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Julia Tanner [20]Julian A. Tanner [1]
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Profile: Julia Tanner
  1. Julia Tanner (2014). Clarifying the Concept of Cruelty: What Makes Cruelty to Animals Cruel. Heythrop Journal 55 (5).
  2. Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
    It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.
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  3. Julia Tanner (2012). Anthropocentrism. In Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Environmental Issues.
    Definition: considering human beings to be of central importance; the source of value.
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  4. Julian A. Tanner (2012). The Softer Art of Enzymology. Bioessays 34 (1):83-84.
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  5. Gerald K. Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think, 10(27), 113-121 (27):113-121.
    Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).
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  6. Gerald Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think 10 (27):113-121.
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  7. Julia Tanner (2011). The Argument From Marginal Cases: Is Species a Relevant Difference. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (32):225-235.
    Marginal humans are not rational yet we still think they are morally considerable. This is inconsistent with denying animals moral status on the basis of their irrationality. Therefore, either marginal humans and animals are both morally considerable or neither are. In this paper I consider a major objection to this argument: that species is a relevant difference between humans animals.
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  8. Julia Tanner (2011). Moral Status of Animals From Marginal Cases. In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Julia Tanner (2011). Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):569-587.
    Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).
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  10. Julia Tanner (2010). Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship – by Gary Steiner. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):102-104.
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  11. Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values 18 (1):51-66.
    Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly speaking (...)
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  12. Julia Tanner (2009). The Epistemic Irresponsibility of the Subjects-of-a-Life Account. Between the Species 13 (9):7.
    In this paper I will argue that Regan’s subjects-of-a-life account is epistemically irresponsible. Firstly, in making so many epistemic claims. Secondly in making the claims themselves.
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  13. Julia Tanner (2008). Species as a Relationship. Acta Analytica 23 (4):337-347.
    The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species membership (...)
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  14. Julia Tanner (2008). Why I Won’T Hurt Your Felines? In Steven Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell You About Your Cat. Open Court Publishing.
    Some philosophers (such as Kant and Rawls) think it is only wrong to be cruel to cats because it will make one behave cruelly to humans. This explanation is unsatisfactory. Why? Because being cruel to your cat is a direct wrong to your cat regardless of the effects it has on other humans. Ascribing the wrongness of cruelty to the fact it will make one callous to other humans is to assess the character of the cruel person not the act (...)
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  15. Julia Tanner (2007). Can Animals Have Preference-Interests? Ethic@ 6 (1).
    It has been argued that only moral agents can have preference-interests and this therefore excludes animals. I will present two objections to this argument. The first will show that moral agency is not necessary to have preference-interests. The second will assert that the argument that animals cannot have preference-interests has unwelcome consequences.
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  16. Julia Tanner (2007). Intrinsic Value and the Argument From Regress. Forum Philosophicum 12 (2):313-322..
    Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of intrinsic value is (...)
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  17. Julia Tanner (2006). Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument. Facta Universitatis 5 (1):47-63.
    In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.
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  18. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  19. Julia Tanner (2005). The Marginal Cases Argument: Animals Matter Too. Think 4 (10):53-62..
    If we are going to treat other species so very differently from our own — killing, eating and experimenting on pigs and sheep, for example, but never human beings — then it seems we need to come up with some morally relevant difference between us and them that justifies this difference in treatment. Otherwise it appears we are guilty of bigotry (in just the same way that someone who discriminates on the basis of race or sex is guilty of bigotry). (...)
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  20. Julia Tanner (2002). Value, Respect and Attachment (Book Review). [REVIEW] Philosophical Writings (21).
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