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Joshua Schulz [6]Joshua W. Schulz [2]
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Profile: Joshua Schulz (DeSales University)
  1. Joshua Schulz (forthcoming). How Do You Know If You Haven't Tried It? In Advance. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
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  2. Joshua W. Schulz (2014). Aristotle and the Virtues. By Howard J. Curzer. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):167-169.
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  3. Joshua Schulz (2013). How Do You Know If You Haven’T Tried It?: Aristotelian Reflections on Hateful Humor. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 87:295-305.
    Howard Curzer argues that Aristotle’s virtue of wit is a social virtue, a form of philia: conversation with a witty person is pleasing rather than offensive or hateful. On the basis of an analogy between wit and temperance, Curzer holds that the witty person is good at detecting hateful humor but is not necessarily an expert in judging the funniness of jokes. Curzer thus defends a moderate position in contemporary philosophy of humor—a Detraction Account of hateful humor—arguing that the humorousness (...)
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  4. Joshua Schulz (2012). Indissoluble Marriage: A Defense. Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 15 (2):118-137.
  5. Joshua W. Schulz (2012). Kierkegaard's Comic and Tragic Lovers. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):251-269.
    This essay examines a dialogue between Kierkegaard and the Aristotelian tradition on the topic of love and friendship. At stake in the dispute is whetherphilia or agape is the highest form of love and how we should understand the relation between the two loves. The essay contributes to the conversation by analyzing two kinds of deceptive love identified in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, viewing each through the lens of a Shakespearian persona. Against the Aristotelian tradition, Kierkegaard defends the idiosyncratic view (...)
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  6. Joshua Schulz (2008). Grace and the New Man. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):439 - 446.
    Kant’s discussion of radical evil and moral regeneration in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone raises numerous moral and metaphysical problems.If the ground of one’s disposition does not lie in time, as Kant argues, how can it be reformed, as the moral law commands? If divine aid is necessary for thisimpossible reformation, how does this not destroy a person’s moral personality by bypassing her freedom? This paper argues that these problems can be resolved by showing how Kant can conceive (...)
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  7. Joshua Schulz (2007). Grace and the New Man: Conscious Humiliation and the Revolution of Disposition in Kant's Religion. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):439-446.
    Kant’s discussion of radical evil and moral regeneration in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone raises numerous moral and metaphysical problems.If the ground of one’s disposition does not lie in time, as Kant argues, how can it be reformed, as the moral law commands? If divine aid is necessary for thisimpossible reformation, how does this not destroy a person’s moral personality by bypassing her freedom? This paper argues that these problems can be resolved by showing how Kant can conceive (...)
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  8. Joshua Schulz (2007). Good Sex on Kantian Grounds, or A Reply to Alan Soble. Essays in Philosophy 8 (2):13.
    Immanuel Kant offers definitions of “sexual desire” and “sexual use” in the Metaphysics of Morals that occasion an inconsistency within his moral system, for they entail that sexual desire, as a natural inclination that is conditionally good, is also categorically objectifying, and thus per se immoral according to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Following Alan Soble, various attempts to resolve the inconsistency are here criticized before more suitable, and suitably Kantian, definitions of these terms are offered. It is (...)
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