This article argues that previous research on the outcomes of corporate responsibility should be refined in two ways. First, although there is abundant research that addresses the link between corporate responsibility (CR) and financial performance, hardly any studies scrutinize whether the type of corporate responsibility makes a difference to this link. Second, while the majority of CR research conducted within business studies concentrates on the financial outcomes for the firm, the societal outcomes of CR are left largely unexplored. To tackle (...) these two deficiencies, this article extends the different conceptualizations of corporate responsibility and elaborates both the financial and the societal outcomes of different types of CR. (shrink)
I shall briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals to decide freely on the number of their children. I shall ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use (...) coercive methods such as laws or economic incentives and deterrents, on the other. I shall argue that when changing a population policy, it may be morally desirable to affect people's procreative decisions more rather than less, and that sometimes it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to a population policy that does maximize it. I shall also point out that indirect population policies that use incentives and deterrents are not necessarily incompatible with liberal principles. Finally, I try to show what is assumed by those who defend the view that coercive population policies are morally wrong in all circumstances. (shrink)
In this paper I will discuss the causes of global inequality. I will argue that there may be other important reasons for poverty than Western selfishness. Further, I will claim that most Western people believe that for one reason or another it is practically impossible to eradicate poverty, and that this shared belief itself may be a cause for why it is practically impossible to eradicate it in the near future. The question is about an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy. In my (...) view, it is important to consider the background and logic of this prophecy. (shrink)
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.
'Structural realism' is a buzzword in the scientific realism debate. Various positions with diverse motivations fall under this label. A much advertised distinction is between epistemic and ontological forms of structuralism. This paper scrutinizes the alleged dichotomy between these two 'alternatives', and criticises the considerations that have been taken to motivate the ontic variety over the epistemic. I will argue that ontological structural realism is not called for within the traditional realism debate.
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge.
Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument.
This paper discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attending to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising wholesale arguments.
The central concern of this paper is whether the Semantic Approach to theories has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty, for example, has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component which undermines the Approach itself. We suggest first of all, that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language with respect to the Semantic Approach. Secondly, we argue that an appropriately (...) structuralist account of representation can serve the structural realist’s needs. However, the real challenge, we feel, is whether a core notion of ‘explanatory approximate truth’ can be incorporated into this account and in such a way that the emphasis on structure is retained. The extent to which this challenge can be met is something on which even the authors are divided! (shrink)
Thomas Pogge has recently defended additional ways in which to eradicate poverty from the developing world. In this article, Pogge's argument is discussed. First the premises on which Pogge relies are summarized and the logic of 'international borrowing privilege' introduced. Then it is argued that Pogge's solutions to the poverty problem would face similar difficulties to many other solutions - that is, in order to work properly they all must gain extensive international support and political willingness, which they will not (...) easily obtain. The final section looks at how the solutions might gain more support and why people tend to resist new suggestions. (shrink)
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered.
In the discussion of such social questions as how should alcoholics be treated by society? and what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?, is disease a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance alcoholism should be classified as a disease we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and therefore (...) we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden. (shrink)
According to the indispensability argument, scientific realists ought to believe in the existence of mathematical entities, due to their indispensable role in theorising. Arguably the crucial sense of indispensability can be understood in terms of the contribution that mathematics sometimes makes to the super-empirical virtues of a theory. Moreover, the way in which the scientific realist values such virtues, in general, and draws on explanatory virtues, in particular, ought to make the realist ontologically committed to abstracta. This paper shows that (...) this version of the indispensability argument glosses over crucial detail about how the scientific realist attempts to generate justificatory commitment to unobservables. The kind of role that the Platonist attributes to mathematics in scientific reasoning is compatible with nominalism, as far as scientific realist arguments are concerned. (shrink)
I will argue that the fairly common assumption that brain imaging may compromise people’s privacy in an undesirable way only if moral crimes are committed is false. Sometimes persons’ privacy is compromised because of failures of privacy. A normal emotional reaction to failures of privacy is embarrassment and shame, not moral resentment like in the cases of violations of right to privacy. I will claim that if (1) neuroimaging will provide all kinds of information about persons’ inner life and not (...) only information that is intentionally searched for, and (2) there will be more and more application fields of fMRI and more and more people whose brains will be scanned (without any coercion), then, in the future, shame may be an unfortunately common feeling in our culture. This is because failures of privacy may dramatically increase. A person may feel shame strongly and long, especially if his failure is witnessed by people who he considers relatively important, but less than perfectly trustworthy. (shrink)
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. (...) We examine various ways in which the structural realist may respond, and conclude that the best way of blocking the model theoretic argument involves formulating his Ramseyfied theories using intensional operators. Introduction The model theoretic arguments On Ramseyfying away predicates The model theoretic argument bites back Restricting the second order quantifiers 5.1 Naturalness 5.2 Intrinsic 5.3 Qualitative 5.4 Contingent and causal Intensional operators and relations between properties Conclusion. (shrink)
This comment on Sven Ove Hansson's article on the history of the journal Theoria elaborates and corrects Hansson's characterisation of the political standpoint of the Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila as "sympathetic towards the German regime". Although not an easy question, particularly considering Kaila's unfortunate publications during the Second World War, it is argued that the characterisation is plainly wrong if it refers to the mid-1930s.
