Libet considers “positive free voluntary acts” as mere illusions, admitting free will only as Veto. This essay shows seven ways by which we can gain evident knowledge about positive and negative free will, through: (1) the immediate evidence of free will in the cogito, (2) the light of the necessary essence of free will, (3) the experience of moral “oughts” in whose experience freedom is co-given, (4) any denial of human free will entails its assertion or recognition, (5) the objects (...) and subjects of certain acts disclose free will, (6) in a world without free agents there would be no explanation of the beginning of efficient causality, and (7) Veto-power of the will logically presupposes positive free will. Libet’s experiments confirm that the free decision to act at a certain time and the preceding and accompanying free acts make new energy to burst forth in the brain. (shrink)
Este estudo tem por objeto a filosofia scotista dos transcendentais, em especial a filosofia dos transcendentais como “perfeições puras”. Isso levará a uma consideração particular da “liberdade” como uma perfeição pura, bem como à concepção de um novo conceito de amor, não presente no eudemonismo aristotélicotomístico. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Duns Scotus. Filosofia dos transcendentais. Perfeições puras. Liberdade. Amor. Crítica ao eudemonismo. ABSTRACT The object of this study is Scotus’s philosophy of the transcendentals, particularly the philosophy of the transcendentals as “pure perfections”. (...) That will bring into a special consideration of “freedom” as a pure perfection, as well as into the formulation of a new concept of love, not to be found in the Aristotelian-Thomistic eudaimonism. KEY WORDS – Duns Scotus. Philosophy of the transcendentals. Pure perfections. Freedom. Love. Critique on eudaimonism. (shrink)
The author studies Scheler’s essay, “Repentance and Rebirth,” gathering together and interpreting all the insights of Scheler on repentance, and often reading them in the light of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s work in the philosophy of religion. The author examines Scheler’s critique of the reductionist accounts of repentance as well as Scheler’s own account. He gives particular attention to one basic problem in Scheler’s account of repentance, namely, a tendency to let forgiveness arise in the repentant person simply by the force (...) of the act of repenting and not to give due weight to the divine initiative without which there is no forgiveness. (shrink)
PREFACE Towards the end of his important article 'What is Phenomenology?" Adolf Reinach writes: When we wish to break with all theories and constructions in ...