonathan Tallant (2009). Presentism and Truth-Making. Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416.
    Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
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  27. Jonathan Tallant (2009). Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives • by Yuval Dolev. Analysis 69 (2):372-374.
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  28. Jonathan Tallant (2008). What is It to “B” a Relation? Synthese 162 (1):117 - 132.
    The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, I look to show Oaklander’s (The ontology of time. New York: Prometheus Books, 2004) theory of time to be false. Second, I show that the only way to salvage the B-theory is via the adopting of the causal theory of time, and allying this to Oaklander’s claim that tense is to be eliminated. I then raise some concerns with the causal theory of time. My conclusion is that, if one adopts eternalism, (...)
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  29. Jonathan Tallant (2007). There Have Been, Are (Now), and Will Be Lots of Times Like the Present in the Hybrid View of Time. Analysis 67 (1):83–86.
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  30. Jonathan Tallant (2007). What is B-Time? Analysis 67 (294):147–156.
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