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Joseph Levine [69]Joseph M. Levine [8]Joseph R. Levine [2]
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Profile: Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
  1.  84
    Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the "explanatory gap," the fact that we can't explain (...)
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  2.  36
    Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze. Oxford University Press.
    In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ...
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  3. Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  4. Joseph Levine (2010). Demonstrative Thought. Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...)
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  5. Joseph Levine (1993). On Leaving Out What It's Like. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
     
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  6. Joseph Levine (1993). On Leaving Out What It's Like. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press 543--557.
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  7. Joseph Levine (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press
  8. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1997). Reduction with Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.
  9. Joseph Levine (2006). Conscious Awareness and Representation. In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. The MIT Press 173--198.
  10. Joseph Levine (1998). Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind. Noûs 32 (4):449-480.
  11. Joseph Levine (2010). The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism Versus Modal Autonomism. Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
    Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. (...)
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  12. Joseph Levine (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
  13.  39
    Joseph Levine (2011). On the Phenomenology of Thought. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press 103.
  14. Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon (2009). The Modal Status of Materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian (...)
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  15. Joseph M. Levine (2005). Intellectual History as History. Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (2):189-200.
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  16. Joseph M. Levine (2003). Matter of Fact in the English Revolution. Journal of the History of Ideas 64 (2):317-335.
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  17. Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet (...)
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  18.  63
    Joseph Levine (2014). Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.
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  19. Joseph Levine (2003). Experience and Representation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
     
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  20. Joseph Levine (2010). Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
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  21.  38
    Joseph Levine (2015). Phenomenal Intentionality, Edited by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (495):924-927.
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  22.  44
    Joseph Levine (1991). Cool Red. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
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  23. Joseph Levine (1995). On What It is Like to Grasp a Concept. Philosophical Issues 6:38-43.
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  24.  10
    Joseph Levine (2007). Two Kinds of Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.
    I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
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  25.  48
    Joseph Levine (1994). Out of the Closet: A Qualophile Confronts Qualophobia. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):107-126.
  26.  52
    Joseph Levine (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  27. Joseph Levine (2004). Review: Consciousness and Cognition. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):596-599.
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  28. Joseph Levine (2003). Knowing What It's Like. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate
  29.  16
    Joseph Levine (1999). Philosophy as Massage: Seeking Relief From Conscious Tension. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):159-78.
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  30.  12
    Joseph Levine (1997). Are Qualia Just Representations? Mind and Language 12 (1):101-13.
  31.  50
    Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in Mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
  32. Joseph Levine (1988). Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited. Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
  33.  1
    Joseph Levine (1999). Philosophy as Massage: Seeking Cognitive Relief for Conscious Tension. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):159-178.
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  34.  56
    Joseph Levine (1993). Intentional Chemistry. In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi 103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
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  35.  14
    Joseph Levine (1995). Qualia: Intrinsic, Relational, or What? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh 277--292.
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  36. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1991). The Nomic and the Robust. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
     
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  37. Joseph Levine (2003). Materialism and Qualia. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. OUP Oxford
  38.  92
    Joseph Levine, Comments on Melnyk's A Physicalist Manifesto.
  39. Joseph Levine (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and the First-Person. Psyche 7 (10).
    Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from what it's like to have it. (...)
     
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  40. Joseph Levine (2009). The Explanatory Gap. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
     
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  41.  32
    Joseph Levine (2010). Out of the Closet. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):107-126.
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  42.  76
    Joseph Levine (2001). Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature Scott Sturgeon. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):629-634.
  43.  48
    Joseph Levine (1997). Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness. Mind and Language 12 (1):101-113.
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  44.  29
    Joseph Levine (1987). The Nature of Psychological Explanation by Robert Cummins: A Critical Notice. Philosophical Review 96 (2):249-274.
  45.  34
    Joseph Levine (1997). Recent Work on Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.
    This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made.
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  46.  11
    Joseph Levine (1996). Swampjoe: Mind or Simulation? Mind and Language 11 (1):86-91.
  47.  40
    Joseph Levine, From Yeshiva Bochur to Secular Humanist.
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  48.  38
    Joseph Levine (2001). The Self and What It's Like to Be One: Reviews of José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Conciousness and Lawrence Weiskrantz, Consiousness Lost and Found. Mind and Language 16 (1):108–119.
  49.  37
    Joseph Levine (2004). Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on Austen Clark's a Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):541-551.
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  50.  12
    Joseph Levine (2010). Philosophy as Massage. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):159-178.
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