We consider collective quantification in natural language. For many years the common strategy in formalizing collective quantification has been to define the meanings of collective determiners, quantifying over collections, using certain type-shifting operations. These type-shifting operations, i.e., lifts, define the collective interpretations of determiners systematically from the standard meanings of quantifiers. All the lifts considered in the literature turn out to be definable in second-order logic. We argue that second-order definable quantifiers are probably not expressive enough to formalize all collective (...) quantification in natural language. (shrink)
This paper takes another look at a case study which has featured prominently in a variety of arguments for rival realist positions. After critically reviewing the previous commentaries of the theory shift that took place in the transition from Fresnel’s ether to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of optics, it will defend a slightly different reading of this historical case study. Central to this task is the notion of explanatory approximate truth, a concept which must be carefully analysed to begin with. With (...) this notion properly understood, it will be finally argued, the popular Fresnel-Maxwell case study points towards a novel formulation of scientific realism. (shrink)
We show that for any pair $\phi$ and $\psi$ of contradictory formulas of dependence logic there is a formula $\theta$ of the same logic such that $\phi\equiv\theta$ and $\psi\equiv\neg\theta$. This generalizes a result of Burgess.
Vakiintuneeksi tavaksi on muodostunut puhua nykyfilosofiasta kahtiajakautuneena analyyttiseen ja mannermaiseen filosofiaan. Harvalla on kuitenkaan kovin selkeää käsitystä siitä, mitä näillä nimilapuilla tosi asiassa nimetään. Kirjaimellisesti ymmärrettynä vastakkainasettelu on näillä sanoilla tietysti monella tapaa ongelmallinen: Bernard Williams onkin äskettäin huomauttanut, että filosofian jakaminen mannermaiseen ja analyyttiseen on vähän kuin yrittäisi jakaa autot kahteen toisensa poissulkevaan luokkaan, etuvetoisiin ja japanilaisiin. Nimittäin, toinen kriteeri on sisällöllinen ja toinen maantieteellinen. Lisäksi terminologia sopii huonosti yhteen sen tosiasian kanssa, että analyyttisen filosofian juuret ovat mitä suurimmassa (...) määrin mannermaiset; onhan sen keskeinen taustahahmo Frege ja suurin edustaja Wittgenstein (Williams 1995). Williamsin kritiikissä on kieltämättä tietty perä: terminologia johtaa sellaisiin kummallisuuksiin kuin äskettäin ilmestynyt teos American Continental Philosophy. Johdonmukaisemmin, sisällöllisemmillä kriteereillä analyyttisen filosofian vastakohtana on usein pidetty fenomenologista filosofiaa. Ansiokkaassa väitöskirjassaan Juha Himanka on pyrkinyt valottamaan näiden kahden filosofiantradition välistä sisällöllistä eroa keskustelulla, jonka fenomenologi Bataille ja looginen empiristi Ayer kävivät 1950-luvulla lauseista ”Maa liikkuu” ja ”Aurinko oli olemassa ennen kuin oli ihmisiä”. Ayerin mielestä lauseet olivat täysin mielekkäitä, kun taas fenomenologeille ne näyttäytyivät merkityksettöminä (Himanka.. (shrink)
A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide (...) a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings. (shrink)
We study definability of second-order generalized quantifiers. We show that the question whether a second-order generalized quantifier $\sQ_1$ is definable in terms of another quantifier $\sQ_2$, the base logic being monadic second-order logic, reduces to the question if a quantifier $\sQ^{\star}_1$ is definable in $\FO(\sQ^{\star}_2,<,+,\times)$ for certain first-order quantifiers $\sQ^{\star}_1$ and $\sQ^{\star}_2$. We use our characterization to show new definability and non-definability results for second-order generalized quantifiers. In particular, we show that the monadic second-order majority quantifier $\most^1$ is not definable (...) in second-order logic. (shrink)
We study the expressive power of open formulas of dependence logic introduced in Väänänen [Dependence logic (Vol. 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts), 2007]. In particular, we answer a question raised by Wilfrid Hodges: how to characterize the sets of teams definable by means of identity only in dependence logic, or equivalently in independence friendly logic.
