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  1. Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2014). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Iii: The Nature and Sources of Historical Change. Oup Oxford.
    Psychiatry has been subject to major changes in the last 150 years. This book explores the forces that have shaped these changes and how they have impacted on the psychiatric profession in this time. The result is a dynamic discussion about the nature of psychiatric disorders, and a book that is compelling reading.
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  2. Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2012). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.
    Psychiatry has long struggled with the nature of its diagnoses. This book brings together established experts in the wide range of disciplines that have an interest in psychiatric nosology. The contributors include philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, historians and representatives of the efforts of DSM-III, DSM-IV and DSM-V.
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  3. Josef Parnas (2012). A Sea of Distress. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 229.
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  4. Josef Parnas (2012). Comments: A Sea of Distress. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.
     
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  5. Josef Parnas (2012). Comments: The Nature of the Psychiatric Object and Classification. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.
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  6. Josef Parnas (2012). DSM-IV and the Founding Prototype of Schizophrenia: Are We Regressing to a Pre-Kraepelinian Nosology? In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.
     
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  7. Josef Parnas (2012). Introduction. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.
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  8. Josef Parnas (2012). The Nature of the Psychiatric Object and Classification. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 118.
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  9. Josef Parnas & Louis Sass (2011). The Structure of Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenia. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.
  10. Josef Parnas, Louis Sass & Dan Zahavi (2011). Phenomenology and Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):37-39.
    In this response to Wiggins and Schwartz, Ratcliffe, and Stanghellini, we first wish to express our gratitude to Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology for providing us the space to clarify our views and to overcome certain misunderstandings. Ratcliffe notes that our critique is "harsh," whereas Wiggins and Schwartz lament the fact that the debate "has taken the form of sometimes acid formulations and rejoinders . . . that lack the tone of mutual appreciation" (2011, 31). We deplore the fact that this (...)
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  11. Louis Sass, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi (2011). Phenomenological Psychopathology and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Approaches and Misunderstandings. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):1–23.
    The phenomenological approach to schizophrenia has undergone something of a renaissance in Anglophone psychiatry in recent years. There has been a proliferation of works that focus on the nature of subjectivity in schizophrenia and related disorders, and that take inspiration from the work of such German and French philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and such classical psychiatrists as Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Binswanger (Rulf 2003; Sass 2001a, 2001b). This trend includes predominantly theoretical articles, which typically incorporate clinical material as well (...)
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  12. Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2008). Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    This multidisciplinary collection explores three key concepts underpinning psychiatry -- explanation, phenomenology, and nosology -- and their continuing relevance in an age of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. An introduction by Kenneth S. Kendler lays out the philosophical grounding of psychiatric practice. The first section addresses the concept of explanation, from the difficulties in describing complex behavior to the categorization of psychological and biological causality. In the second section, contributors discuss experience, including the complex and vexing issue of how self-agency and (...)
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  13. Josef Parnas & S. C. I. Drmed (2008). Psychiatrists Encounter Patients Who Are Real People Inhabiting Specific Cultural and Social Contexts and Who Have, for One Reason or Another (And. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 387.
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  14. Josef Parnas & Louis A. Sass (2008). Varieties of "Phenomenology" : On Description, Understanding, and Explanation in Psychiatry. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 239.
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  15. Thor Gruenbaum, Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2004). The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.
  16. Josef Parnas (2004). Belief and Pathology of Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Contribution to the Classification of Delusions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161.
    Delusions are usually defined as false beliefs about the state of affairs in the public world. Taking this premise as unquestionable, the debate in cognitive science tends to oscillate between the so-called 'rationalist approach'- proposing some breakdown in the central intellective modules embodying human rationality - and the 'empiricist approach' - proposing a primary peripheral deficit , followed by explanatory efforts in the form of delusions. In this article the foundational assumption about delusion is questioned. Especially in the case of (...)
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  17. Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2004). The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.
    This volume presents essays on self-consciousness by prominent psychologists, cognitive neurologists, and philosophers.
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  18. Josef Parnas (2003). Self and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Perspective. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. 217--241.
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  19. Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas (2003). Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self. Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.
  20. Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2003). Conceptual Problems in Infantile Autism Research: Why Cognitive Science Needs Phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Until recently, cognitive research in infantile autism primarily focussed on the ability of autistic subjects to understand and predict the actions of others. Currently, researchers are also considering the capacity of autists to understand their own minds. In this article we discuss selected recent contributions to the theory of mind debate and the study of infantile autism, and provide an analysis of intersubjectivity and self-awareness that is informed both by empirical research and by work in the phenomenological tradition. This analysis (...)
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  21. Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Critique of Representational Theory. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 5-6.
    Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...)
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  22. Josef Parnas & Louis A. Sass (2001). Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.
  23. Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas (2001). Phenomenology of Self-Disturbances in Schizophrenia: Some Research Findings and Directions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):347-356.
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  24. Josef Parnas (2000). The Self and Intentionality in the Pre-Psychotic Stages of Schizophrenia. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self. Amsterdam: J Benjamins. 115--47.
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  25. Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Critique of Representational Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.
    Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...)
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