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Profile: Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (University of Oslo)
  1. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.
    Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based reply (...)
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  2. Ausonio Marras & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010). Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List. In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. 129.
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  3. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010). Conditional and Habitual Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):624-630.
    Michael Fara's ‘habitual analysis’ of disposition ascriptions is equivalent to a kind of ceteris paribus conditional analysis which has no evident advantage over Martin's well known and simpler analysis. I describe an unsatisfactory hypothetical response to Martin's challenge, which is lacking in just the same respect as the analysis considered by Martin; Fara's habitual analysis is equivalent to this hypothetical analysis. The feature of the habitual analysis that is responsible for this cannot be harmlessly excised, for the resulting analysis would (...)
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