One of the key events in the relations between the Central European philosophers and those of the Nordic countries was the Second International Congress for the ...
The article discusses burden of proof rules in social criticism. By social criticism I mean an argumentative situation in which an opponent publicly argues against certain social practices; the examples I consider are discrimination on the basis of species and discrimination on the basis of one's nationality. I argue that burden of proof rules assumed by those who defend discrimination are somewhat dubious. In social criticism, there are no shared values which would uncontroversially determine what is the reasonable presumption and (...) who has the burden of proof, nor are there formal rules which would end the debate and determine the winner at a specific point. (shrink)
In this paper I will discuss the causes of global inequality. I will argue that there may be other important reasons for poverty than Western selfishness. Further, I will claim that most Western people believe that for one reason or another it is practically impossible to eradicate poverty, and that this shared belief itself may be a cause for why it is practically impossible to eradicate it in the near future. The question is about an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy. In my (...) view, it is important to consider the background and logic of this prophecy. (shrink)
Modern software is infested with flaws having information security aspects. Pervasive computing has made us and our society vulnerable. However, software developers do not fully comprehend what is at stake when faulty software is produced and flaws causing security vulnerabilites are discovered. To address this problem, the main actors involved with software vulnerability processes and the relevant roles inside these groups are identified. This categorisation is illustrated through a fictional case study, which is scrutinised in the light of ethical codes (...) of professional software engineers and common principles of responsibility attribution. The focus of our analysis is on the acute handling of discovered vulnerabilities in software, including reporting, correcting and disclosing these vulnerabilities. We recognise a need for guidelines and mechanisms to facilitate further improvement in resolving processes leading to and in handling software vulnerabilities. In the spirit of disclosive ethics we call for further studies of the complex issues involved. (shrink)
This paper erects a framework for analyzing some idealized models as (what I call) inferentially veridical representations. It adopts a version of the semantic view of theories that focuses on properties, and mobilizes conceptual resources associated with properties and the way that properties are related in various ways. The outcome is an elaboration of some aspects of the analysis of Jones (2005).
I offer a meta-level analysis of realist arguments for the reliability of ampliative reasoning about the unobservable. We can distinguish form-driven and content-driven arguments for realism: form-driven arguments appeal to the form of inductive inferences, whilst content-driven arguments appeal to their specific content. After regimenting the realism debate in these terms, I will argue that the content-driven arguments are preferable. Along the way I will discuss how my analysis relates to John Norton’s recent, more general thesis that the grounds for (...) licit induction are always material. (shrink)
We studied the patient JP who has exceptional abilities to draw complex geometrical images by hand and a form of acquired synesthesia for mathematical formulas and objects, which he perceives as geometrical figures. JP sees all smooth curvatures as discrete lines, similarly regardless of scale. We carried out two preliminary investigations to establish the perceptual nature of synesthetic experience and to investigate the neural basis of this phenomenon. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, image-inducing formulas produced larger fMRI (...) responses than non-image inducing formulas in the left temporal, parietal and frontal lobes. Thus our main finding is that the activation associated with his experience of complex geometrical images emerging from mathematical formulas is restricted to the left hemisphere. (shrink)
Many known tools for proving expressibility bounds for first-order logic are based on one of several locality properties. In this paper we characterize the relationship between those notions of locality. We note that Gaifman's locality theorem gives rise to two notions: one deals with sentences and one with open formulae. We prove that the former implies Hanf's notion of locality, which in turn implies Gaifman's locality for open formulae. Each of these implies the bounded degree property, which is one of (...) the easiest tools for proving expressibility bounds. These results apply beyond the first-order case. We use them to derive expressibility bounds for first-order logic with unary quantifiers and counting. We also characterize the notions of locality on structures of small degree. (shrink)
We study definability of second order generalized quantifiers on finite structures. Our main result says that for every second order type t there exists a second order generalized quantifier of type t which is not definable in the extension of second order logic by all second order generalized quantifiers of types lower than t.
