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  1. Julia Tanney, The Colour Flows Back: Intention and Interpretation in Literature and in Everyday Action.
    The notion of the author’s intention is logically tied to the interpretation we give to her work as the notion of the agent’s intention is logically tied to the interpretation we give to her action. When we find a discrepancy between what the author or agent says and the meaning we find in her work or the sense we make of what she does, this does not show that the intention is irrelevant in determining this meaning or sense. As Frank (...)
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  2. Julia Tanney, On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status Of.
    Zombies are presently generating much discussion in the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.2 For if a creature could be physically, functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from humans (in the rich sense implied) yet lack conscious experience, then the theories of mind that tie the nature of the mental too closely to physical, functional, or behavioural conditions will seem to have left something crucially mental out of their theories. If having conscious experiences is necessary for being conscious – as these discussions (...)
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  3. Julia Tanney, Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind.
    The more empirical, ‘naturalistic’ turn in the approach of many contemporary philosophers, their search for ‘theories’ and their appeal to general ‘theoretical’ considerations apparently continuous with natural science...puts [contemporary] philosophy...farther from the spirit as well as the letter of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical problems. He thought that ‘philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads (...)
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  4. Julia Tanney, Investigating Cultures: A Critique of Cognitive Anthropology.
    - The objectivity of anthropological investigation When we deem an investigation a scientific one, one of the aspects we might be trying to emphasize is the importance of objectivity in our judgments about the phenomenon we are studying. At least, we might agree that physical scientists are bound to adhere to certain norms of investigation such that, if someone else of sufficient training and expertise were to investigate as well, he or she would come up with the same results. In (...)
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  5. Julia Tanney, Ordinary Language and Commonsense Psychology.
     
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  6. Julia Tanney, Prolegomena to a Cartographical Investigation of Cause and Reason.
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  7. Julia Tanney (2013). Ryle's Conceptual Cartography. In Erich H. Reck (ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  8. Julia Tanney, Conceptual Cartography and Aesthetics.
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  9. Julia Tanney (2012). Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
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  10. Julia Tanney, Foreword.
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  11. Julia Tanney (2009). Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 94--111.
    forthcoming in New Essays on the Explanation of Action Abstract Philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein rejected the idea that the explanatory power of our ordinary interpretive practices is to be found in law-governed, causal relations between items to which our everyday mental terms allegedly refer. Wittgenstein and those he inspired pointed to differences between the explanations provided by the ordinary employment of mental expressions and the style of causal explanation characteristic of the hard sciences. I believe, however, that the particular non-causalism (...)
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  12. Julia Tanney (2009). Real Rules. Synthese 171 (3):499 - 507.
    Wright is correct in surmising that Wittgenstein's refusal to be drawn into the metaphysical and epistemological questions that his own discussion of rules allegedly raises results from his rejection of the assumptions that pit the Platonist against the communitarian. This paper shows why the entire idea (which continues to dazzle philosophers)—that in speaking a language or in engaging in other normative practices we are operating a calculus according to strict rules—has to be rejected. It results, in part, from the conflation (...)
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  13. Julia Tanney, Gilbert Ryle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Although Gilbert Ryle published on a wide range of topics in philosophy (notably in the history of philosophy and in philosophy of language), including a series of lectures centred on philosophical dilemmas, a series of articles on the concept of thinking, and a book on Plato, The Concept of Mind remains his best known and most important work. Through this work, Ryle is thought to have accomplished two major tasks. First, he was seen to have put the final nail in (...)
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  14. Julia Tanney (2005). Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind. Ratio 18 (3):338-351.
    i> This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non- theoretical) judgments about a person.
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  15. Julia Tanney (2005). The Myths We Live By. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):268-269.
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  16. Julia Tanney, Une Cartographie des Concepts Mentaux'.
    Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind was published over 50 years ago to wide acclaim, but his legacy has been tempered because of important misconceptions, including a) that contemporary philosophy has sufficiently absorbed what is valuable about his contribution; b) that he is responsible for propounding a version of philosophical behaviourism; and c) that Ryle travels down a substantially different philosophical track from that of Wittgenstein. This critical introduction sets out to overturn these misconceptions. It is extremely rare for a (...)
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  17. Julia Tanney (2004). On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):173-186.
    In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude (...)
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  18. Julia Tanney, Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Conceptual Elucidation.
    Almost a half century after the publication of the Philosophical Investigations, it seems important to ask why Wittgenstein"s ideas have had so little impact on contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. A clue can be discerned by what Georges Rey says in the introduction to his book on contemporary philosophy of mind. Rey announces at the outset to his readers that his treatment of the mind aspires to be continuous with science, not with literature. He explains that there is (...)
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  19. Julia Tanney (2002). Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. 37-55.
    1. Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the ‘analytic’ tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently existing, determinate items (states, events, dispositions or relations) that are the truth-conferrers of our ascriptions of mental predicates.[1] The view is also a cognitivist one insofar as it holds that when we correctly ascribe such a predicate to an individual the correctness consists in (...)
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  20. Julia Tanney (2000). Playing the Rule-Following Game. Philosophy 75 (292):203-224.
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  21. Julia Tanney (1999). Normativity and Judgment II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):45-61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  22. Julia Tanney (1999). Normativity and Judgement: Julia Tanney. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):45–61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  23. Julia Tanney (1999). Normativity and Judgement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17 - 61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  24. Julia Tanney (1998). How to Resist Mental Representations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):264-278.
    Reviews the book 'The Mechanical Mind - A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation,' by Tim Cranes.
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  25. Julia Tanney (1996). A Constructivist Picture of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy 71 (277):4-5.
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  26. Julia Tanney (1995). De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):237 - 258.
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  27. Julia Tanney (1995). Why Reasons May Not Be Causes. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.
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  28. Julia Tanney (1994). Wittgenstein's Centenary Essays. History of European Ideas 18 (6):970-973.
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