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Profile: Joshua Earlenbaugh (University of California, Davis)
  1. Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
    Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. (...)
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  2. Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). If Intuitions Must Be Evidential Then Philosophy is in Big Trouble. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):35-53.
    Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism---the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach---but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves (...)
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  3. Joshua Earlenbaugh (2008). Beyond Russell's Causal Eliminativism. Metascience 17 (2):315-318.
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