5 found
See also:
Profile: Julia Markovits (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  1. Julia Markovits (2010). Acting for the Right Reasons. Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
    This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  2.  13
    Julia Markovits (2014). Moral Reason. OUP Oxford.
    Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are--an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  3. Julia Markovits (2012). Saints, Heroes, Sages, and Villains. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):289-311.
    This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  20
    Julia Markovits (2011). Why Be an Internalist About Reasons? Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:255.
  5. Julia Markovits (2011). Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
    Export citation  
    My bibliography