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Profile: Juha Saatsi (University of Leeds)
  1.  33
    Juha Saatsi, Explanation and Explanationism in Science and Metaphysics.
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  2.  23
    Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi, Explanatory Abstractions.
    We distinguish different senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and we analyse the connection between explanations' abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract non-causal, mathematical explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations. This opposes a clear recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way.
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  3. Juha Saatsi (2011). The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational Versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):143-154.
    The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge.
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  4. Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). On the 'Indispensable Explanatory Role' of Mathematics. Mind.
    The literature on the indispensability argument for mathematical realism often refers to the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics. I argue that we should examine the notion of explanatory indispensability from the point of view of specific conceptions of scientific explanation. The reason is that explanatory indispensability in and of itself turns out to be insufficient for justifying the ontological conclusions at stake. To show this I introduce a distinction between different kinds of explanatory roles – some (...)
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  5.  26
    Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). Models, Idealisations, and Realism. In F. Sterpetti, E. Ippoloti & T. Nickles (eds.), Models and Inferences in Science. Springer
    I explore a challenge that idealisations pose to scientific realism and argue that the realist can best accommodate idealisations by capitalising on certain modal features of idealised models that are underwritten by laws of nature.
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  6.  23
    Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). Replacing Recipe Realism. Synthese:1-12.
    Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with ‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.
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  7.  72
    Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). On Explanations From 'Geometry of Motion'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from "geometry of motion" with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics.
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  8.  97
    Juha Saatsi (2012). Mathematics and Program Explanations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):579-584.
    Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument.
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  9. Steven French & Juha Saatsi (2006). Realism About Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):548-559.
    The central concern of this paper is whether the Semantic Approach to theories has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty, for example, has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component which undermines the Approach itself. We suggest first of all, that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language with respect to the Semantic Approach. Secondly, we argue that an appropriately (...)
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  10.  47
    Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi (2006). Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
    Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. (...)
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  11. Juha Saatsi (2005). On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1088-1098.
    The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.
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  12.  37
    Juha Saatsi (2005). Reconsidering the Fresnel–Maxwell Theory Shift: How the Realist Can Have Her Cake and EAT It Too. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):509-538.
    This paper takes another look at a case study which has featured prominently in a variety of arguments for rival realist positions. After critically reviewing the previous commentaries of the theory shift that took place in the transition from Fresnel’s ether to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of optics, it will defend a slightly different reading of this historical case study. Central to this task is the notion of explanatory approximate truth, a concept which must be carefully analysed to begin with. With (...)
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  13.  51
    Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.) (2006). The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press.
  14.  29
    Juha Saatsi (2014). Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. Synthese 191 (13):2941-2955.
    I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.
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  15.  12
    Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). Historical Inductions, Old and New. Synthese:1-15.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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  16.  87
    Juha Saatsi (2012). Scientific Realism and Historical Evidence: Shortcomings of the Current State of Debate. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 329--340.
    This paper discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attending to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising wholesale arguments.
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  17.  47
    Juha Saatsi & Peter Vickers (2011). Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff's Diffraction Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):29-46.
    Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered.
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  18.  42
    Juha Saatsi & Mark Pexton (2013). Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):613-624.
    We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity (...)
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  19.  48
    Juha Saatsi (2007). Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):19 – 33.
    According to the indispensability argument, scientific realists ought to believe in the existence of mathematical entities, due to their indispensable role in theorising. Arguably the crucial sense of indispensability can be understood in terms of the contribution that mathematics sometimes makes to the super-empirical virtues of a theory. Moreover, the way in which the scientific realist values such virtues, in general, and draws on explanatory virtues, in particular, ought to make the realist ontologically committed to abstracta. This paper shows that (...)
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  20.  42
    Juha Saatsi (2010). Whence Ontological Structural Realism? In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer 255--265.
    'Structural realism' is a buzzword in the scientific realism debate. Various positions with diverse motivations fall under this label. A much advertised distinction is between epistemic and ontological forms of structuralism. This paper scrutinizes the alleged dichotomy between these two 'alternatives', and criticises the considerations that have been taken to motivate the ontic variety over the epistemic. I will argue that ontological structural realism is not called for within the traditional realism debate.
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  21.  87
    Juha Saatsi (2009). Whence Ontological Structural Realism? In M. Suarez (ed.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer
    'Structural realism' is a buzzword in the scientific realism debate. Various positions with diverse motivations fall under this label. A much advertised distinction is between epistemic and ontological forms of structuralism. This paper scrutinizes the alleged dichotomy between these two 'alternatives', and criticises the considerations that have been taken to motivate the ontic variety over the epistemic. I will argue that ontological structural realism is not called for within the traditional realism debate.
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  22.  18
    Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). Structuralism with and Without Causation. Synthese:1-17.
    This paper explores the status of causation in structuralist metaphysics of physics. What role (if any) does causation play in understanding ‘structure’ in ontological structural realism? I address this question by examining, in a structuralist setting, arguments for and against the idea that fundamental physics deals, perhaps exclusively, with causal properties. I will argue (against Esfeld, Dorato and others) that a structuralist interpretation of fundamental physics should diverge from ‘causal structuralism’. Nevertheless, causation outside fundamental physics, and the basic motivation for (...)
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  23. Juha Saatsi (2009). Form Vs. Content-Driven Arguments for Realism. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan
    I offer a meta-level analysis of realist arguments for the reliability of ampliative reasoning about the unobservable. We can distinguish form-driven and content-driven arguments for realism: form-driven arguments appeal to the form of inductive inferences, whilst content-driven arguments appeal to their specific content. After regimenting the realism debate in these terms, I will argue that the content-driven arguments are preferable. Along the way I will discuss how my analysis relates to John Norton’s recent, more general thesis that the grounds for (...)
     
