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Joshua Rasmussen [12]Joshua L. Rasmussen [1]
  1. Joshua Rasmussen (2014). Continuity as a Guide to Possibility. 92 (3):525-538.
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  2. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew Cullison (2013). On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):198-204.
    Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on (...)
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  3. Alexander R. Pruss & Joshua L. Rasmussen (2013). Explaining Counterfactuals of Freedom. Religious Studies:1-6.
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  4. Joshua Rasmussen (2013). From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence. Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):19-30.
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  5. Joshua Rasmussen (2013). How Truth Relates to Reality. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):167-180.
    Many people think that truth somehow depends upon the way things are. Yet, it has proven difficult to precisely explain the nature of this dependence. The most common view is that truth depends upon the way things are by corresponding to things. But this account relocates the difficulty: one now wonders what correspondence is. It is worth emphasizing that the question of how truth relates to reality is not only a question for correspondence theorists; theorists of all stripes may wonder (...)
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  6. Joshua Rasmussen (2013). On the Value of Freedom To Do Evil. Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):418-428.
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  7. Joshua Rasmussen (2012). Presentists May Say Goodbye to A-Properties. Analysis 72 (2):270-276.
    Philosophers of time say that if presentism is true (i.e. if reality is comprised solely of presently existing things), then a complete description of reality must contain tensed terms, such as ‘was’, ‘presently is’ and ‘will be’. I counter this viewpoint by explaining how the presentist may de-tense our talk about times. I argue, furthermore, that, since the A-theory of time denies the success of any such de-tensing strategy, presentism is not a version of the A-theory – contrary to the (...)
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  8. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke Van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349 - 360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum (...)
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  9. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  10. Joshua Rasmussen (2010). A New Argument for a Necessary Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):351 - 356.
    I present a new argument for the thesis that there is a necessarily existing, causally powerful entity?a necessary being. The outline of the argument is this: (i) necessarily, every beginning of a certain sort S (which I'll specify) can have a cause; (ii) a beginning to the existence of all non-necessarily existing things would be of sort S; (iii) such a beginning can obtain; (iv) such a beginning cannot be caused unless there is a necessary being; therefore, (v) there is (...)
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  11. Joshua Rasmussen (2010). Cosmological Arguments From Contingency. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):806-819.
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  12. Joshua Rasmussen (2010). From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):183 - 200.
    I develop new paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being. These paths assume a metaphysical framework in which there are abstract states of affairs that can obtain or fail to obtain. One path begins with the following causal principle: necessarily, any contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. I mark out steps from that principle to a more complex causal principle and from there to the existence of a concrete necessary being. I offer a couple alternative causal principles (...)
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  13. Joshua Rasmussen (2009). From a Necessary Being to God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):1 - 13.
    Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.
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