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Jonathan Waskan [10]Jonathan A. Waskan [8]
  1. Jonathan A. Waskan (forthcoming). A Virtual Solution to the Frame Problem. Proceedings of the First IEEE-RAS International Conference on Humanoid Robots.
    We humans often respond effectively when faced with novel circumstances. This is because we are able to predict how particular alterations to the world will play out. Philosophers, psychologists, and computational modelers have long favored an account of this process that takes its inspiration from the truth-preserving powers of formal deduction techniques. There is, however, an alternative hypothesis that is better able to account for the human capacity to predict the consequences worldly alterations. This alternative takes its inspiration from the (...)
     
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  2. Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese:1-23.
    Many philosophers of science follow Hempel in embracing both substantive and methodological anti-psychologism regarding the study of explanation. The former thesis denies that explanations are constituted by psychological events, and the latter denies that psychological research can contribute much to the philosophical investigation of the nature of explanation. Substantive anti-psychologism is commonly defended by citing cases, such as hyper-complex descriptions or vast computer simulations, which are reputedly generally agreed to constitute explanations but which defy human comprehension and, as a result, (...)
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  3. Mike Braverman, John Clevenger, Ian Harmon, Andrew Higgins, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & Jonathan Waskan (2012). Intelligibility is Necessary for Scientific Explanation, but Accuracy May Not Be. In Naomi Miyake, David Peebles & Richard Cooper (eds.), Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
    Many philosophers of science believe that empirical psychology can contribute little to the philosophical investigation of explanations. They take this to be shown by the fact that certain explanations fail to elicit any relevant psychological events (e.g., familiarity, insight, intelligibility, etc.). We report results from a study suggesting that, at least among those with extensive science training, a capacity to render an event intelligible is considered a requirement for explanation. We also investigate for whom explanations must be capable of rendering (...)
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  4. Jonathan Waskan (2011). A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists). Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential (...)
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  5. Jonathan Waskan (2011). Mechanistic Explanation at the Limit. Synthese 183 (3):389-408.
    Resurgent interest in both mechanistic and counterfactual theories of explanation has led to a fair amount of discussion regarding the relative merits of these two approaches. James Woodward is currently the pre-eminent counterfactual theorist, and he criticizes the mechanists on the following grounds: Unless mechanists about explanation invoke counterfactuals, they cannot make sense of claims about causal interactions between mechanism parts or of causal explanations put forward absent knowledge of productive mechanisms. He claims that these shortfalls can be offset if (...)
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  6. Jonathan Waskan (2010). Applications of an Implementation Story for Non-Sentential Models. In W. Carnielli L. Magnani (ed.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer. 463--476.
    Summary. The viability of the proposal that human cognition involves the utilization of nonsentential models is seriously undercut by the fact that no one has yet given a satisfactory account of how neurophysiological circuitry might realize representations of the right sort. Such an account is offered up here, the general idea behind which is that high-level models can be realized by lower—level computations and, in turn, by neural machinations. It is shown that this account can be usefully applied to deal (...)
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  7. Jonathan Waskan (2008). Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
    Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward's interventionist-counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to (...)
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  8. Daniel Kolak, William Hirstein, Peter Mandik & Jonathan Waskan (2006). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain. Routledge.
    Cognitive Science is a major new guide to the central theories and problems in the study of the mind and brain. The authors clearly explain how and why cognitive science aims to understand the brain as a computational system that manipulates representations. They identify the roots of cognitive science in Descartes - who argued that all knowledge of the external world is filtered through some sort of representation - and examine the present-day role of Artificial Intelligence, computing, psychology, linguistics and (...)
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  9. Jonathan A. Waskan (2006). Models and Cognition. A Bradford Book.
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  10. Jonathan A. Waskan (2003). Folk Psychology and the Gauntlet of Irrealism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):627-656.
  11. Jonathan A. Waskan (2003). Intrinsic Cognitive Models. Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283.
    Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction (...)
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  12. Jonathan A. Waskan (2001). A Critique of Connectionist Semantics. Connection Science 13 (3):277-292.
  13. Jonathan A. Waskan (2000). Kant's Epistemic and Defining Criteria of Truth. International Studies in Philosophy 32 (4):107-121.
  14. Jonathan Waskan (1998). De Facto Legitimacy and Popular Will. Social Theory and Practice 24 (1):25-56.
  15. Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel (1998). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  16. Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel (1998). Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  17. Jonathan A. Waskan & William P. Bechtel (1997). Directions in Connectionist Research: Tractable Computations Without Syntactically Structured Representations. Metaphilosophy 28 (1‐2):31-62.
    Figure 1: A pr ototyp ical exa mple of a three-layer feed forward network, used by Plunkett and M archm an (1 991 ) to simulate learning the past-tense of En glish verbs. The inpu t units encode representations of the three phonemes of the present tense of the artificial words used in this simulation. Th e netwo rk is trained to produce a representation of the phonemes employed in the past tense form and the suffix (/d/, /ed/, or /t/) (...)
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