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  24.  32
    Juha Saatsi (2014). Recalling a Habermas-Inspired Experimental Realism. Metascience 23 (2):339-341.
    This is a revised edition of Hans Radder’s Habermas-inspired study of scientific experimentation and realism. The previous English edition (1988) has been out of print since 2004 (The book first appeared in Dutch in 1984). The author (together with the editors of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science) has deemed it worthy of resuscitation. Perhaps it is. There are certainly a number of lasting elements of continuing interest, some of which indeed strike to the heart of the contemporary (...)
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  25.  35
    Juha Saatsi (2008). Eclectic Realism—the Proof of the Pudding: A Reply to Busch. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):273-276.
    Eclectic realism is defended against the criticism in Busch by clarifying its terminological and conceptual basis, and by comparing it with structural and semirealism.Keywords: Realism; Pessimistic induction; Augustin Jean Fresnel; Eclectic realism; Semi-realism.
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  26. Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading (2006). 1. Preface Preface (Pp. I-Ii). Philosophy of Science 73 (5).
     
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  27.  4
    Juha Saatsi (2007). Critical Commentaries on Critical Rationalism. Metascience 16 (2):271-275.
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  28. Juha Saatsi (2011). Idealized Models as Inferentially Veridical Representations : A Conceptual Framework. In Paul Humphreys & Cyrille Imbert (eds.), Models, Simulations, and Representations. Routledge
    This paper erects a framework for analyzing some idealized models as (what I call) inferentially veridical representations. It adopts a version of the semantic view of theories that focuses on properties, and mobilizes conceptual resources associated with properties and the way that properties are related in various ways. The outcome is an elaboration of some aspects of the analysis of Jones (2005).
     
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  29.  3
    Steven French & Juha Saatsi (2011). Travelling in New Directions. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum 337.
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  30.  34
    Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.) (2011). Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum.
    A one volume reference guide To The latest research in Philosophy of Science, written by an international team of leading scholars in the field.
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  31. Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading (2006). 10. Can Philosophy Offer Help in Resolving Contemporary Biological Controversies? In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan
     
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  32. Juha Saatsi (2010). Form-Driven Vs. Content-Driven Arguments for Realism. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan
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  33. Juha Saatsi (2011). Mathematics and Reality. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):267-268.
     
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  34. Juha Saatsi (2011). M. Leng, Mathematics and Reality. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):267.
     
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  35. Juha Saatsi (ed.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Routledge.
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  36. Juha Saatsi (2010). Whence Ontic Structural Realism? In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer 255--66.
     
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