This paper discusses and provides a tentative model of a firm for purposes of accounting. The paper first presents the neo-classical capital circulation model of the firm—a model that has been an integral part of Finnish business economics and accounting education for at least half a century. During the same period the stakeholder model has become an alternative model of the firm in Scandinavia. These models have represented two alternatives to define the firm in education. In this paper we try (...) to combine these two models to provide a more comprehensive picture of the firm, especially from the accounting education perspective. An earlier version of this model was presented in 1995 in a book edited by Juha Näsi. Stakeholders with business transactions were seen to be crucial to firms and were categorized as primary in the 1995 model. In addition to stakeholders, a number of stakeholder issues were illustrated in the stakeholder model serving accounting as an educational framework. In this paper the earlier model has been updated, taking into account the current globalization and other developments in the business world. (shrink)
On the basis of a recent in-depth case study of the severe conflicts that arose in relation to the process of forming a spin-off biotech company at Helsinki University, Juha Tuunainen argued that "the traditional university is not being transformed into an entrepreneurial one as straightforwardly as claimed by Henry Etzkowitz" and that it remains an open question whether "hybrid entities" combining academic work and corporate activity can "ever survive as stable organizations within a university" (2005, 202, 203). The (...) present paper offers a reinterpretation of Tuunainen's study, identifying the inadequate separation of researcher and entrepreneur roles as the crux of the conflicts. Most importantly, however, this reinterpretation enables the conceptualisation of a model for university governance that maintains role separation while at the same time promoting an acceleration of university entrepreneurship and commercialisation by integrating it in the very core of the university institution. (shrink)
We discuss an abstract notion of a logical operation and corresponding logics. It is shown that if all the logical operations considered are implicitely definable in a logic *, then the same holds also for the logic obtained from these operations. As an application we show that certain iterated forms of infinitely deep languages are implicitely definable in game quantifier languages. We consider also relations between structures and show that Karttunen's characterization of elementary equivalence for the ordinary infinitely deep languages (...) can be generalized to hold for the iterated infinitely deep languages. An early version of this work was presented in the Abstracts Section of ICM '78. (shrink)
The goal of evolutionary theory is to (a) specify the general causal structure of evolving systems and (b) analyze evolutionary consequences that are expected to result from the proposed structure of the model systems. Biologists frequently emphasize the hypothetico-deductive method in evolutionary theory. I will show that this method primarily provides a tactical device for (b), while evolutionary synthesis requires a foundation of a unifying conceptual model for (a). Therefore, any successful strategy for a new synthesis requires both a new (...) conceptual insight of evolving systems, and tactical devices for analyzing new specific aspects of the evolutionary process. (shrink)
I shall briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals to decide freely on the number of their children. I shall ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use (...) coercive methods such as laws or economic incentives and deterrents, on the other. I shall argue that when changing a population policy, it may be morally desirable to affect people's procreative decisions more rather than less, and that sometimes it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to a population policy that does maximize it. I shall also point out that indirect population policies that use incentives and deterrents are not necessarily incompatible with liberal principles. Finally, I try to show what is assumed by those who defend the view that coercive population policies are morally wrong in all circumstances. (shrink)
The idea of this paper is to approach linear orderings as generalized ordinals and to study how they are made from their initial segments. First we look at how the equality of two linear orderings can be expressed in terms of equality of their initial segments. Then we shall use similar methods to define functions by recursion with respect to the initial segment relation. Our method is based on the use of a game where smaller and smaller initial segments of (...) linear orderings are considered. The length of the game is assumed to exceed that of the descending sequences of elements of the linear orderings considered. By use of such game-theoretical methods we can for example extend the recursive definitions of the operations of sum, product and exponentiation of ordinals in a unique and natural way for arbitrary linear orderings. Extensions coming from direct limits do not satisfy our game-theoretic requirements in general. We also show how our recursive definitions allow very simple constructions for fixed points of functions, giving rise to certain interesting linear orderings. (shrink)
C. Karp has shown that if α is an ordinal with ω α = α and A is a linear ordering with a smallest element, then α and $\alpha \bigotimes A$ are equivalent in L ∞ω up to quantifer rank α. This result can be expressed in terms of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games where player ∀ has to make additional moves by choosing elements of a descending sequence in α. Our aim in this paper is to prove a similar result for Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (...) games of length ω 1 . One implication of such a result will be that a certain infinite quantifier language cannot say that a linear ordering has no descending ω 1 -sequences (when the alphabet contains only one binary relation symbol). Connected work is done by Hyttinen and Oikkonen in [H] and [O]. (shrink)
We prove that the class of trees with no branches of cardinality ≥κ is not RPC definable in L ∞κ when κ is regular. Earlier such a result was known for L κ + κ under the assumption $\kappa^{ . Our main result is actually proved in a stronger form which covers also L ∞λ (and makes sense there) for every strong limit cardinal $\lambda > \kappa$ of cofinality κ.
