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Profile: Julia Staffel (Washington University in St. Louis)
  1. Julia Staffel (forthcoming). Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    Epistemic utility theory seeks to establish epistemic norms by combining principles from decision theory and social choice theory with ways of determining the epistemic utility of agents’ attitudes. Recently, Moss (Mind, 120(480), 1053–69, 2011) has applied this strategy to the problem of finding epistemic compromises between disagreeing agents. She shows that the norm “form compromises by maximizing average expected epistemic utility”, when applied to agents who share the same proper epistemic utility function, yields the result that agents must form compromises (...)
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  2. Julia Staffel (forthcoming). Measuring the Overall Incoherence of Credence Functions. Synthese:1-27.
    Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to distinguish between two kinds of credence (...)
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  3. Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
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  4. Julia Staffel (2011). Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-Lies'. Analysis 71 (2):300-302.
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