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Profile: Judith Crane (Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville)
  1.  98
    Judith K. Crane (2004). On the Metaphysics of Species. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...)
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  2.  27
    Judith Crane (2003). Locke's Theory of Classification. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2):249 – 259.
  3.  83
    Judith Crane (2012). Biological-Mereological Coincidence. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):309-325.
    This paper presents and defends an account of the coincidence of biological organisms with mereological sums of their material components. That is, an organism and the sum of its material components are distinct material objects existing in the same place at the same time. Instead of relying on historical or modal differences to show how such coincident entities are distinct, this paper argues that there is a class of physiological properties of biological organisms that their coincident mereological sums (...)
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  4.  10
    Judith K. Crane & Ronald Sandler (2011). 13 Species Concepts and Natural Goodness. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press 289.
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  5.  36
    Judith K. Crane & Ronald Sandler (2005). Identity and Distinction in Spinoza's Ethics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):188–200.
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  6.  10
    Ronald Sandler & Judith Crane (2006). On the Moral Considerability of Homo Sapiens and Other Species. Environmental Values 15 (1):69 - 84.
    It is sometimes claimed that as members of the species Homo sapiens we have a responsibility to promote the good of Homo sapiens itself (distinct from the good of its individual members). Lawrence Johnson has recently defended this claim as part of his approach to resolving the problem of future generations. We show that there are several difficulties with Johnson's argument, many of which are likely to attend any attempt to establish the moral considerability of Homo sapiens or species generally. (...)
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  7. Ronald Sandler & Judith Crane (2006). On the Moral Considerability of Homo Sapiens and Other Species. Environmental Values 15 (1):69-84.
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