Search results for 'Jour AZZOUNI' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Otavio Bueno & Jour AZZOUNI, Critical Studies/Book Reviews 319.score: 240.0
    Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented (...)
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  2. Jody Azzouni (1994). Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences. Cambridge University Press.score: 60.0
    This original and exciting study offers a completely new perspective on the philosophy of mathematics. Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similiar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a (...)
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  3. Jody Azzouni (2000). Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science. Routledge.score: 60.0
    Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science is a fascinating study of the bounds between science and language: In what sense does science provide knowledge? Is it to be taken literally? Is science an instrument only distantly related to what's real? Does the language of science adequately describe the truth? Jody Azzouni approaches these questions through an analysis of the "reference" of kind terms. He investigates the technology of science--the actual forging and exploiting of causal links--and shows how this technology (...)
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  4. Jody Azzouni (2004). Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for Nominalism. OUP USA.score: 60.0
    If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoid a (...)
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  5. Jody Azzouni (2006). Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. OUP USA.score: 60.0
    If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract eternal invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoid (...)
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  6. Jody Azzouni (2006). Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. OUP USA.score: 60.0
    When ordinary people - mathematicians among them - take something to follow (deductively) from something else, they are exposing the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. Jody Azzouni investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues invented by logicians. One claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of consequence, we do not introspect rules by which we reason, nor do we grasp the scope and range of the domain, as (...)
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  7. Jody Azzouni (1998). On "on What There Is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.score: 30.0
  8. Jody Azzouni (2004). Theory, Observation and Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):371-392.score: 30.0
    A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within which (...)
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  9. Jody Azzouni (2007). Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular. Noûs 41 (2):204–226.score: 30.0
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  10. Jody Azzouni (2010). Ontology and the Word 'Exist': Uneasy Relations. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):74-101.score: 30.0
    An extensive exploration of the special properties of ‘exist’ is here undertaken. Two of several results are: Denying that `exist’ has associated with it a set of necessary and sufficient conditions has seemed to a number of philosophers to imply metaphysical nihilism . This is because it has seemed that without such conditions the target domain of `existence’ is arbitrarily open. I show this is wrong. Second, my analysis sheds light on the puzzling question of what we are asking when (...)
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  11. Jody Azzouni (2011). Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.score: 30.0
    Tim Crane (2011) characterizes the cognitive role of singular thought via singular mental files: the application of such files to more than one object is senseless. As many do, he thus stresses the contrast between ‘singular’ and ‘general’. I give a counterexample, plurally-directed singular thought, and I offer alternative characterizations of singular thought—better described as ‘objects-directed thought’—initially in terms of the defeasibility of the descriptions associated with one's thinking of an object, and then more broadly in terms of whether descriptions (...)
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  12. Jody Azzouni & Otávio Bueno (2008). On What It Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter. Noûs 42 (4):753-769.score: 30.0
    Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within (...)
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  13. Jody Azzouni (2009). Empty de Re Attitudes About Numbers. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):163-188.score: 30.0
    I dub a certain central tradition in philosophy of language (and mind) the de re tradition. Compelling thought experiments show that in certain common cases the truth conditions for thoughts and public-language expressions categorically turn on external objects referred to, rather than on linguistic meanings and/or belief assumptions. However, de re phenomena in language and thought occur even when the objects in question don't exist. Call these empty de re phenomena. Empty de re thought with respect to numeration is explored (...)
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  14. Jody Azzouni (2008). A Cause for Concern: Standard Abstracta and Causation. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):397-401.score: 30.0
    Benjamin Callard has recently suggested that causation between Platonic objects—standardly understood as atemporal and non-spatial—and spatio-temporal objects is not ‘a priori’ unintelligible. He considers the reasons some have given for its purported unintelligibility: apparent impossibility of energy transference, absence of physical contact, etc. He suggests that these considerations fail to rule out a priori Platonic-object causation. However, he has overlooked one important issue. Platonic objects must causally affect different objects differently, and different Platonic objects must causally affect the same objects (...)
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  15. Jody Azzouni (2010). Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Numbers -- Hallucinations -- Fictions -- Scientific languages, ontology, and truth -- Truth conditions and semantics.
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  16. Jody Azzouni (1997). Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):193-209.score: 30.0
    The ramifications are explored of taking physical theories to commit their advocates only to ‘physically real’ entities, where ‘physically real’ means ‘causally efficacious’ (e.g., actual particles moving through space, such as dust motes), the ‘physically significant’ (e.g., centers of mass), and the merely mathematical—despite the fact that, in ordinary physical theory, all three sorts of posits are quantified over. It's argued that when such theories are regimented, existential quantification, even when interpreted ‘objectually’ (that is, in terms of satisfaction via variables, (...)
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  17. Jody Azzouni (2007). The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It. Inquiry 50 (6):590 – 605.score: 30.0
    I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its facticity (...)
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  18. Jody Azzouni (2004). The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):81-106.score: 30.0
    The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.
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  19. Jody Azzouni (2013). Inconsistency in Natural Languages. Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.score: 30.0
    An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.
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  20. Jody Azzouni (1992). A Priori Truth. Erkenntnis 37 (3):327 - 346.score: 30.0
    There are several epistemic distinctions among truths that I have argued for in this paper. First, there are those truths which holdof every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class A truths). Second, there are those truths which holdin every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class B truths). And finally, there are those truths whose truthvalue status isindependent of the empirical sciences (class C truths). The last category broadly includes statementsabout systems and the statements they contain, as well as statements true by virtue (...)
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  21. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.score: 30.0
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  22. Jody Azzouni (2009). Why Do Informal Proofs Conform to Formal Norms? Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.score: 30.0
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
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  23. Jody Azzouni (1997). Thick Epistemic Access: Distinguishing the Mathematical From the Empirical. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):472-484.score: 30.0
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  24. Jody Azzouni (2003). The Strengthened Liar, the Expressive Strength of Natural Languages, and Regimentation. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):329–350.score: 30.0
  25. Jody Azzouni (2012). Summary. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (2):327-329.score: 30.0
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  26. Jody Azzouni (2000). Stipulation, Logic, and Ontological Independence. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):225-243.score: 30.0
    A distinction between the epistemic practices in mathematics and in the empirical sciences is rehearsed to motivate the epistemic role puzzle. This is distinguished both from Benacerraf's 1973 epistemic puzzle and from sceptical arguments against our knowledge of an external world. The stipulationist position is described, a position which can address this puzzle. Methods of avoiding the stipulationist position by using pure logic to provide knowledge of mathematical abstracta are discussed and criticized.
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  27. Jody Azzouni & Otavio Bueno, Critical Studies/Book Reviews 319.score: 30.0
    Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented (...)
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  28. J. Azzouni (2005). How to Nominalize Formalism. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):135-159.score: 30.0
    Formalism shares with nominalism a distaste for abstracta. But an honest exposition of the former position risks introducing abstracta as the stuff of syntax. This article describes the dangers, and offers a new escape route from platonism for the formalist. It is explained how the needed role of derivations in mathematical practice can be explained, not by a commitment to the derivations themselves, but by the commitment of the mathematician to a practice which is in accord with a theory of (...)
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  29. Jody Azzouni (2001). Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.score: 30.0
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and (...)
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  30. J. Azzouni (2013). That We See That Some Diagrammatic Proofs Are Perfectly Rigorous. Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3):323-338.score: 30.0
    Mistaken reasons for thinking diagrammatic proofs aren't rigorous are explored. The main result is that a confusion between the contents of a proof procedure (what's expressed by the referential elements in a proof procedure) and the unarticulated mathematical aspects of a proof procedure (how that proof procedure is enabled) gives the impression that diagrammatic proofs are less rigorous than language proofs. An additional (and independent) factor is treating the impossibility of naturally generalizing a diagrammatic proof procedure as an indication of (...)
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  31. Jody Azzouni (2000). Applying Mathematics. The Monist 83 (2):209-227.score: 30.0
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  32. Jody Azzouni (2012). Responses to Gabriele Contessa, Erin Eaker, and Nikk Effingham. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (2):366-379.score: 30.0
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  33. J. Azzouni (2012). Taking the Easy Road Out of Dodge. Mind 121 (484):951-965.score: 30.0
    I defend my nominalist account of mathematics from objections that have been raised to it by Mark Colyvan.
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  34. Rosamond Rhodes, Jody Azzouni, Stefan Bernard Baumrin, Keith Benkov, Martin J. Blaser, Barbara Brenner, Joseph W. Dauben, William J. Earle, Lily Frank, Nada Gligorov, Joseph Goldfarb, Kurt Hirschhorn, Rochelle Hirschhorn, Ian Holzman, Debbie Indyk & Ethylin Wang Jabs (2011). De MinimisRisk: A Proposal for a New Category of Research Risk. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (11):1-7.score: 30.0
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 1-7, November 2011.
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  35. Jody Azzouni (forthcoming). A New Characterization of Scientific Theories. Synthese:1-16.score: 30.0
    First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent scientific theories.
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  36. Jody Azzouni (1991). A Simple Axiomatizable Theory of Truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32 (3):458-493.score: 30.0
  37. Jody Azzouni (2013). Hobnobbing with the Nonexistent. Inquiry 56 (4):340-358.score: 30.0
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  38. J. Azzouni (2013). The Relationship of Derivations in Artificial Languages to Ordinary Rigorous Mathematical Proof. Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2):247-254.score: 30.0
    The relationship is explored between formal derivations, which occur in artificial languages, and mathematical proof, which occurs in natural languages. The suggestion that ordinary mathematical proofs are abbreviations or sketches of formal derivations is presumed false. The alternative suggestion that the existence of appropriate derivations in formal logical languages is a norm for ordinary rigorous mathematical proof is explored and rejected.
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  39. Jody Azzouni & Bradley Armour-Garb (2005). Standing on Common Ground. Journal of Philosophy 102 (10):532-544.score: 30.0
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  40. Otávio Bueno & Jody Azzouni (2005). Review of D. Mac Kenzie, Mechanizing Proof: Computing, Risk, and Trust. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3):319-325.score: 30.0
  41. Jody Azzouni (1999). Comments on Shapiro. Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):541-544.score: 30.0
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  42. Jody Azzouni (2009). Evading Truth Commitments: The Problem Reanalyzed. Logique Et Analyse 52 (206):139.score: 30.0
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  43. Jody Azzouni (1997). Thick Epistemic Access. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):472 - 484.score: 30.0
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  44. Jody Azzouni (2010). The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).score: 30.0
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  45. Jody Azzouni (forthcoming). Why Deflationary Nominalists Shouldn't Be Agnostics. Philosophical Studies:1-19.score: 30.0
    A feature of agnostic views—views that officially express ignorance about the existence of something (God, mathematical abstracta, theoretical entities)—is that they are widely perceived to be epistemically more cautious than views that are committed to (or against) the entities in question. This is often seen as giving agnostics a debating advantage: all things being equal, fence-sitters have smaller argumentative burdens. Otávio Bueno argues in this way for what he calls “agnostic nominalism,” the view that we don’t know whether ontologically-independent Platonic (...)
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  46. Jody Azzouni (1995). Bookreviews. Mind 104 (413):222-225.score: 30.0
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  47. Jody Azzouni (1999). Review: Michael D. Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (2):922-923.score: 30.0
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  48. Nada Gligorov, Jody Azzouni, Douglas P. Lackey & Arnold Zweig (2013). Personal Identity. In Rosamond Rhodes, Nada Gligorov & Abraham Schwab (eds.), The Human Microbiome: Ethical, Legal and Social Concerns. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
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