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Profile: Jules Holroyd (Nottingham University)
  1. Jules Holroyd (2012). Responsibility for Implicit Bias. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
    Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...)
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  2. Jules Holroyd & Joseph Sweetman (forthcoming). The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias. In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. OUP
    The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely (...)
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  3. Jules Holroyd & Dan Kelly (forthcoming). Implicit Bias, Character and Control. In Jonathan Webber & Alberto Masala (eds.), From Personality to Virtue.
    Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4] We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued (...)
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  4. Jules Holroyd (2010). Punishment and Justice. Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):78-111.
    Should the state punish its disadvantaged citizens who have committed crimes? Duff has recently argued that where disadvantage persists the state loses its authority to hold individuals to account and to punish for criminal wrongdoings. I here scrutinize Duff’s argument for the claim that social justice is a precondition for the legitimacy of state punishment. I sharpen an objection to Duff’s argument: with his framework, we seem unable to block the implausible conclusion that where disadvantage persists the state lacks the (...)
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  5.  57
    Jules Holroyd (2015). Implicit Bias, Awareness and Imperfect Cognitions. Consciousness and Cognition 33:511-523.
  6. Jules Holroyd (2010). The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):343-371.
    It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering (...)
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  7.  4
    Jules Holroyd (2012). Clarifying Capacity: Value and Reasons. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
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  8. Jules Holroyd (2009). Relational Autonomy and Paternalistic Interventions. Res Publica 15 (4):321-336.
  9. Jules Holroyd (forthcoming). Clarifying Capacity: Reasons and Value. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Health. Oxford University Press
    It is usually appropriate for adults to make significant decisions, such as about what kinds of medical treatment to undergo, for themselves. But sometimes impairments are suffered - either temporary or permanent - which render an individual unable to make such decisions. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out the conditions under which it is appropriate to regard an individual as lacking the capacity to make a particular decision (and when provisions should be made for a decision on their behalf). (...)
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  10.  82
    Jules Holroyd (2013). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Analysis 73 (1):198-202.
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  11.  38
    Jules Holroyd (2010). Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):180-199.
    Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to explain (...)
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  12.  63
    Jules Holroyd (2013). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility by Nelkin. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):198-202.
    What must the world be like, and what must we agents be like, in order to be morally responsible for our actions? In Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, Dana Nelkin develops and defends what she dubs the ‘rational abilities’ view (RA) of moral responsibility. On this compatibilist view, an agent is morally responsible for an action, in a sense which makes it appropriate to hold her accountable for that action, if she has ‘the ability to do the right thing (...)
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  13.  33
    Jules Holroyd (2007). A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):267 - 278.
    I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent, and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral (...)
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  14.  56
    Jules Holroyd (2011). The Metaphysics of Relational Autonomy. In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self. Springer 99--115.
    I here focus on two debates about the conditions for self-governance. In one, the metaphysical debate, theorists are concerned with the potential threat that causal determinism poses to self-governance. In another, the relational debate, theorists are concerned with the potential threat that certain social conditions—especially those that are oppressive to certain social groups—pose to self-governance. MacKenzie and Stoljar have suggested (2000) that the concerns of these two debates do not intersect. In this chapter, I draw out the connections between the (...)
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  15.  42
    Jules Holroyd (2011). Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, by Rae Langton. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):327-334.
  16.  22
    Jules Holroyd (2015). Mark D. White : Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1):177-188.
    It is customary to remark, in writings on retributivism, that the meaning of the term is so diffuse and variably applied that there is no one concept or justificatory principle picked out by the term. Cottingham identified 9 different ideas captured by the term retributivism, and a similar paper could today no doubt identify as many again. This edited volume of essays on retributivism does justice to that customary remark, by bringing together a range of writings on retributivism many of (...)
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  17.  31
    Jules Holroyd (2011). The Antisocial Networker. The Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53):112-113.
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  18.  17
    Jules Holroyd & Alessandra Tanesini (2012). Under-Represented Groups in Philosophy. Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 22:243-249.
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  19.  33
    Jules Holroyd (2010). Alasdair Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law, a Relational Challenge. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):255-262.
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  20. Jules Holroyd (2011). The Social Network Directed by David Fincher, Starring Jesse Eisenberg, Andrew Garfield and Justin Timberlake. The Philosophers' Magazine 53:112-113.
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  21. Jules Holroyd (2007). A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):267-278.
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  22. Jules Holroyd, Responsibility for Implicit Bias.
    Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...)
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  23. Jules Holroyd, The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment.
    It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of (...)
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