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  1.  88
    Joseph Melia (2002). Response to Colyvan. Mind 111 (441):75-80.
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  2. Joseph Melia (2005). Truthmaking Without Truthmakers. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon 67.
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  3. John Divers & Joseph Melia (2002). The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism. Mind 111 (441):15-36.
    According to the Genuine Modal Realist, there is a plurality of possible worlds, each world nothing more than a maximally inter-related spatiotemporal sum. One advantage claimed for this position is that it offers us the resources to analyse, in a noncircular manner, the modal operators. In this paper, we argue that the prospects for such an analysis are poor. For the analysis of necessity as truth in all worlds to succeed it is not enough that no modal concepts be used (...)
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  4. Joseph Melia (1995). On What There's Not. Analysis 55 (4):223 - 229.
    (1) The average Mum has 2.4 children. (2) The number of Argle’s fingers equals the number of Bargle’s toes. (3) There are two possible ways in which Joe could win this chess game. In the right contexts, and outside the philosophy room, all the above sentences may be completely uncontroversial. For instance, if we know that Joe could win either by exchanging queens and entering an endgame, or by initiating a kingside attack then, if ignorant of Quine’s work on ontology, (...)
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  5.  56
    Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi (2006). Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
    Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. (...)
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  6.  26
    Joseph Melia (2003). Modality. Acumen.
    The book begins by introducing readers to various notions of possibility, the de re/de dicto distinction, and the ubiquity of our modal concepts. It then presents an accessible introduction to modal logic and possible worlds semantics.
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  7.  93
    Joseph Melia (1998). Field's Programme: Some Interference. Analysis 58 (2):63–71.
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  8. Joseph Melia (2008). Ersatz Possible Worlds. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub. 135--51.
     
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  9. Joseph Melia (2006). The Conservativeness of Mathematics. Analysis 66 (3):202–208.
  10.  32
    Joseph Melia (2008). 5. A World of Concrete Particulars. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 4 4:99.
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  11.  85
    Joseph Melia (1992). Against Modalism. Philosophical Studies 68 (1):35 - 56.
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  12.  80
    Joseph Melia (1992). A Note on Lewis's Ontology. Analysis 52 (3):191--192.
  13.  63
    Joseph Melia (1992). An Alleged Disanalogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis 52 (1):46 - 48.
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  14.  92
    John Divers & Joseph Melia (2003). Genuine Modal Realism Limited. Mind 112 (445):83-86.
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  15.  37
    Joseph Melia (2003). Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics. Metascience 12 (1):55-58.
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  16.  62
    John Divers & Joseph Melia (2006). Genuine Modal Realism: Still Limited. Mind 115 (459):731-740.
    In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Paseau has said, (...)
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  17.  78
    Joseph Melia (1991). Anti-Realism Untouched. Mind 100 (3):341-342.
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  18.  81
    Joseph Melia (1995). The Significance of Non-Standard Models. Analysis 55 (3):127--34.
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  19. Joseph Melia & Duncan Watson (2009). Properties, Possibilia and Contingent Second-Order Predication. Analysis 69 (4):643-649.
    1. The problemLewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dyadic relation R is identified with the set of actual and possible pairs of things that are related by R; and so on . 1 Egan has argued that the fact that some properties have some of their properties contingently leads to trouble: " Let @ be the actual world, in which being green is [someone's] favourite property, and let w be (...)
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  20. Joseph Melia (2001). Reducing Possibilities to Language. Analysis 61 (1):19–29.
    Ehring, D. 1997. Causation and Persistence. New York: Oxford University Press. Fair, D. 1979. Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis 14: 219–50. Goldman, A. 1977. Perceptual objects. Synthese 35: 257–84. Lewis, D. 1986a. Causation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, 159–213. New York.
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  21.  71
    Joseph Melia (2001). Reducing Possibilities to Language. Analysis 61 (269):19-29.
    Ehring, D. 1997. Causation and Persistence. New York: Oxford University Press. Fair, D. 1979. Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis 14: 219–50. Goldman, A. 1977. Perceptual objects. Synthese 35: 257–84. Lewis, D. 1986a. Causation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, 159–213. New York.
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  22. Joseph Melia (2002). Reply to Colyvan. Mind 111:75-9.
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  23. Nikk Effingham & Joseph Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (294):140–147.
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  24.  32
    Joseph Melia (2000). Continuants and Occurrents, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):77–92.
    [Peter Simons] Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants (...)
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  25.  38
    Joseph Melia (2005). Review of Jody Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8).
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  26.  27
    Joseph Melia (2013). Comments on 'De Jure and De Facto Validity in the Logic of Time and Modality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):206-209.
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  27. Joseph Melia (1991). ``Anti-Realism Untouched&Quot. Mind 100:341-342.
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  28.  4
    Joseph Melia & Graeme Forbes (1990). Languages of Possibility. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):271.
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  29.  7
    Joseph Melia (2002). Tensing the Copula, David Lewis. Mind 111 (441).
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  30.  24
    Joseph Melia (1996). Against Taylor's Putnam. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):171 – 174.
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  31. Joseph Melia (1990). Books Received. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159).
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  32. Joseph Melia (1990). Graeme Forbes, "Languages of Possibility". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 40 (59):271.
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  33. Joseph Melia (2003). Modality. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    This introduction to modality places the emphasis on the metaphysics of modality rather than on the formal semetics of quantified modal logic. The text begins by introducing students to the "de re/de dicto" distinction, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and some of the key problems in modality, particularly Quine's criticisms. It then moves on to explain how possible worlds provide a solution to many of the problems in modality and how possible worlds themselves have been used to analyse notions (...)
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  34. Joseph Melia (2014). Modality. Routledge.
    This introduction to modality places the emphasis on the metaphysics of modality rather than on the formal semetics of quantified modal logic. The text begins by introducing students to the "de re/de dicto" distinction, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and some of the key problems in modality, particularly Quine's criticisms. It then moves on to explain how possible worlds provide a solution to many of the problems in modality and how possible worlds themselves have been used to analyse notions (...)
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