Guilt feelings are an important part of our emotional life that is relevant to moral philosophy, and guilt feelings raise many theoretically interesting questions. One such question is the problem of how it is possible that sometimes people seem to feel guilty because of an act they have committed even if they believe that the act is not wrong and that it does not have any moral costs. A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going (...) to the theater is wrong, and even if she has rejected this taboo years ago, she may still feel guilty when attending theater. At least, this seems to be the case. If it is the case, then one must explain how it is possible that a person may feel guilty without believing that she is guilty, i.e. that (1) she is responsible for the act and that (2) the act is wrong or has moral costs. Suppose, however, that it is not possible to feel guilty while believing that one is not guilty. Then one must explain why it seems that sometimes—in taboo cases—one can feel that she is guilty and at the same time believe that she is not guilty. In this paper I evaluate some of the usual solutions to the problem and explicate their problems. (shrink)
: The main contribution of this paper for social studies of scientific practice is to use and further elaborate the concept of experimental system. It is expanded from mere epistemic concerns to also incorporate the built-in practicality and societal relevance of scientific research. For this, an analysis of object construction by a potato-biotechnology research group is presented. The group's object of activity is conceptualized as a dual one comprising both the epistemic and applied objectives. The application object points to the (...) virus-resistant cultivated potato under construction, the epistemic object to the knowledge on the virus-resistance mechanism. Two major phases of the group's work are perceived as distinct experimental systems. The transition between them is analysed in terms of a gradual evolution characterised by network collaboration, ad hoc improvization, resistance, opportunism and informal interaction. (shrink)
In this paper I will discuss the causes of global inequality. I will argue that there may be other important reasons for poverty than Western selfishness. Further, I will claim that most Western people believe that for one reason or another it is practically impossible to eradicate poverty, and that this shared belief itself may be a cause for why it is practically impossible to eradicate it in the near future. The question is about an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy. In my (...) view, it is important to consider the background and logic of this prophecy. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the changes in managers’ moral attitudes, stakeholder orientation and economic interests from 1994 to 2004. Dataare presented concerning 8-10 stakeholder groups and 50-58 moral issues.
An entrepreneurial firm was sold to a MNC, and then back to the original entrepreneur. The process will be examined through the lenses of the integration-responsiveness framework, moral and stakeholder approaches, as well as theory of entrepreneurship.
Do all methods of moral justification resemble the method of reflective equilibrium in presupposing that moral judgment's being justified depends at least in part on its being appropriately related to our actual substantial moral views? Can a moral judgment be justified without such a presupposition? I shall distinguish three versions of the no-option argument According to any version of the no-option argument, there is certain fact which characterizes moral theories, and that fact implies that there is no option other than (...) to justify moral judgments by presupposing that their justification depends at least in part on their being appropriately related to our actual substantial moral views. Versions of the no-option argument differ in their specification of the characterizing fact that proves that in ethics there is only one option. I shall argue that the most common versions of the no-option argument are indefensible, while the defensibility of a more sophisticated version depends on the meaning of a notion of moral argument in philosophical ethics. (shrink)
Political conspiracy theorists have done a lot of good in the past; undoubtedly they will do a lot of good in the future too. However, it is important to point out that conspiracy theories may have adverse consequences too. Political conspiracy theorizing, as a public activity, may lead to harmful scapegoating and its implications may be racist and fascist rather than democratic. Conspiracy theories may undermine trust in political institutions. Certain conspiracy theories are kept artificially alive, because of their political (...) effects; “conspiracy theorists” do not always believe in their theories, but repeat them in public because of politicalreasons. Conspiracy theories have close connections to populism, and when theories are accepted widely enough, they remind harmful rumors. Sometimes conspiracy theories are designed and disclosed to make political decision-making more difficult and to create an impression that certain questions are still “open”. Certain conspiracy theories are disguised libels: they place individual persons in a “false light” in the public eye. In my presentation, I aim to discuss the ethics of political conspiracy theorizing and conditions for ethically acceptable conspiracy theorizing. (shrink)
