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Profile: Josefa Toribio (ICREA-Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
  1. Josefa Toribio (2014). Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):621-642.
    (2014). Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 621-642. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893386.
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  2. Josefa Toribio (2013). Positing a Space Mirror Mechanism Intentional Understanding Without Action? Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
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  3. Josefa Toribio (2012). Michael Dummett (1925-2011). Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 31 (1):163-169.
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  4. Josefa Toribio (2011). Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.
    This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state?content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ?state?content error error,? i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...)
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  5. Josefa Toribio (2011). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy and Mental Illness, by George Graham. The Disordered Mind 4 (30).
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  6. Josefa Toribio (2011). What We Do When We Judge. Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
    In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...)
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  7. Josefa Toribio (2010). The Animal Concepts Debate: A Metaphilosophical Take. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (2):11-24.
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  8. Josefa Toribio (2009). Does Seeing Red Require Thinking About Red Things? Think 8 (22):29-39.
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  9. Josefa Toribio (2008). How Do We Know How? Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.
    I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, (...)
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  10. Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, (...)
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  11. Josefa Toribio (2007). Mind and Supermind – Keith Frankish. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):139–142.
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  12. Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
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  13. Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio, Commentary on J.K O'Regan and A Noe: A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.
    O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will (...)
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  14. Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio, Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness”.
    While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
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  15. Josefa Toribio, Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation.
    Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] [1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal and Sober [1991]): i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal representations, not their meanings. Therefore it seems that if we (...)
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  16. Josefa Toribio, Extruding Intentionality From the Metaphysical Flux.
    On the Origin of Objects is, at heart, an extended search for a non-circular and nonreductive characterization of two key notions: intentionality (the content or "aboutness" distinctive of mental states) and computation (the familiar but elusive tool of much cognitive scientific explanation). Only a non-circular and non-reductive account of these key notions can, Smith believes, provide a secure platform for a proper understanding of the mind. The project has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively, Smith rejects views that (...)
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  17. Josefa Toribio, Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism.
    Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encapsulated, insulated, special-purpose nature of the psychological mechanisms of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of (most forms of) relativism, and second, that an alternative (‘neural constructivist’) model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge.
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  18. Josefa Toribio, Naturalism and Causal Explanation.
    Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other (more primitive, less problematic) kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner (...)
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  19. Josefa Toribio, Pulp Naturalism.
    There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of (mental or linguistic) content that are naturalistic. The stand has been taken: semantic properties are not part of the primitive ontological furniture of the world. If we want to vindicate those properties as real, we will have to show that it is possible to unpack them into some other –primitive– set of properties. It is taken for granted (...)
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  20. Josefa Toribio, The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke.
    Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of (i) why we need implicit conceptions; (ii) how we can discover them; (iii) what they explain; (iv) what they are; and (v) how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which (...)
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  21. Josefa Toribio (2003). Free Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
    The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of (...)
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  22. Josefa Toribio (2002). Mindful Belief: Accountability, Expertise, and Cognitive Kinds. Theoria 68 (3):224-49.
    It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall argue, (...)
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  23. Josefa Toribio (2002). Perceptual Experience and its Contents. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
    The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in every respect. It will be shown that this debate is compromised by the failure of both sides to mark a further, and crucial, distinction in cognitive space. This is the distinction between what is doubted here as mindful and mindless modes of perceiving: a distinction which cross-classifies the conceptual / non-conceptual divide. (...)
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  24. Josefa Toribio (2002). Semantic Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):39-58.
    In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses (...)
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  25. Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (2001). Sensorimotor Chauvinism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):979-980.
    O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will (...)
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  26. Josefa Toribio (2000). The Future of the Cognitive Revolution David Marter Johnson and Christina D. Erneling, Editors New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, X + 401 Pp., $44.50 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (01):183-.
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  27. Josefa Toribio (2000). The Future of the Cognitive Revolution. Dialogue 39 (1):183-185.
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  28. Josefa Toribio (1999). Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity. Minds and Machines 9 (3):399-413.
    In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox. (...)
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  29. Josefa Toribio (1998). Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Philosophical Issues 9:115-120.
  30. Josefa Toribio (1998). Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories. Philosophical Papers 27 (2):129-150.
    In this paper I display a general metaphysical assumption that characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is inherited, in a residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The assumption is that intentional states require identifiable inner vehicles and that to explain intentional properties we must develop accounts that bind specific contents to specific vehicles. I show that this assumption is deeply rooted in representationalist and reductionist theories of content and I argue that it is deeply inappropriate. I sketch the main (...)
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  31. Josefa Toribio & Andy Clark (eds.) (1998). Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues. Garland Pub..
    Summarizes and illuminates two decades of research Gathering important papers by both philosophers and scientists, this collection illuminates the central themes that have arisen during the last two decades of work on the conceptual foundations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. Each volume begins with a comprehensive introduction that places the coverage in a broader perspective and links it with material in the companion volumes. The collection is of interest in many disciplines including computer science, linguistics, biology, information science, psychology, (...)
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  32. Josefa Toribio (1997). Ecological Content. Pragmatics and Cognition 5 (2):253-281.
    The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how to characterize an alternative notion of content (ecological content) that meets those requirements. This account is supported by (a) a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent upon properties external to the system and (b) some empirical research in developmental psychology. My main contention (...)
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  33. Josefa Toribio (1997). Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):871-89.
    So called dual factor theories are proposed in an attempt to provide an explanation of the meaning of our utterances and the content of our mental states in terms that involve two different theories, each one serving separate concerns. One type of theory deals with the causal explanatory aspect of contentful mental states and/or sentences. The other type deals with those contentful mental states and/or sentences as related to propositions, i.e., as objects that can be assigned referential truth-conditions (Cfr. McGinn, (...)
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  34. Josefa Toribio (1995). Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  35. Josefa Toribio (1995). Ruritania and Ecology. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 188-195.
  36. Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (1994). Doing Without Representing. Synthese 101 (3):401-31.
    Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper (...)
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  37. Josefa Toribio (1993). Why There Still has to Be a Theory of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):28-47.
  38. Josefa Toribio (1991). Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation. Logique Et Analyse 34 (September-December):297-318.
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  39. Josefa Toribio (1991). Una crítica al realismo desde la teoría del significado. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 5:13.
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