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Joshua D. Greene [16]Joshua Greene [7]Joshua David Greene [1]
  1.  37
    Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt (2002). How Does Moral Judgment Work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):517-523.
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  2.  12
    Joshua Greene (2013). Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them. Penguin Press.
    Our brains were designed for tribal life, for getting along with a select group of others and for fighting off everyone else. But modern times have forced the world’s tribes into a shared space, resulting in epic clashes of values along with unprecedented opportunities. As the world shrinks, the moral lines that divide us become more salient and more puzzling. We fight over everything from tax codes to gay marriage to global warming, and we wonder where, if at all, we (...)
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  3.  26
    Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen (2009). Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment. Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
  4.  7
    Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen (2008). Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment. Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
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  5. Joshua D. Greene (2014). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics. Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
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  6. Joshua Greene (2008). The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press
    In this essay, I draw on Haidt’s and Baron’s respective insights in the service of a bit of philosophical psychoanalysis. I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent3 an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine (...)
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  7.  20
    Joshua D. Greene (2007). Why Are VMPFC Patients More Utilitarian? A Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment Explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (8):322-323.
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  8.  88
    Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene (2010). Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
    Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic (...)
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  9. Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene (2010). Multi-System Moral Psychology. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press
  10. Joshua D. Greene (2012). Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment. Cognitive Science 36 (1):163-177.
  11. Joshua D. Greene (2011). Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu. Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.
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  12.  4
    Joshua D. Greene (2015). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Science Matters for Ethics. Law and Ethics of Human Rights 9 (2):141-172.
    Journal Name: The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Issue: Ahead of print.
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  13.  7
    Joshua D. Greene (2015). The Rise of Moral Cognition. Cognition 135:39-42.
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  14. Joshua Greene (2005). 19 Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press 1--338.
     
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  15.  14
    Samuel M. McClure, Matthew M. Botvinick, Nick Yeung, Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan D. Cohen (2007). Conflict Monitoring in Cognition-Emotion Competition. In James J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press
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  16. Joshua D. Greene, Finding Faults: How Moral Dilemmas Illuminate Cognitive Structure.
    In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...)
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  17. Joshua D. Greene, How Moral Dilemmas Illuminate Cognitive Structure.
    In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...)
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  18.  13
    Joshua D. Greene (forthcoming). Morality and Emotion: A Tasting Menu. Emotion Review.
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  19.  16
    Joshua Greene & Wioletta Dziarnowska (2012). Emocje i procesy poznawcze zaangażowane w wydawanie sądów moralnych. Dane z neuroobrazowania. Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 6.
    Tradycyjne teorie psychologii moralności podkreślają rolę rozumowania i „wyższych procesów poznawczych”, podczas gdy ostatnie prace z tego zakresu uwypuklają udział emocji. W niniejszym artykule rozpatruję dane pochodzące z neuroobrazowania wspierające teorię sądzenia moralnego, zgodnie z którą zarówno procesy „poznawcze”, jak i emocjonalne pełnią istotne a czasami wzajemnie konkurencyjne role. Dane te wskazują, że rejony mózgu związane z kontrolą poznawczą (przednia część zakrętu obręczy i grzbietowo boczna kora przedczołowa) są zaangażowane w rozwiązywanie trudnych moralnych dylematów, w których wartości utylitarne wymagają naruszenia (...)
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  20.  3
    Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene (1996). Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and Prominence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 2 (2):107.
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  21. Joshua D. Greene, D. Lindsell, A. C. Clarke, L. E. Nystrom & J. D. Cohen (forthcoming). What Pushes Your Moral Buttons? Modular Myopia and the Trolley Problem. Cognition.
     
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  22. Joshua D. Greene (2015). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Science Matters for Ethics. The Law and Ethics of Human Rights 9 (2).
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  23. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt (2010). Trends in Cognitive Sciences–How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Web 13:02011-9.
     
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