21 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Jonathan Weisberg (University of Toronto)
  1. Jonathan Weisberg, Indiscriminate Evidence, Easy Knowledge.
    Offers a diagnosis of the easy knowledge problem, according to which easy knowledge is unjustified belief because the inferences that deliver easy knowledge feign evidential support that is not actually there. This diagnosis leads to a rejection of Closure. But, I argue, this rejection of Closure is more plausible than the traditional one endorsed by tracking theorists. I also argue that my diagnosis suggests a general plausibility argument against Closure, since a number of epistemic goods traditionally associated with knowledge do (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan Weisberg, You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.
    F orty years ago Bayesian philosophers were just catching a new wave of technical innovation, entering an era of scoring rules, imprecise credences, and infinitesimal probabilities. Meanwhile, down the hall, Gettier’s (1963) paper was shaping an epistemological literature with little obvious interest in the formal programs of Reichenbach, Hempel, and Carnap, or their successors like Jeffrey, Levi, Skyrms, van Fraassen, and Lewis. And how Bayesians might accommodate the epistemological discourses of belief and knowledge was but a glimmer in the eye (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan Weisberg, The Preface Paradox and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.
    The preface paradox is a problem for everyone; you don’t need to be committed to any special epistemological theory to face the problem it raises. The problem of easy knowledge is supposed to be different in this respect. It is generally thought to arise only for those who believe there is such a thing as basic knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through a source that one does not know to be reliable or trustworthy. Because it is thought to arise only for (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan Weisberg, Varieties of Bayesianism.
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan Weisberg (2013). Knowledge in Action. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (22).
    Recent proposals that frame norms of action in terms of knowledge have been challenged by Bayesian decision theorists. Bayesians object that knowledge-based norms conflict with the highly successful and established view that rational action is rooted in degrees of belief. I argue that the knowledge-based and Bayesian pictures are not as incompatible as these objectors have made out. Attending to the mechanisms of practical reasoning exposes space for both knowledge and degrees of belief to play their respective roles.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Adam Sennet & Jonathan Weisberg (2012). Embedding "If and Only If". Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):449 - 460.
    Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while others seem fine. Some proponents of the view that indicative conditionals have No Truth Values (NTV) use their view to explain why some left-nestings are hard to interpret: the embedded conditional does not express the truth conditions needed by the embedding conditional. Left-nestings that seem fine are then explained away as cases of ad hoc, pragmatic interpretation. We challenge this explanation. The standard reasons for NTV about indicative conditionals (triviality results, Gibbardian (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Argument From Divine Indifference. Analysis 72 (4):707-714.
    I argue that the rationale behind the fine-tuning argument for design is self-undermining, refuting the argument’s own premise that fine-tuning is to be expected given design. In (Weisberg 2010) I argued on informal grounds that this premise is unsupported. White (2011) countered that it can be derived from three plausible assumptions. But White’s third assumption is based on a fallacious rationale, and is even objectionable by the design theorist’s own lights. The argument that shows this, the argument from divine indifference, (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not depend on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg (2011). Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
    Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, we (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jonathan Weisberg (2011). Varieties of Bayesianism. In Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann & John Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10. Elsevier. 477.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). A Note on Design: What's Fine-Tuning Got to Do with It? Analysis 70 (3):431 - 438.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.
    Vogel (2000) argues that bootstrapping poses a novel problem for reliabilist theories of knowledge. According to the reliabilist, a true belief is knowledge just in case it was formed by a reliable process, even if one does not know that the process is reliable. Vogel argues that reliabilism allows one to gain knowledge of a source’s reliability in an intuitively illicit way, using the deliverances of the source itself. Cohen (2002; 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and others have argued that bootstrapping (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan Weisberg, Dempster-Shafer Theory.
    An introduction to Dempster-Shafter Theory, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jonathan Weisberg, Pollock's Theory of Defeasible Reasoning.
    An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of John Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jonathan Weisberg, Upper & Lower Probabilities.
    An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of upper and lower probabilities, from a lecture given at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jonathan Weisberg (2009). Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793 - 812.
    Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the same total evidence is gathered in the end. (Jeffrey) Conditionalization cannot satisfy either of these desiderata without violating the other. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jonathan Weisberg (2009). Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework. Synthese 167 (1):125 - 143.
    Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism are our two most prominent theories of scientific inference. Are they compatible? Van Fraassen famously argued that they are not, concluding that IBE must be wrong since Bayesianism is right. Writers since then, from both the Bayesian and explanationist camps, have usually considered van Fraassen's argument to be misguided, and have plumped for the view that Bayesianism and IBE are actually compatible. I argue that van Fraassen's argument is actually not so misguided, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jonathan Weisberg (2007). Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-97.
    Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jonathan Weisberg, Conditionalization Without Reflection.
    Conditionalization is an intuitive and popular epistemic principle. By contrast, the Reflection principle is well known to have some very unappealing consequences. But van Fraassen argues that Conditionalization entails Reflection, so that proponents of Conditionalization must accept Reflection and its consequences. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jonathan Weisberg (2005). Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):809-821.
    Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when evaluating likelihoods. Applying this analysis to the design argument shows (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg (2003). Clark and Shackel on the Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind 112 (448):685-689.
    Clark and Shackel have recently argued that previous attempts to resolve the two-envelope paradox fail, and that we must look to symmetries of the relevant expected-value calculations for a solution. Clark and Shackel also argue for a novel solution to the peeking case, a variant of the two-envelope scenario in which you are allowed to look in your envelope before deciding whether or not to swap. Whatever the merits of these solutions, they go beyond accepted decision theory, even contradicting it (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation