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Profile: Juan Comesaña (University of Arizona)
  1. Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio (2014). Difference‐Making in Epistemology. Noûs 48 (2):368-387.
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  2. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):15-29.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...)
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  3. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply. Inquiry 56 (4):400-415.
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  4. Juan Comesaña (2013). Epistemic Pragmatism. Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.
    By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known orbeing justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of (...)
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  5. Juan Comesaña (2013). On a Puzzle About Withholding. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):374-376.
    I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle.
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  6. Juan Comesaña (2013). Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 165--178.
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  7. Juan Comesana (2012). Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust that (...)
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  8. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  9. Juan Comesaña (2010). Reliabilist Evidentialism”. Noûs 44:571-600.
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  10. Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin (2010). Is Evidence Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447 - 454.
    We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.
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  11. Juan Comesaña (2009). Comments on Carl Ginet's “Self-Evidence”. Veritas 54 (2).
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  12. Juan Comesana (2009). Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa. Teorema 28 (1):75-81.
     
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  13. Juan Comesaña (2009). What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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  14. Juan Comesaña (2008). Could There Be Exactly Two Things? Synthese 162 (1):31 - 35.
    Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.
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  15. Juan Comesaña (2007). Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):781-791.
    What relation must hold between a fact p and the corresponding belief that p for the belief to amount to knowledge? Many authors have recently proposed that the relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. In this paper I critically evaluate the main proposals along those lines.
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  16. Juan Comesaña (2007). Review of Stephen Hetherington (Ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).
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  17. Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
  18. Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield (...)
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  19. Juan Comesaña (2005). Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6).
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  20. Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...)
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  21. Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
    In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is (...)
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  22. Juan Comesana (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76.
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  23. Juan Comesaña (2002). The Diagonal and the Demon. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
    Reliabilism about epistemic justification – thethesis that what makes a belief epistemicallyjustified is that it was produced by a reliableprocess of belief-formation – must face twoproblems. First, what has been called ``the newevil demon problem'', which arises from the ideathat the beliefs of victims of an evil demonare as justified as our own beliefs, althoughthey are not – the objector claims – reliablyproduced. And second, the problem of diagnosingwhy skepticism is so appealing despite beingfalse. I present a special version ofreliabilism, (...)
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